Camden Interstate Ry. Co. v. City of Catlettsburg

• Decision Date: 04 April 1904
• Citation: 129 F. 421
• Parties: CAMDEN INTERSTATE RY. CO. v. CITY OF CATLETTSBURG et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

129 F. 421

CAMDEN INTERSTATE RY. CO. v. CITY OF CATLETTSBURG et al.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Kentucky.

April 4, 1904

Brown &amp Vinson, Thos. R. Brown, and Z. T. Vinson, for plaintiff.

P. K Malin and H. C. Sullivan, for defendant.

COCHRAN District Judge.

The complainant is a West Virginia corporation owning and operating an electric railroad between Huntington, W. Va and Ironton, Ohio, which passes in its course through the city of Catlettsburg, a municipal corporation of the fourth class in the state of Kentucky. The defendants are said city and the mayor and the chief of police thereof. The object of the suit is to enjoin the prosecution of proceedings already instituted and threatened to be instituted against complainant in the police court of said city for violation of an ordinance thereof which requires it to keep flagmen at a certain point on Center street, and at the intersection thereof and Division street, and at the intersection of Division and Louisa streets, or, in lieu of flagmen at said intersections, to have the conductor of each car flag it around the curves thereat. The ordinance provides that each day's failure to comply therewith shall be deemed a separate offense, and fixes a fine of $10 for each offense. The complainant moves for a preliminary injunction, and defendants demur to the bill. Each step raises the same questions.

It is urged by the defendants that this court has no jurisdiction of this suit because of the eleventh amendment to the federal Constitution. That amendment is in these words:

'The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.'

They cite authorities to the effect that a municipal corporation is an agent of the state government for local purposes, and contend, therefore, that a suit against such corporation and its officers is a suit against 'one of the United States,' within the meaning of that amendment. That such a corporation is such an agent is undoubtedly true, but it does not follow therefrom that a suit against it or its officers is such a suit. The most that can be said is that it is a suit against a subdivision of one of said states, not that it is a suit against one of said states itself. This being so, the amendment in question does not deny jurisdiction to the federal courts of the suit, for it denies to them jurisdiction only of suits against 'one of the United States,' and not against a subdivision thereof. If the federal courts do not, by reason of said amendment, have jurisdiction upon what ground it has been that they have so often taken jurisdiction of suits against them. So far as my research has gone, I have not found a case where it has been urged that federal courts do not have such jurisdiction, much less where it has been so held. The cases cited by counsel for defendants in support of the proposition that municipal corporations are state agencies for local purposes were mostly suits against municipal corporations, and in none of them was it suggested that the suits could not be maintained for want of jurisdiction; on the contrary, in each of them jurisdiction to dispose of them on their merits was exercised. I think it therefore clear that the jurisdiction of this court of this cause is not affected by this consideration.

But this is not the only ground upon which it can be claimed that this court has no jurisdiction, though it is the only one that has been urged. It is certain that it has no jurisdiction to enjoin the further prosecution of the proceedings already instituted and now pending. This is because of section 720, Rev.St.U.S. (U.S. Comp.St. 1901, p. 581), which is in these words:

'The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a state except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.'

It is well settled that such proceedings as are now pending are proceedings in a court of the state of Kentucky within the meaning of said statutory provision. In the case of Yick Wo v. Crowley (C.C.) 26 F. 207, it was held that said section forbade the issuance of an injunction to prevent a police officer of a city from serving warrants of arrest issued by a state court for violation of city ordinances claimed to be in contravention of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and the treaty with China. Said statutory provision, however, has no relation to such proceedings as are not now pending, but are only threatened. In the case of Rhodes & Jacobs Mfg. Co. v. New Hampshire (C.C.) 70 F. 721, Judge Putnam said:

'We are asked to enjoin one of the defendants from proceeding in his official capacity as a justice of a state police court, admittedly a judicial function; and all the other defendants are sought to be restrained in the exercise of their official duties solely and purely with reference to the incidents of proceedings in the justice's court. It is plain that under section 720 of the Revised Statutes the proceedings instituted before this bill was filed and described in it cannot be enjoined by this court. It seems, however, to be for the most part considered that this section does not apply to proceedings, either criminal or civil, which have not in fact commenced, but which are threatened by state officials. Mr. Justice Bradley, in Live Stock Dealers & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 1 Abb. (U.S.) 388, 404, 407, Fed. Cas. No. 8,408, and Mr. Justice Blatchford in Fisk v. R.R. Co., 10 Blatchf. 518, Fed. Cas. No. 4,830. A like distinction seems also to have been made by Judge Sawyer in Yick Wo v. Crowley (C.C.) 26 F. 207. Therefore if we had only this statutory provision to consider, we might find no difficulty in going to an injunction against criminal proceedings threatened, but not commenced, when the bill was filed.'

But though it cannot be said that this court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the institution of threatened proceedings under said ordinance because of said statutory provision, there is ground upon which it may be urged that it has not such jurisdiction. That ground is that proceedings under said ordinance are criminal proceedings, and a court of equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin the institution or prosecution of such proceedings. There can be no doubt but that such is the nature of such proceedings; and it is equally true that as a general rule, a court of equity is without jurisdiction to enjoin their institution or prosecution. But to this rule there are two exceptions, and the question arises whether this case comes within either one of them. To determine this question correctly it is essential to understand exactly just what those two exceptions are. And here we will limit our attention to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States relevant to the matter. The leading case on the subject, though what is said in the opinion therein in relation to the jurisdiction of a court of equity to enjoin criminal proceedings is open to the suggestion that it was obiter, is the case of In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 8 Sup.Ct. 482, 31 L.Ed. 402. That was a petition by the mayor and councilmen of Lincoln, Neb., for a writ of habeas corpus to release them from imprisonment for contempt of court in disobeying an order of the United States Circuit Court for that state enjoining them from prosecuting proceedings already instituted and then pending to remove the police judge of said city from his office for malfeasance therein. The contempt depended upon the question whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to make the order disobeyed. It was held that it did not have such jurisdiction, and the petition was therefore granted. The ground upon which it was held that said court was wanting in such jurisdiction was that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings to remove a public officer from his office, and this without regard to the nature of the proceedings. Mr. Justice Gray, who, suggested that there were several possible views as to their nature, without deciding which was the true one. They might be regarded as criminal or civil, and, if the latter, they might be regarded as judicial or administrative. If regarded as civil judicial proceedings, he held that there was in this an additional reason for holding that the lower court was without jurisdiction to enjoin their prosecution, because of section 720, Rev.St.U.S., heretofore referred to, which prohibits a court of the United States granting a writ of injunction to restrain proceedings in a state court. This reason equally applied if the proceedings were regarded as criminal, and therefore judicial, in their character, though no suggestion was made as to this. If, however, the proceedings were regarded as criminal, he held that there was in this consideration a reason also for the lower court being without jurisdiction to make the order which had been disobeyed. And in this connection he stated the law in regard to the right of a court of equity to enjoin criminal proceedings. Seemingly, at least, he recognized but one exception to the general rule on the subject. In the course of his consideration of the subject he said:

'The modern decisions in England by eminent equity judges concur in holding that a court of chancery has no power to restrain criminal proceedings unless they are instituted by a party to a suit already pending before it, and to try the same right that is in issue there.'

Mr Justice Field, who delivered a concurring opinion, had this to say on the subject:

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