U.S. v. Williams
| Decision Date | 30 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-2557,96-2557 |
| Citation | 128 F.3d 1128 |
| Parties | 47 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1401 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dennis J. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Richard H. Lloyd (argued), Office of the United States Attorney, Criminal Division, Fairview Heights, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Eric W. Butts (argued), St. Louis, MO, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.
A jury found Dennis Williams guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced him as an Armed Career Criminal. Williams raises three challenges to his conviction and one to his sentence. We reject them all.
On March 11, 1995, Dennis Williams ("Williams") and his girlfriend Darcell Franklin ("Darcell") were shopping at the St. Clair Mall in Fairview Heights, Illinois. Williams drew the attention of other shoppers in the parking lot because he had somehow locked himself inside Darcell's car and was calling for help. Shoppers brought Williams' plight to the attention of mall security, who helped him out of the car and then called the Fairview Heights Police Department to report the odd incident.
A Fairview Heights police officer checked Darcell's license plate against their computer files and found that the plates were suspended and expired. The expired plates, however, bore a current registration sticker in Williams' name. After learning of an outstanding warrant for Williams' arrest, the officer followed Williams and Darcell out of the parking lot and pulled them over. He arrested Williams immediately on the outstanding warrant. A search of the car revealed two guns, prompting police to arrest Darcell as well.
Police questioned Williams briefly en route to the station, to no avail. They booked Williams and Darcell and placed them in separate cells. Some time later, around 1:00 a.m., police questioned Williams again. He admitted owning one of the guns. There is no dispute that police properly gave Williams his Miranda warnings.
On March 12, Darcell telephoned her mother, Alaina Franklin ("Alaina"), from the police station. Darcell allegedly told her that Williams was not the owner of the guns, but he claimed ownership of them in order to protect Darcell. Presumably Darcell needed Williams' protection since Darcell had no permit to carry guns and the serial number on one of the guns was scratched off. Darcell also telephoned her friend, Valerie Johnson ("Johnson"). She allegedly restated the story to Johnson, i.e. that Williams had claimed the guns in order to protect her.
Williams was a heroin addict with a habit costing $200-400 per day. While he sat in jail after his arrest, he began to suffer withdrawal symptoms. Withdrawal can, occasionally, be life threatening. On March 12, 1995, one day after Williams' arrest, a county doctor administered 60 mg of phenobarbital to counteract the withdrawal effects. Williams took two more 30 mg doses sometime on March 13.
On March 13 at around 1:00 p.m., Fairview Heights police officers and an agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms interviewed Williams. Williams made an oral statement which the ATF agent transcribed. In his statement Williams admitted owning one of the guns. Later, the ATF agent and police officers testified that Williams did not seem ill or out of sorts. One officer testified that he seemed a bit "jumpy," but no more than an average criminal defendant might seem during an interview with police.
Williams was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Before trial, the defense attempted to suppress Williams' statements on the ground that Williams' drug use, withdrawal, or use of phenobarbital made his statements involuntary. The court refused to suppress that evidence. At trial, Williams called Johnson and Alaina to testify. They would have testified that Darcell called them from jail and told them that the guns were not actually Williams', but the district court sustained the prosecution's hearsay objections. Williams argued at trial that Congress lacks the authority to regulate firearms. The district court rejected this argument. The jury found Williams guilty. Because Williams had three prior felony convictions, the district court sentenced Williams as an Armed Career Criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
Williams raises four arguments on appeal. First, he claims that the district court erred in refusing to suppress his statements. Second, he claims that the district court should have allowed Johnson and Alaina to testify to the substance of their conversations with Darcell. Third, Williams reasserts his position that Congress lacks the authority to regulate firearms. Finally, he submits for the first time that one of his convictions should not have been included in the § 924 calculation because his civil rights were restored after he served his sentence for that conviction. We address Williams' four claims in turn.
The district court held a suppression hearing to decide whether to admit Williams' confession. After hearing the evidence, the district court determined that the confession was voluntary, and thus admitted it into evidence. We review the ultimate question of whether the confession was voluntary de novo, see United States v. D.F., 115 F.3d 413, 419 (7th Cir.1997), but we review the district court's determination of the facts for clear error, id.
A trial court may admit a confession into evidence only if the accused made it voluntarily. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166, 107 S.Ct. 515, 521, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86, 56 S.Ct. 461, 464-65, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936). Williams argues that his confession was not voluntary because the phenobarbital in his system acted as a "truth serum." He relies on Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992), for the proposition that a confession obtained through the use of truth serum is involuntary. In Townsend, the defendant received an injection of phenobarbital mixed with hyoscine. See id. He produced evidence that he had no memory of confessing. Rather, he only remembered flickering lights, someone telling him to keep his head up, and an officer telling him that he had confessed to murder. See id. at 300-01, 83 S.Ct. at 750-51. A medical expert testified that hyoscine acts as a truth serum, and phenobarbital could enhance the effect. See id. The Supreme Court held that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a situation in which a confession would be less the product of a free intellect, less voluntary, than when brought about by a drug having the effect of a 'truth serum.' " Id. at 307-08, 83 S.Ct. at 754. Since the state court did not make a factual finding that the confession was voluntary before admitting it into evidence, the Court remanded the case for a new suppression hearing. See id. at 298, 83 S.Ct. at 749-50.
In the case at hand, the government produced evidence that when Williams made his first statement, he was not behaving unusually. Williams' expert testified that after six hours without heroin, an addict would start to withdraw, exhibiting symptoms such as diarrhea, intense nausea, yawning, and goose pimples. Williams produced evidence that at that questioning, which took place around 1:00 a.m., he was sleepy.
Williams took phenobarbital between his first statement and his March 13 statement. Police testified that at the time of his March 13 statement, Williams said he had not slept well, but he was not exhibiting any strange body movements. He appeared no different then he did at the time he made his first statement, before having taken any phenobarbital. He was a little bit "jumpy," but enunciated clearly, did not sweat, and did not act unusually. Williams' expert testified that phenobarbital can act to reduce inhibitions.
The district court announced its ruling orally after hearing the evidence. The court found that the defendant's sleepiness at the first statement was attributable to the time of day and not to narcotics use, stating that "I don't think that proves that his statement was involuntary and there is no other evidence before the Court at this time of the defendant's condition at that time other than that offered by the Government that he exhibited no signs of addiction." Tr. of Suppression Hr'g at 54. The district court found that the defendant exhibited some withdrawal symptoms before his March 13 interview, but showed no effects from taking phenobarbital. Indeed, the district court found that
there is nothing before the Court from any witnesses or even from the interview of the correctional officers at the county jail, from anyone, that the defendant exhibited any symptoms associated with the administering of the phenobarbital. So absent that, the Court cannot leap to the conclusion that he exhibited the tendency to have a loosened tongue caused by the use of this drug.
We find no reason to disturb the district court's findings. The district court listened to the evidence presented and made findings in light of and relying on that evidence.
As to the ultimate question of whether the confession was voluntary, Williams argues that the district court failed to consider the holding of Townsend v. Sain, that a confession given as a result of tongue-loosening drugs is involuntary. In light of the district court's finding that Williams' tongue was not loosened by the phenobarbital, we agree with the district court that his confession was not, at least for that reason, involuntary. Townsend did not announce a blanket rule that all defendants who confess after taking narcotics have confessed involuntarily. Rather, Townsend held that a...
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