Plyler v. Moore

Decision Date16 October 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-7689,96-7689
Citation129 F.3d 728
PartiesHarry Allen PLYLER, et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. Michael W. MOORE, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

ARGUED: Kenneth Paul Woodington, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, SC, for Appellant. W. Gaston Fairey, Fairey, Parise & Mills, P.A., Columbia, SC, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Charles Molony Condon, Attorney General, Treva Ashworth, Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, SC; Larry C. Batson, General Counsel, South Carolina Department of Corrections, Columbia, SC, for Appellant. Rochelle Romosca McKim, Fairey, Parise & Mills, P.A., Columbia, SC; Elizabeth Alexander, National Prison Project, American Civil Liberties Union, Washington, DC; Stephen B. Bright, Southern Center for Human Rights, Atlanta, GA, for Appellees.

Before RUSSELL and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and OSTEEN, United States District Judge for the Middle District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILKINS wrote the opinion, in which Judge RUSSELL and Judge OSTEEN joined.

OPINION

WILKINS, Circuit Judge:

In 1981, the General Assembly of South Carolina provided for a supervised furlough program for prisoners; however, inmates who had committed specified crimes were excluded from participation in the program. See S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-710 (Law.Co-op.Supp.1981). 1 Two years later, the General Assembly enacted a statute providing for the mandatory release on supervised furlough of all prison inmates serving sentences of less than life imprisonment six months prior to the expiration of their sentences. See S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-720 (Law.Co-op.1989). Although this latter provision referenced § 24-13-710, it did not address specifically whether inmates excluded from participation in the supervised furlough program of § 24-13-710 were also excluded from participation in the mandatory furlough program of § 24-13-720. In 1993, the General Assembly amended § 24-13-720 to incorporate the eligibility criteria contained in § 24-13-710 and to make the program permissive rather than mandatory. See S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-720 (Law.Co-op.Supp.1993).

Considering the relationship between the two statutes, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the exclusions contained in § 24-13-710 did not apply to inmates entitled to mandatory release on furlough under § 24-13-720 as that statute was originally enacted. See Plyler v. Evatt, 313 S.C. 405, 438 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1993) (holding "that the two statutes refer to two different classes of inmates and that the conditions for participation created by [ § 24-13-710] are not implied in [ § 24-13-720]"). The court reasoned that the amendment of § 24-13-720 was not a clarification of the law, but rather constituted a substantive change. See id. The court also concluded in a footnote that application of the amended version of the statute to inmates who were not within six months of the expiration of their sentences at the time of the 1993 amendment did not offend ex post facto principles. See id. at 245 n. 1.

This action subsequently was filed in federal district court by members of the plaintiff class of inmates involved in the state litigation, claiming that application of the 1993 version of § 24-13-720 to prisoners serving sentences of less than life imprisonment for crimes committed between the 1983 enactment of § 24-13-720 and its amendment in 1993 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. 2 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The district court agreed and accordingly enjoined application of the amended statute to the Inmates. The State 3 now appeals that decision, asserting two alternative arguments. First, the State contends that because this litigation essentially amounts to an appeal of the ex post facto ruling of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Plyler, we lack subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Second, the State maintains that application of the amended version of § 24-13-720 to the Inmates does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the furlough program in question is not a part of the Inmates' sentences. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

The "supervised furlough program" allows "carefully screened and selected inmates who have served the mandatory minimum sentence as required by law ... to be released on furlough" subject to "policies, procedures, guidelines, and cooperative agreement[s]" developed by the Department of Corrections and the Parole and Community Corrections Board. S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-710 (Law.Co-op.Supp.1983). The General Assembly later enacted the provision at issue in this case, which provided:

Unless sentenced to life i[m]prisonment, an inmate under the jurisdiction or control of the Department of Corrections shall, within six months of the expiration of his sentence, be placed with the program provided for in § 24-13-710 and shall be subject to every rule, regulation, and condition of such program. No inmate otherwise eligible under the provisions of this section for placement with the program under § 24-13-710 may be so placed unless he has maintained a clear disciplinary record for at least six months prior to eligibility for placement with such program.

S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-720 (Law.Co-op.1989). While § 24-13-710 excludes any inmate who is incarcerated for certain crimes or who has "been committed to the State Department of Corrections with a total sentence of five years or less as the first or second adult commitment for a criminal offense for which the inmate received a sentence of one year or more," S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-710, these limitations were not expressly incorporated in § 24-13-720.

Although the program is termed a "furlough," inmates released under it agree to conditions identical in all material respects to the conditions imposed on parolees concerning, inter alia, residence, employment, use of illegal drugs, and possession of weapons. Inmates who violate these conditions are subject to revocation proceedings before the Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services. Moreover, inmates who participate in the furlough program report to, and are supervised by, state parole officers. 4

In 1993, the General Assembly significantly amended § 24-13-720. The amended statute provides:

Unless sentenced to life imprisonment, an inmate under the jurisdiction or control of the Department of Corrections who has not been convicted of a violent crime may, within six months of the expiration of his sentence, be placed with the program provided for in Section 24-13-710 and is subject to every rule, regulation, and condition of the program. No inmate otherwise eligible under the provisions of this section for placement with the program may be so placed unless he has qualified under the selection criteria and process authorized by the provisions of Section 24-13-710. He must also have maintained a clear disciplinary record for at least six months prior to eligibility for placement with the program.

S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-720 (Law.Co-op.Supp.1993) (emphasis added). 5 Later that year, the Supreme Court of South Carolina issued a decision regarding the scope of § 24-13-720 as it existed prior to the 1993 amendment, holding that the conditions for participation in the furlough program under § 24-13-710 did not apply to inmates entitled to mandatory release on furlough pursuant to § 24-13-720. See Plyler v. Evatt, 313 S.C. 405, 438 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1993). In other words, the court ruled that all inmates serving sentences of less than life imprisonment, including those unable to satisfy the eligibility criteria for the supervised furlough program of § 24-13-710, were entitled to participate in the mandatory furlough program of § 24-13-720. The court also stated in a footnote that application of the amended version of § 24-13-720 to any inmate who was not within six months of the expiration of his sentence when the 1993 amendment became effective would not violate ex post facto principles. See id. at 245 n. 1.

The Inmates subsequently filed this action in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that application of § 24-13-720 as amended in 1993 to prisoners serving sentences of less than life imprisonment for crimes committed between the enactment of § 24-13-720 in 1983 and its amendment in 1993 would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The district court concluded that application of the amended version of § 24-13-720 to such prisoners would retroactively increase punishment for their crimes and therefore was ex post facto. See generally Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2719, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) (explaining that a law is ex post facto if, inter alia, it increases the punishment for a crime previously committed). Accordingly, the court ordered injunctive relief in favor of the Inmates. Upon a motion by the State, however, the district court stayed its order pending appeal to this court.

II.

The State first argues that we lack subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the Inmates' ex post facto claim because a ruling in favor of the Inmates would nullify the contrary judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Plyler, thereby violating the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See District of Columbia Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1314-17, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). 6 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts generally do not have jurisdiction to review state-court decisions; rather, jurisdiction to review such decisions lies exclusively with superior state courts and, ultimately, the United States Supreme Court. See Leonard v. Suthard, 927 F.2d 168, 169-70 (4th Cir....

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