127 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 1997), 96-2305, Belhomme v. Widnall
| Citation | 127 F.3d 1214 |
| Party Name | , 97 CJ C.A.R. 2354 Renaud BELHOMME, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sheila WIDNALL, Secretary of the Department of the Air Force, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Case Date | October 14, 1997 |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
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Submitted on the briefs: [*]
Renaud Belhomme, Pro Se.
John J. Kelly, United States Attorney and Phyllis A. Dow, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before BRORBY, EBEL and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
The appellant challenges the dismissal of his statutory and constitutional claims arising out of his termination from a civilian position with the Air Force at Kirtland Air Force Base. Although we differ in some respects from the district court's rationale, we affirm the district court's judgment on all of the appellant's claims: the appellant's individual claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (as amended), was time-barred under the regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); his class-action claim was not presented to the EEOC; and his other statutory and constitutional claims either fail to state a claim as a matter of law or are preempted by provisions of Title VII.
I.
Because the sequence and timing of events in this case controls the outcome, we must itemize the chronology of the case in particular detail. Renaud Belhomme, a black of Haitian national origin, was hired by the Air Force to work as a front desk clerk in the billeting office at Kirtland Air Force Base. On December 16, 1988, less than two months after Mr. Belhomme began work, the Air Force fired him for insubordination. The record reflects that this insubordination consisted of Mr. Belhomme's failure to answer the phone when directed to do so, and his failure to come to his supervisor's office promptly upon being requested to do so, considered against a backdrop of other complaints against Mr. Belhomme.
Mr. Belhomme complained that his firing actually resulted from his supervisor's racial and national-origin discrimination. An internal investigation by the Air Force Civilian Appellate Review Agency confirmed Mr. Belhomme's characterization of his supervisor as rude and abrasive, and that Mr. Belhomme had been criticized for his French Caribbean accent. The investigation concluded, however, that Mr. Belhomme's termination was not motivated by illegal discrimination.
On June 21, 1991, the Air Force issued its proposed determination of no illegal discrimination in Mr. Belhomme's case. Mr. Belhomme requested a hearing, which was held before an administrative law judge of the EEOC on August 16, 1991. The judge issued her bench decision by telephone on August 27, 1991, and on December 13, 1991, the Air Force adopted her conclusion, that Mr. Belhomme was not the victim of illegal discrimination, as its final agency action. On January 6, 1992, Mr. Belhomme appealed the Air Force's decision to the EEOC.
The EEOC issued its decision affirming the Air Force's conclusions on August 13, 1992. The notice informed Mr. Belhomme that he had thirty days from his receipt of the decision either to file a civil action in district court or to file a request under the Commission's regulations to reopen the case. Mr. Belhomme received his copy of the decision by certified mail on August 17, 1992, giving him until September 16, 1992, to respond. Two days after this deadline, on September 18, 1992, Mr. Belhomme filed a petition to reopen the EEOC case. On April 29, 1993, the Commission denied the petition as untimely. In this denial, the commission again informed Mr. Belhomme that he had a right to file a civil action in district court to challenge the underlying Air Force decision within thirty days.
Thirty-five days later, on June 2, 1993, Mr. Belhomme filed this action, denominated as a class action, alleging violations of his rights under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16; the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and the First,
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Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The district court converted the motion of the Secretary of the Air Force for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment and granted judgment in favor of the Secretary. The court found that Mr. Belhomme had not filed his petition to reopen the EEOC case within the time set by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), and that his claim for class-action status was barred because he failed to present it to the EEOC. The court did not explicitly address Mr. Belhomme's constitutional or other statutory claims.
II.
We review a district court's grant or denial of summary judgment de novo applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1234-35 (10th Cir.1997). When applying this standard, we examine the factual record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See id. In this case, because the party opposing summary judgment appears pro se, we will interpret his pleadings generously. See Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir.1996).
A federal employee who claims that he was the victim of illegal employment discrimination may bring a claim in district court under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). As a prerequisite to his suit, 1 the federal employee must file an administrative complaint concerning his allegations, and he may not bring his suit more than ninety days after receiving a final decision from either his employing agency or from the EEOC. See id. 2 Under the EEOC's administrative rules, a complainant may file a petition to reopen his case within thirty days of receiving the EEOC's final action. See 29 C.F.R....
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