State v. Stanley
| Decision Date | 26 March 1925 |
| Docket Number | 11725. |
| Citation | 127 S.E. 574,131 S.C. 513 |
| Parties | STATE v. STANLEY. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Horry County; John S Wilson, Judge.
Mort R Stanley was convicted of violating an act regulating trapping, shipping, or transportation of furs and hides, and he appeals. Reversed.
Sherwood & McMillan, of Conway, for appellant.
L. M Gasque, Sol., of Marion, and M. A. Wright, of Conway, for the State.
W. C COTHRAN, A. A. J.
The defendant appellant was convicted by a jury of Horry county in March, 1924, of violating the provisions of an act of the General Assembly of 1923 entitled "An act to provide regulations for trapping, shipping or transporting furs, pelts, skins and hides * * * and to prescribe penalties."
The indictment was as follows:
Upon the call of the case for trial a motion to quash the indictment was made upon the following grounds:
(1) That the indictment is void in that it fails to allege the kind of hides or furs transported.
(2) That section 2 of an act to provide regulations for trapping, etc., Acts 1923, p. 108, does not make the offense charged in the indictment a crime. For that reason this court is without jurisdiction, under sections 1 and 18 of article 5 of the Constitution.
(3) That the act upon which indictment is based is a revenue measure providing for the raising and distribution of a license tax, and is in violation of section 15 of article 3 of the Constitution of 1895, in that the bill which was afterwards enacted into an act originated in the Senate and not in the House of Representatives.
(4) That the act upon which the indictment is based is unconstitutional in that it relates to more than one subject, in violation of section 17 of article 3 of the Constitution.
(5) That the act upon which the indictment is based is unconstitutional in that the subject-matter of the act is not expressed in its title, in violation of section 17 of article 3 of the Constitution.
These grounds of the motion will be considered in inverse order.
It appears that the subject-matter of the act is clearly apparent from a most casual reading of the title. It is to regulate the trapping, shipping, or transporting of furs. To regulate the trapping, a closed season was provided, and for regulating the shipping and transporting, tags were to be bought from the game warden. It is unreasonable to expect the title to contain all of the provisions of the act. Robinson v. Columbia, 116 S.C. 193, 107 S.E. 476.
Nor do we see where the act is unconstitutional because relating to two subjects. The fixing of a closed season and the requirement for tags are both directly connected with the protection of the fur bearer and his necessary natural product, the fur.
The ground that it was a revenue measure originating in the Senate cannot be sustained. The act provides for penalties, not revenues. It is true that one-half of the fines shall go to the game protection fund and one-half to the county school fund of the county where the penalty was paid, but this is not sufficient to make this act a revenue measure. The law is very correctly stated in Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State, 68 Tex. 526, 4 S.W. 865, as follows:
The Constitution "providing that revenue bills shall originate in the House of Representatives only applies to bills to levy Taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and not to bills for other purposes, which may incidentally raise revenue." United States v. James, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 464, 13 Blatchf. 207; Dundee Mortg. Trust Inv. Co. v. Parrish (C. C.) 24 F. 197; Perry County v. Selma, M. & M. R. Co., 58 Ala. 546; Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 289; Harper v. Commissioners, 23 Ga. 566.
That the offense charged in the indictment was not a crime under the statute, although abandoned by the appellant in his printed argument, will be referred to later in this opinion.
The first ground of the motion to quash was that the indictment failed to allege the kinds of furs or hides transported. By reference to the indictment above set forth, it is seen that it was most meager and incomplete in its charge against the defendant. It must be borne in mind that all furs and hides were not included in the act; hence the appellant was entitled to be "fully informed," as provided in the Constitution, of the nature of the alleged offense. The act mentions hides of opossum, raccoon, otter, muskrat, red fox, gray fox, mink, and skunk. The inclusion of these necessarily excludes all others not mentioned in the act. All others are excepted. It was therefore necessary for the indictment to show that it applied to some or all of those furs, pelts, hides, or skins mentioned in the act. State v. Freeland, 106 S.C. 220, 91 S.E. 3.
A few of the other authorities relating to the necessity for full allegations in indictments will be cited.
In 31 C.J. 704, the rule is thus expressed:
"Either the letter or the substance of the Statute defining the offense must be followed, it being held in some cases in general terms that an indictment for a crime unknown at the common law must follow the statute or that the precise words of the Statute must be employed"--citing cases from practically every state in the Union, together with State v. Henderson, 30 S.C. Law (1 Rich.) 179; State v. Cheatwood, 20 S.C. Law (2 Hill) 459, and State v. Padgett, 18 S.C. 317.
The indictment does say that the hides did not have the tags "as required by law," but this was not a sufficient compliance with the rule requiring the indictment to state fully the facts set forth in the statute. In 31 C.J. 694, it is said:
"The omission of...
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