Forgione v. Forgione

• Citation: 162 Conn.App. 1,129 A.3d 766
• Decision Date: 22 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 36991.,36991.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Beatrice FORGIONE v. Mennato FORGIONE.

162 Conn.App. 1

129 A.3d 766

Beatrice FORGIONE

v.Mennato FORGIONE.

No. 36991.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 8, 2015.

Decided Dec. 22, 2015.

Thomas C.C. Sargent, Westport, for the appellant (defendant).

Norman A. Roberts II, with whom, on the brief, was Tara C. Dugo, for the appellee (plaintiff).

LAVINE, MULLINS and SCHALLER, Js.

MULLINS, J.

In this case, nearly three and one-half years after a judgment of dissolution, the parties entered into a stipulation in which they agreed to permit the trial court to open the dissolution judgment for the limited purpose of resolving "all issues of a financial nature, including the division of assets, alimony and support, and liabilities, but not as to custody or parenting."¹ Pursuant to that stipulation, the trial court opened the judgment and reissued financial orders. The defendant, Mennato Forgione, appeals from the judgment of the trial court reissuing those financial orders. We conclude that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to open the judgment as to the division of the parties' assets in the absence of a finding or concession of fraud. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the matter with direction to restore to the docket the motion to open filed by the plaintiff, Beatrice Forgione.

The following facts inform our review. A judgment dissolving the marriage of the parties was rendered on August 26, 2009. The court incorporated into its judgment the parties' settlement agreement resolving the issues of custody, alimony, and property distribution.

Approximately three and one-half years later, on March 12, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion to open the judgment as to the financial issues on the ground that the judgment had been procured by fraud.

Specifically, she alleged that the defendant intentionally had failed to disclose that he had received $90,000 in commissions just weeks before the judgment of dissolution was rendered. On May 30, 2012, the parties entered a postjudgment stipulation, agreeing to the opening of the judgment for the limited purpose of redetermining all financial matters. The court, Emons, J., approved the stipulation, opened the judgment, and assigned the matter for trial.

Following the conclusion of the trial, the court, Schofield, J., on November 6, 2013, issued a written memorandum of decision reissuing the financial orders from the dissolution judgment, including reallocating the parties' assets.² The defendant appealed from the court's judgment, claiming that the court had erred in its method of redividing the parties' financial assets.

After the matter was briefed and argued before this court, we ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefs addressed to the following:

"1. In light of General Statutes § 46a–86 (a), whether the trial court, approximately three and one-half years after judgment was rendered, had subject matter jurisdiction to open the judgment of dissolution for the purpose of redetermining and reissuing financial orders, including property distribution orders, on the basis of a stipulation of the parties, made without a finding or concession of fraud. See Sousa v. Sousa, 157 Conn.App. 587, cert. granted, 317 Conn. 917, (2015), and the cases cited therein.

"2. If this court determines that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant the plaintiff's motion to open on the basis of the parties' stipulation, what should this court order on remand."

In his supplemental brief, the defendant asserts that the trial court had no jurisdiction to open the judgment by stipulation because he did not concede that fraud had been committed. Rather, he contends that his concession was limited to permitting the court simply to open the judgment and redetermine the financial issues after a hearing.

On the other hand, in her supplemental brief, the plaintiff asserts that the stipulation itself was a concession by the defendant that he committed fraud in procuring the financial orders in the original dissolution judgment. In the alternative, she argues that, if we do not agree that the stipulation was a concession of fraud, the judgment must be vacated, and her motion to open must be restored to the docket.

We conclude that the parties' stipulation was not a concession of fraud. Accordingly, we conclude that the court was without jurisdiction to open the judgment to reallocate the parties' financial assets on the basis of that stipulation.

"[A] stipulation is considered a contract.... Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity.... Moreover, the mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ahmadi v. Ahmadi, 294 Conn. 384, 390–91, 985 A.2d 319 (2009).

On May 30, 2012, the parties entered a postjudgment stipulation that stated: "1. The plaintiff's motion to [open] may be granted by agreement as and for all issues of a financial nature, including the division of assets, alimony and support, and liabilities, but not as to custody or parenting. 2. The issue of counsel fees shall be reserved for a later date." Judge Emons approved the stipulation, opened the judgment, and assigned the matter for trial. The plaintiff contends that when the defendant stipulated that the plaintiff's motion "may be granted by agreement," he necessarily was conceding the allegations contained in the motion. We do not agree.

The stipulation specifically states that the parties agree that the motion to open could be granted to permit the court to reconsider the parties' financial matters, including the division of assets. The plain language of the stipulation contains no concession by the defendant that he was agreeing to or conceding the allegations set forth in the motion; rather, he was agreeing that the court could open the dissolution judgment to redetermine the parties' financial matters. See also footnote 2 of this opinion. Accordingly, we conclude that the stipulation was not a concession of fraud by the defendant.

We next consider whether the trial court had jurisdiction to open the judgment on the basis of the parties' stipulation for the limited purpose of determining all financial matters, including property distribution. "[B]ecause [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary.... Buehler v. Buehler, 138 Conn.App. 63, 70, 50 A.3d 372 (2012).

"It is well settled that [c]ourts have no inherent power to transfer property from one spouse to another; instead, that power must rest upon an enabling statute.... The court's authority to transfer property appurtenant to a dissolution proceeding rests on ... [General Statutes] § 46b–81.³ ... Accordingly, the court's authority to divide the personal property of the parties, pursuant to § 46b–81, must be exercised, if at all, at the time that it renders judgment dissolving the marriage.... General Statutes § 46b–86 (a)⁴ deprives the Superior Court of continuing jurisdiction over that portion of a dissolution...