King Mfg. v. Meadows

Decision Date01 November 2005
Docket NumberNo. 100,725.,100,725.
Citation127 P.3d 584,2005 OK 78
PartiesKING MANUFACTURING, and Compsource Oklahoma, Petitioners, v. Darrell MEADOWS, and The Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals, Division III Certiorari Previously Granted; Honorable Richard L. Blanchard, Workers' Compensation Judge.

¶ 0 The respondent, Darrell Meadows (employee) was injured in 1992 and awarded permanent partial disability as a result of the work-related injury. By 1996, the employee's condition had deteriorated and he sought additional benefits due to the change in condition. The workers' compensation court initially denied benefits, determining that the total sum of permanent partial disability was limited to 100% under the law in effect when the change in condition was discovered. A three-judge panel reversed the workers' compensation court and ordered the trial court to apply the law in effect at the time of the initial injury, which did not impose a 100% limit. Subsequently, the trial judge, Honorable Richard L. Blanchard, awarded the employee additional compensation for his impairment based upon the change of condition. The employer appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals vacated and remanded. We hold that: 1) under the facts presented, an award of permanent disability for a change in condition is governed by the statutory language in effect at the time of the initial injury; and 2) appeal related attorney fees are not warranted.

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED.

Donald A. Bullard, Oklahoma City, OK, for Petitioners.

Joe Farnan Purcell, Oklahoma, Barry K. Roberts, Norman, OK, for Respondents.

KAUGER, J.

¶ 1 The primary issue presented is whether a workers compensation award for a change in condition is subject to statutory limits in effect at the time of the initial injury or when the change in condition is discovered. Title 85 O.S. Supp.1995 § 22(7),1 the statute in effect when the change in condition in the present cause was discovered, limits the sum of all permanent partial disability awards to 100% for an individual. The 100% limits are absent from the version of § 22(7), which was in effect at the time of the initial injury.2 We are also asked to determine whether appeal-related attorney fees should be awarded because the appeal was frivolous.

¶ 2 We hold that: 1) an award of permanent disability for a change in condition is governed by the statutory language in effect at the time of the initial injury; and 2) appeal-related attorney fees are not warranted.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

¶ 3 On May 8, 1992, the respondent, Darrell Meadows (employee) was injured in a work related accident while working for King Manufacturing (employer) in Duncan, Oklahoma. The employee injured his arm, shoulders, chest, neck, and leg, when he and two co-workers attempted to carry a 600 pound pipe.

¶ 4 On February 1, 1995, the workers compensation court determined that the employee had sustained a 57% permanent partial disability3 to the body as a whole, and that impairment was added to previously-adjudicated impairments of 59% resulting in a total sum of 116%.4 On July 27, 1995, the workers compensation court awarded the employee permanent total disability against the Special Indemnity Fund.5

¶ 5 By June 4, 1996, the employee became aware that his condition had deteriorated. Consequently, on September 13, 1996, he filed a motion, requesting additional benefits due to the change in condition. Various hearings and orders6 culminated in an order from the workers' compensation court filed September 10, 2003, in which the employee's request for a determination of additional impairment was denied. The court held that: 1) the law governing reopening of claims for a change in condition is the law in effect when a change in condition is discovered, rather than the law in effect at the time of the original injury or at the time of the original award; and 2) pursuant to the law in effect when the change in condition was discovered, 85 O.S. Supp.1995 § 22(7),7 the sum of all of the employee's permanent partial disability awards could not exceed 100%.

¶ 6 On December 1, 2003, a three-judge panel of the workers' compensation court reversed the trial court and ordered it to apply the law in effect at the time of the original injury without regard to the 100% limit. On May 5, 2004, the workers' compensation court awarded the employee additional compensation for impairment based upon the change of condition.8 The employer appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals vacated and reversed the trial court. We granted certiorari on June 20, 2005.

I.

¶ 7 AN AWARD OF PERMANENT DISABILITY FOR A CHANGE IN CONDITION IS GOVERNED BY THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL INJURY.

¶ 8 The employer argues that the statutory limits in effect at the time the employee's change in condition is discovered apply, and that the permanent partial disability award must be limited to a total of 100%. It finds support in two non-precedential opinions9 released for publication by the Court of Civil Appeals, Cable Vision of Muskogee v. Tracy, 1994 OK CIV APP 57, 876 P.2d 743 and Wolfenbarger v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1990 OK CIV APP 65, 798 P.2d 1093.10

¶ 9 The employee insists that, because the amount of benefits to which he is entitled affects a substantive right, the statute in effect at the time of his original injury governs. He contends that Cable Vision and Wolfenbarger are factually distinguishable because they involve the procedural question of the timeliness of a motion to reopen, rather than the substantive question of the amount of benefits a claimant is entitled to receive. We agree.

¶ 10 Both Cable Vision of Muskogee v. Tracy, supra, and Wolfenbarger v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, involved the reopening of a workers' compensation claim based on a change of condition and a change in the applicable statute of limitations, 85 O.S.1991 § 43,11 subsequent to the claimants' initial injuries. In discussing which version of the statute applied, the appellate court held, in both cases, that the law governing the timeliness of reopening a claim for change of condition is the law in effect at the time of the change of condition for the worse, rather than the law in effect at the time of the injury or the law in effect at the time of the original award. Cable Vision and Wolfenbarger are distinguishable from the situation presented here. They deal with the timeliness of a filed motion to reopen a claim and they address the statute of limitations to be applied. Both Cable Vision and Wolfenbarger concerned the procedural question of the timeliness of a motion to reopen. Here, the issue concerns the substantive question of the amount of benefits a claimant is entitled to receive.12

¶ 11 The general rule is that the law in effect at the time of an employee's injury controls in workers' compensation matters.13 A compensation claim is controlled by the laws in existence at the time of injury and not by laws enacted thereafter.14 The right of an employee to compensation arises from the contractual relationship existing between the employee and the employer on the date of injury. The statutes then in force form a part of the contract and determine the substantive rights and obligations of the parties.15 No subsequent amendment can operate retrospectively to affect in any way the rights and obligations which are fixed.16

¶ 12 In Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2003 OK 81, 78 P.3d 542, the Court discussed the impact of after-enacted legislative changes to an employee's compensation rights and benefits. Cole involved a claimant whose statutorily allowed time-span to request a hearing for an adjudication of the workers' compensation claim was shortened during the pendency of the claim.17 The Court noted that statutes which relate solely to remedies and affect only modes of procedure are generally held to operate retroactively and apply to pending proceedings. However, statutes which affect a parties' substantive rights and liabilities are shielded from amendatory change by the terms of the Okla. Const. Art. 5, § 54.18

¶ 13 The Court went on to recognize that after-enacted legislation that increases or diminishes the amount of recoverable compensation or alters the elements of the claim or defense by imposition of new conditions affects the parties' substantive rights and liabilities. Retroactive application of an amendment affecting such matured rights would materially abridge an employee's right to press for unrecovered elements of a claim.

¶ 14 Although Cole dealt with a different statute than the one at issue in the present cause, the same rationale applies where a change in the statute clearly affects employees' substantive rights regarding the amount of the recoverable compensation. This rationale is further illustrated in Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, 12 P.3d 452, where 85 O.S. Supp.1995 § 22(7)19 was upheld against a worker's claim that the provision violated the federal equal protection clause and the state constitutional right for remedy guarantee.

¶ 15 The Rivas claimant had previous permanent partial disability adjudications which occurred prior to the 1995 change totaling 99.85%. In 1997, the claimant sustained a new work-related injury to his shoulder. The court recognized that § 22(7) did not disturb any of the worker's existing or vested rights because his cause could not be maintained prior to the date of injury in 1997. Had the worker in Rivas been injured before the statutory amendment to § 22(7), he would have been entitled to the remedy under the pre-1995 statute.

¶ 16 Here, the provisions of 85 O.S.1991 § 22(7)20 afforded the employee matured rights to permanent partial disability awards which remain unaffected by subsequent amendments limiting the amount of compensation recoverable. Accordingly, we hold that under the...

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