Pickett v. RTS Helicopter
| Decision Date | 26 November 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-31195,96-31195 |
| Citation | 128 F.3d 925 |
| Parties | Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,192 Margie A. PICKETT; Terry A. Pound; Angenette Mullet; Michael Brent Pickett, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RTS HELICOPTER, et al., Defendants, PETROLEUM HELICOPTERS, INC., Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant, v. RTS HELICOPTER LEASING CORPORATION; RTS Capital Services Incorporated, Defendant Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellees Appellants, Pacific Scientific Company, Defendant Third Party Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Jennings B. Jones, Jr., Jennifer Jones Bercier, Jones Law Firm, Cameron, LA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Kenneth H. Laborde, Pulaski, Gieger & Laborde, New Orleans, LA, for RTS Helicopter
Leasing Corporation and RTS Capital Services, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
Richard Kearney Christovich, Kevin Richard Tully, Christovich & Kearney, New Orleans, LA, for Pacific Scientific Company, Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
Before WISDOM, JOLLY and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
This appeal arises from a products liability action concerning a helicopter seat belt. It involves interpretations of both the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA"), La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 9:2800.51 et seq. (West 1991), and Louisiana Civil Code Article 2317, La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 2317 (West 1979). Margie A. Pickett, Terry A. Pound, Angenette Mullet, and Michael Brent Pickett, widow and children of the helicopter pilot killed by the failure of the seat belt (the "Picketts"), and Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., his employer ("PHI"), assert that Pacific Scientific Company, the manufacturer of the seat belt ("PSC"), is liable under the LPLA for making an unreasonably dangerous product. They argue that the seat belt was defective because it could be taken apart and reassembled in a way that made it likely to fail in a crash, and that there was no adequate warning of this characteristic. The Picketts further assert that RTS Helicopter Leasing Corporation, the owner of the helicopter, and RTS Capital Services, Inc., its parent company (collectively, "RTS"), are strictly liable under Article 2317 as the owners of an unreasonably dangerous thing. The district court granted both PSC's and RTS's motions for summary judgment. We affirm.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in the Picketts' favor, 1 the facts are the following. On November 19, 1990, a helicopter owned by RTS and leased to PHI crashed shortly after takeoff in Cameron, Louisiana. The pilot, Joseph Pickett, was fatally injured when his seat belt failed to restrain him and he was flung into the rotor. Had it operated correctly, the seat belt might well have saved his life, as the accident was not necessarily fatal.
The crash itself was caused by a PHI mechanic who removed the wrong control tube from the helicopter during routine maintenance, resulting in its total loss of cyclic control immediately after take-off. During the resulting crash, the seat belt failed because one of its components, the "take-up bar," had been at some point removed and reinserted upside down. On this particular belt, the take-up bar is the part of the cinching mechanism that keeps the belt tight after adjustment. Because the take-up bar was upside down at the time of the crash, the load placed on the seat belt was born by the thin, flat part of the bar, instead of the thick, round portion. The bar slipped, allowing the seat belt to come undone, just when it was most needed. This incorrect configuration of the take-up bar was possible because the bar was asymmetric (i.e., it had a thin, flat half and a thick, round half) and the seat belt was capable of disassembly. At the time of manufacture of the seat belt, there existed both symmetric designs that could not be incorrectly reassembled in this way, and other designs that could not be disassembled at all.
The seat belt in question had been originally manufactured in 1971 by PSC. It was not a part of the helicopter's original equipment, but had been installed as a replacement sometime prior to 1983. There is no evidence that the take-up bar was upside down at any time prior to 1983. In May of 1983, the seat belt was refurbished by Aircraft Belts, Inc. They rewebbed the belt straps, disassembled and cleaned the metal parts, including the take-up bar, and then reassembled and relaced the belt. Obviously, the most likely explanation for the take-up bar's being upside down at the time of the crash is that the seat belt was reassembled incorrectly by Aircraft Belts. 2 There is not, however, any direct evidence of this. Whether a jury could reasonably infer that this is what happened is a close question that we need not reach. For purposes of argument, we will assume that this was the cause of the take-up bar's incorrect configuration.
PSC was aware that the take-up bar could be positioned upside down. It issued two written warnings ("Safety Bulletins"), one dated January 11, 1972, and one dated May 30, 1983, that clearly described the problem, the potential danger, and the solution with easy to understand diagrams. There is no dispute that the warnings would have been effective to avoid the incorrect configuration of the take-up bar in the hands of someone performing a reassembly of the seat belt. There is also no dispute that the warnings were in the possession of Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company ("Tenneco"), the owner of the helicopter from 1976 to November of 1989, as well as PHI, the lessee after November of 1989, at all relevant times.
After the accident, the Picketts brought suit against a wide variety of parties in Louisiana state court, including the manufacturer of the helicopter, PSC, Aircraft Belts, RTS, and PHI. The case was removed to federal district court on diversity grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. After being dismissed as a defendant, PHI intervened as a plaintiff to recover what it had already paid to the Picketts in compensation, should the Picketts' claims succeed. RTS crossclaimed against PSC. Prior to the instant motions for summary judgment, all original defendants other than PSC and RTS had been dismissed for one reason or another. The Picketts and PHI now appeal the summary judgments entered in favor of PSC and RTS. RTS makes a protective appeal of its crossclaim against PSC.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment has been presented, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. In examining the facts, we draw "all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil and Chemical Workers Union, 77 F.3d 850, 853 (5th Cir.1996). We are also mindful, however, of the underlying standards and burdens of proof. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The pivotal question will always be whether the non-moving party has produced sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could find for him at a trial on the merits.
With regard to the Picketts' LPLA claims against PSC, the sole question before us is whether the seat belt's capability of disassembly and incorrect reassembly was a proximate cause of Mr. Pickett's death. Based on our precedent of Graham v. Amoco Oil Co., 21 F.3d 643 (5th Cir.1994), we conclude that it was not.
In order to establish manufacturer's liability under the LPLA, a claimant must show (1) damage, that (2) was proximately caused by (3) a characteristic of an unreasonably dangerous product during (4) a reasonably anticipated use of that product. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 9:2800.54 (West 1991). In order for a product to be unreasonably dangerous, it must either: (a) be defective in construction, (b) be defective in design, (c) have an inadequate warning, or (d) fail to conform to an express warranty. Id.
The Picketts assert claims under both the defective design and inadequate warning prongs of the LPLA. First, the Picketts argue that the seat belt was defective in design because it could be disassembled and incorrectly reassembled in a way that made it likely to fail in a crash. Under their reasoning, this capability of misassembly was the characteristic of the seat belt that caused the death of their husband and father. Because there existed alternate designs at the time of manufacture that did not have this characteristic, they conclude that the design in question was defective. Alternately, the Picketts argue that the seat belt was unreasonably dangerous because there was no adequate warning of the capability of misassembly.
Regardless of which theory of liability we consider, under the LPLA the Picketts must also establish that the actual failure of the seat belt (and thus Mr. Pickett's death) was proximately caused by the capability of misassembly. Although not in the LPLA context, we had occasion to consider the definition of proximate cause under Louisiana law in our decision of Graham v. Amoco Oil Co., 21 F.3d 643 (5th Cir.1994). There, we held that proximate cause is " 'any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which the result would not have occurred.' " Id. at 648-49 (quoting Sutton v. Duplessis, 584 So.2d 362, 365 (La.Ct.App.1991)). More specifically, where "an accident results from two negligent acts, 'one more remote and one an intervening cause, the presence of the intervening cause prevents a finding of liability on the one responsible for the more remote cause.' " Id.
Applying Graham, it is clear that the failure of the seat belt in this case was not proximately caused by the mere capability of misassembly inherent in its design. Actual failure simply could not have occurred without actual negligent misassembly, here, presumably by Aircraft Belts, and...
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