U.S. v. S.A., 97-1155

• Decision Date: 17 November 1997
• Docket Number: No. 97-1155,97-1155
• Citation: 129 F.3d 995
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. S.A., Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 995

129 F.3d 995

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. S.A., Appellant.

No. 97-1155.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 22, 1997.

Decided Nov. 17, 1997.

Katherine D. Roe, Minneapolis, MN, argued, for appellant.

Joan D. Humes, Minneapolis, MN, argued, for appellee.

Before FAGG, WOLLMAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

S.A., a federally adjudicated juvenile delinquent, appeals from an order of the district court ¹ committing him to the custody of the United States Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. The district court found that S.A. suffers from a mental disease or defect and that, as a result, he poses a substantial risk of either bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another. The district court held, therefore, that civil commitment was warranted under section 4246. S.A. raises two issues on appeal. First, he asserts that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because juvenile detainees are not subject to civil commitment under section 4246. Second, S.A. argues that, assuming that jurisdiction was proper, the district court erred in determining that he was mentally ill and dangerous. We affirm.

I.

S.A., a Native American male, has an extensive history of psychological problems. In 1988, at the age of twelve, he was referred to Charter Hospital in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, after exhibiting signs of depression. One year later, S.A.'s mother placed him in McKennan Hospital in Sioux Falls after a suicidal incident involving a firearm. He was placed in McKennan again in 1990 following an overdose of prescription medication.

On August 24, 1992, S.A. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent by the district court ² after he set his brother's stereo on fire. ³ S.A. was placed on probation until the age of twenty-one. Nearly a year later, on August 11, 1993, the court found that S.A. had violated the terms of his probation and placed him in the custody of the Attorney General until the age of twenty-one.

S.A. has since been confined to various juvenile detention and mental health facilities. He has encountered problems at each, displaying poor behavior control and violent tendencies. In 1993, at the age of eighteen, S.A. was diagnosed as suffering from major depression with psychotic features. S.A.'s mental health problems peaked in 1995 while he was confined at the Lake Region Correction Center in Devil's Lake, North Dakota. At that time, he reported hearing voices and stated that he believed that there were "beings out there trying to hurt him." Because of his severe psychological problems, S.A. was transferred from Devil's Lake to the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota (FMC-Rochester).

S.A. arrived at FMC-Rochester in January of 1996. Because of his juvenile status he was placed in that facility's Special Housing Unit. ⁴ During his stay at FMC-Rochester, S.A. continued to experience serious psychological difficulties. He reported visual and auditory hallucinations that commanded him to act violently, and he requested to be placed on constant watch (suicide watch) on eight separate occasions. Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, a forensic psychologist with the Bureau of Prisons, treated S.A. at FMC-Rochester and diagnosed him as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.

S.A. was scheduled for release from FMC-Rochester on April 24, 1996. In February of that year, upon Dr. Conroy's certification, the United States filed a petition to determine present mental condition of an imprisoned person due for release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. The petition alleged that S.A. was mentally ill and dangerous and sought to commit him indefinitely. S.A. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that no jurisdiction existed under section 4246 to civilly commit a juvenile detainee due for release.

After conducting a hearing on the issue, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, which concluded that section 4246 did not provide jurisdiction over juvenile detainees and recommended that S.A.'s motion to dismiss be granted. The district court rejected the recommendation and granted the government's petition on the merits.

II.

S.A. first raises a matter of statutory interpretation. He argues that 18 U.S.C. § 4246, which provides for the civil commitment of offenders due for release, does not apply to individuals being held pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (hereinafter "Juvenile Act") ⁵. We review this question of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Clarinda Home Health v. Shalala, 100 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1996).

Our starting point in interpreting a statute is always the language of the statute itself. See United States v. Talley, 16 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir.1994). If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, that language is conclusive absent clear legislative intent to the contrary. See id. Therefore, if the intent of Congress can be clearly discerned from the statute's language, the judicial inquiry must end. See Citicasters v. McCaskill, 89 F.3d 1350, 1354-55 (8th Cir.1996). If, on the other hand, the language of a statute is ambiguous, we should consider "the purpose, the subject matter and the condition of affairs which led to its enactment." Lambur v. Yates, 148 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir.1945). When the meaning of a statute is questionable, it should be given a sensible construction and construed to effectuate the underlying purposes of the law. See id.

The general statutory scheme setting forth the procedures for involuntary civil commitment of federal detainees is found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247. Section 4246 provides for the indefinite hospitalization of a person who is due for release but who, as the result of a mental illness, poses a significant danger to the general public. See United States v. Steil, 916 F.2d 485, 487 (8th Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 237 (2d Cir.1986)). Under section 4246(a), the director of a facility housing a person "whose sentence is about to expire" may certify that the person suffers from "a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, and that suitable arrangements for State custody and care ... are not available." Upon the filing of such a certificate, the district court must hold a hearing to determine if the individual is mentally ill and dangerous. See id. If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is suffering from a mental disease or defect and that, as a result, his release would create a substantial risk of injury to persons or property, the court must commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d).

S.A. contends that section 4246's reference to a "person whose sentence is about to expire" functions as an express limitation on the class of individuals subject to the statute. He argues that use of the word "sentence" limits the class of federal detainees subject to commitment to adult detainees serving criminal sentences. In view of his status as a juvenile offender, S.A.'s incarceration is considered a term of civil detention rather than a criminal sentence. Thus, S.A. argues, the district court has no authority to commit him under section 4246.

We are not convinced that the word "sentence" in section 4246 should be given such a restrictive interpretation. "Sentence," although most often used to define the period of confinement imposed for violation of a criminal statute, is also used in a much broader sense as a generic term to describe any term of detention, including those served by juveniles. The Juvenile Act itself employs "sentence" when referring to the period of confinement that a juvenile offender must serve. See 18 U.S.C. § 5038(f). Our cases also routinely use "sentence" to describe the period of confinement imposed upon federally adjudicated juvenile delinquents. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile PWM, 121 F.3d 382, 383 (8th Cir.1997); United States v. Crawford, 83 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 258, 136 L.Ed.2d 184 (1996); United States v. Early, 77 F.3d 242, 244-45 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Allen, 64 F.3d 411, 413 (8th Cir.1995). Moreover, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines refer to the detention of a juvenile as a "sentence" and permit the inclusion of a "juvenile sentence" in calculating a defendant's criminal history.

See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2). The word "sentence," as used in section 4246, thus encompasses more than simply criminal sentences being served by adult offenders.

S.A. also argues that if Congress had intended to include juveniles within the scope of section 4246, it would have done so expressly. In support of this contention, he cites provisions of the Juvenile Act in which Congress has expressly incorporated adult procedures. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5037(a) (release and detention provisions of Chapter 207 are to be applied in juvenile proceedings); 18 U.S.C. § 5037(b)(2) (probation provisions found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563-3565 are applicable in juvenile proceedings). As S.A. notes, neither the Juvenile Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042) nor the statutory scheme for involuntary commitment (18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247) expressly provides that the involuntary commitment procedures are applicable to juveniles.

To hold that juveniles in federal custody are not subject to commitment under section 4246 would contradict the basic policy considerations that form the foundation of this provision. Under the federal involuntary commitment scheme, the district court is trusted with "an awesome responsibility to the public to ensure that a clinical patient's release is safe." United States v. Bilyk, 949 F.2d 259, 261 (8th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Clark, 893 F.2d 1277, 1282 (11th Cir.1990)). Section 4246 is specifically designed to...