Harrigan v. Connecticut River Lumber Co.

• Citation: 129 Mass. 580
• Parties: Michael Harrigan v. Connecticut River Lumber Company
• Decision Date: 23 November 1880
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

129 Mass. 580

Michael Harrigan v. Connecticut River Lumber Company

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

November 23, 1880

[Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Hampden. Tort for injuries to the plaintiff's pleasure boats, anchored in the Connecticut River, or fastened to a wharf upon the plaintiff's land in Springfield, caused by floating logs, sent down the river by the defendant, not formed into rafts nor attended by persons to manage the same. Trial in the Superior Court, before Wilkinson, J., who allowed a bill of exceptions in substance as follows:

The plaintiff contended that as the logs were floated down the river in violation of the Gen. Sts. c. 78, § 5, ^[*] the defendant was prima facie guilty of negligence. The defendant contended that the statute, so far as it affected this case, was unconstitutional and void. It appeared by uncontradicted evidence that the Connecticut River was navigated from its mouth to Holyoke by a transportation company with barges loaded with seventy-five tons, drawn by steam tugs of fifty tons tonnage, but that the tide did not ebb and flow therein in this State; that the defendant, incorporated in 1878, under the laws of Connecticut, purchased and owned timber lands in the State of Vermont to the extent of one hundred and thirty thousand acres upon the banks of the Connecticut River and its tributaries, upon which were six hundred and fifty million feet of lumber; that it owned a large steam mill at Northampton, in this State, on the said river, turning out sixty thousand feet a day, with an investment of $ 80,000; that it owned another mill of larger capacity at Holyoke, in this State, with an investment of $ 80,000, and still another at Hartford, in the State of Connecticut, of nearly as large capacity and capital; that its business was cutting, in the winter, the timber upon said lands, placing the logs in the Connecticut River in the spring, floating the logs down the river in drives of large quantities at a time to its different mills, sawing the logs into lumber, and selling the lumber in the market. There was evidence tending to prove that by reason of the rapids upon said river at Turner's Falls and Holyoke, within this State, it was absolutely impossible to comply with the first clause of said section, and to drive the logs in rafts over said rapids, and it must abandon the use of the Connecticut River if compelled so to do; that the defendant could unloose logs above rapids, and form them into rafts again after passing the rapids, but that the expense of so doing would be pecuniarily ruinous; that there was no other way of getting its timber into the markets of this State or of the State of Connecticut in any manner that was not ruinously expensive. It also appeared that the drives of logs generally occurred in July or August, and at intervals,--the logs running in the river for from two to four weeks,--and when so running, and at the time in question, substantially filled the river and prevented the use of it by pleasure boats, although the same did not intercept or prevent the large barges and steam tugs from the use of the river.

The defendant asked the judge to rule as follows: "If the jury find that, from the natural flow, current and bed of the river, it is impossible to bring and transport the timber of the defendant in the manner required by the Gen. Sts. c. 78, § 5, to its several mills, and from State to State, and place to place, and that the clause of the statute operates to destroy the defendant's business, and as a prohibition to the defendant of the use of the Connecticut River as a means and way of transportation, then the same is contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and is void. So if the compliance with the provisions of the statute would be so expensive and onerous as to operate as an exclusion of the defendant from the river for the purpose of its business."

The judge declined to give any of the rulings asked for; but instructed the jury that the law was valid and operative in this case, and, if the plaintiff had sustained and injury by reason of an unlawful act on the part of the defendant without the plaintiff's fault, he was entitled to recover; that, if the logs were floated contrary to law, that was prima facie evidence of negligence; but if, upon the whole case, the jury were of the opinion that the defendant was not negligent, the plaintiff could not recover, and that the jury were to decide, under all the circumstances of the case, whether or not the defendant was negligent; and gave other full instructions pertinent to the case. The jury found for the plaintiff; and the defendant alleged exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

G. M. Stearns, (H. K. Hawes with him,) for the defendant. 1. The Connecticut River is a great public highway between the States of Vermont, Massachusetts and Connecticut, and citizens of these States have the right to use it for the purposes of commerce and trade. Commonwealth v. Chapin, 5 Pick. 199, 202. Adams v. Pease, 2 Conn. 481. Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9. Wadsworth v. Smith, 11 Me. 278. Knox v. Chaloner, 42 Me. 150. People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 211. Hooker v. Cummings, 20 Johns. 90. The driving of logs down the river from State to State for sale is navigation. Brown v. Chadbourne, ubi supra. Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 552, 561. Carter v. Thurston, 58 N.H. 104, 107. Thompson v. Androscoggin Improv. Co. 58 N.H. 108. And navigation is a part of commerce. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189-191.

2. So far as § 5 of the Gen. Sts. c. 78, attempts to regulate commerce between the several States, it is in violation of the Constitution of the United States, art. 1, § 8. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282. Foster v. New Orleans Port-Wardens, 94 U.S. 246. Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238, 245. South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4, 10. Whatever limits, impedes or affects transportation of property into or out of the country, or through the States, is a regulation of commerce, within the meaning of the Constitution. Any State legislation is void which creates an impediment to the free navigation of public waters, or prescribes conditions in accordance with which commerce in particular articles or between particular places is required to be conducted. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 102. A State cannot tax passengers, as it is an attempt to regulate commerce, nor require a bond that an emigrant shall not become a pauper. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259. State Freight Tax case, 15 Wall. 232. Nor require a bond that an emigrant is not a lewd woman. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275. Nor regulate the size or kind of vessel used in transportation. Gibbons v. Ogden, ubi supra. Nor tax an auctioneer's sales, if they include imported goods; nor discriminate against goods from other States. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566. Nor tax sales of products of other States by a pedler. Welton v. Missouri, ubi supra. Nor require hatchways to be surveyed. Foster v. New Orleans Port-Wardens, ubi supra. Nor prohibit the carriage of cattle from other States through any State except in a prescribed manner. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465. The rule seems to be that, if the legislation affects the modes and methods of foreign or interstate commerce, or impedes the same, it is void. If it simply declares the rights and duties of persons, it is valid, even though those duties affect the person's relations to commerce. Sherlock v. Alling, ubi supra. Welton v. Missouri, ubi supra.

It may be contended that this is only a police regulation. But it is settled that whatever laws a State may pass under its police power, if such attempts to legislate amount to a regulation of foreign or interstate commerce, they are void. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, and Railroad Co. v. Husen, ubi supra. The law in question distinctly undertakes to regulate the navigation of the Connecticut River with logs and timber. It prescribes the conditions of the use of the river, "the modes and methods of the commerce," the "rules by which it shall be governed." And its regulations, rules, and conditions, as the case finds, amount to a prohibition of the river for the transportation between the States of this merchandise. It appearing that the statute in question does regulate and prohibit interstate commerce, it cannot be valid, allowing the greatest police power to the State, unless the plaintiff shows a grave necessity for the exercise of this power. The only pretence for the destruction of this great commercial and important interest is, that from two to four weeks in the year the prosecution of the enterprise prevents pleasure boats from using the river.

M. P. Knowlton & C. L. Long, for the plaintiff.

Lord J. Colt & Morton, JJ., absent.

OPINION

Lord, J.

At the trial, no question was made of the propriety of any ruling except one upon the provisions of the Gen. Sts. c. 78, § 5. The presiding judge ruled that any acts done in violation of that statute were prima facie wrongful; and the only objection made by the defendant to the ruling is that the statute is unconstitutional, for the reason that it is not competent for the Legislature of the Commonwealth to pass any law upon that subject, it being within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress in the exercise of its power "to regulate commerce among the several States."

The chapter, of which the section in controversy forms a part contains six sections, and the title is "Of timber afloat or case on shore." The other five sections of the chapter guard very strictly the rights of property in logs, masts, spars and other timber which is properly floating in the river; and interference with such property is prohibited under highly penal provisions. The statute does not profess to take from the...