Luttrell v. Nickel
| Decision Date | 22 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-3651,96-3651 |
| Citation | 129 F.3d 933 |
| Parties | Benjamin LUTTRELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Julie NICKEL, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Benjamin Luttrell (Submitted), Green Bay Correctional Institution, Green Bay, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Stephen J. Nicks, Office of the Attorney General, Wisconsin Dept. of Justice, Madison, WI, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before FLAUM, RIPPLE and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.
Benjamin Luttrell, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Green Bay Correctional Institution in Green Bay, Wisconsin, brought suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Luttrell's complaint alleged that while he was housed at the Dodge Correctional Institution (DCI) in Waupun, Wisconsin, Julie Nickel, a sergeant at the prison, violated his Eighth Amendment right by failing to protect him from a sexual assault by another inmate and by not transferring him from a cell housing a psychologically disturbed inmate. The district court granted Sergeant Nickel's motion for summary judgment concluding that Luttrell had failed to support his allegations that Sergeant Nickel acted with the requisite deliberate indifference for a valid Eighth Amendment claim. Luttrell appeals and also argues that the district court improperly denied his motion to amend his complaint and his repeated requests for the appointment of counsel. We affirm.
Construing the record in the light most favorable to Luttrell, as a new arrival at DCI in June, 1994, he was approved for double celling. He was placed in a double cell with an inmate who was "receiving heavy doses of psychiatry [sic] medication repeatedly through-out the day," issued by Sergeant Nickel. Luttrell alleged that his cellmate exhibited psychological problems which included a voice in his head instructing him to make a "sacrifice" by killing someone.
On July 6, 1994, Luttrell complained to an officer about his cellmate's "mental behavior" and requested a new cellmate. The officer summoned Sergeant Nickel to listen to Luttrell's complaint. She responded by laughing and stating that his cellmate " 'would be alright as long as he take[s] his medication,' " and that he would have to talk to a "white shirt" (a lieutenant or higher ranking official) because she did not have the authority to transfer him or his cellmate to a new cell.
Luttrell did not follow up on Sergeant Nickel's advice to raise his complaint with a higher official. Instead, nine days later, as he was lying on his bed asleep, he awoke to find his cellmate standing at the side of his bed with no clothes on, masturbating with one hand and rubbing cocoa butter onto Luttrell's upper thighs and buttocks. In response, Luttrell used a sock containing a padlock to prevent any further assault by his cellmate. Even though Luttrell did not strike his cellmate with this weapon, he was nevertheless placed in temporary lockup, and his cellmate was placed on observational status. Luttrell was subsequently found guilty of possessing a weapon in violation of disciplinary regulations and received a "reprimand" for the infraction.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir.1997). " '[P]rison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.' " Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir.1988)). However, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is not violated by every injury inflicted by one inmate on another. Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1237 (7th Cir.1996).
Luttrell asserts that Sergeant Nickel's failure to transfer him to a new cell was a violation of a "ministerial duty," as well as a violation of guidelines that were created in response to a court order in Delgado v. Cady, 576 F.Supp. 1446 (E.D.Wis.1983). Delgado is not controlling in this situation because that case involved a class action by inmates at the Waupun Correctional Institution (WCI), whereas Luttrell was housed at DCI at all times relevant to this case.
Instead, Luttrell needed to show that Sergeant Nickel knew that there was a substantial risk that his cellmate would seriously harm him and that she failed to take any action. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1978. Sergeant Nickel admitted that she spoke to Luttrell on or about July 6, 1994, at the request of an officer. In her affidavit she stated that when she spoke with him she inquired whether the cellmate had ever hurt him, to which he replied "no." Sergeant Nickel claimed that at the time Luttrell informed her that his cellmate was crazy, she was unaware of the identity of his cellmate. Luttrell countered that Sergeant Nickel issued the medication to his cellmate and that she specifically stated that the cellmate would be all right if he took that medication. Viewing all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Luttrell, as we must, we accept Luttrell's version of events and assume that Sergeant Nickel knew the identity of his cellmate.
In Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630 (7th Cir.1996), we affirmed a jury finding of deliberate indifference in a case where prison officials repeatedly refused a prisoner's request to be separated from his cellmate. As in this case, Haley involved a prisoner sharing a cell with a mentally disturbed inmate. In Haley, the mentally disturbed cellmate started a fire in the cell, killing himself and severely burning the other prisoner. However, Haley differs from the case before us because the facts there would have permitted a jury reasonably to infer that the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference in light of their knowledge of the events leading up to the fire. In Haley, both inmates asked to be separated numerous times during the four or five days preceding the fire, and several prison officials had to be called to their cell on the night of the fire when a volatile argument occurred between the cellmates and they were "ready to start physically fighting." Haley, 86 F.3d at 637. The prison officials were also informed that the mentally disturbed inmate had threatened and intimidated his cellmate, and knocked down his belongings. Id. The mentally disturbed inmate also specifically told the prison officials that he would burn down the cell if the prison officials...
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