Bodner v. Gray, 30883

• Decision Date: 05 May 1961
• Docket Number: No. 30883,30883
• Parties: Charles J. BODNER, Appellant, v. Robert A. GRAY, Secretary of State of the State of Florida, and Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of the State of Florida, Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 419

129 So.2d 419

89 A.L.R.2d 860

Charles J. BODNER, Appellant, v. Robert A. GRAY, Secretary of State of the State of Florida, and Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of the State of Florida, Appellees.

No. 30883.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 5, 1961.

Charles J. Bodner, Miami, for appellant.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., Wilson W. Wright and Gerald Mager, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

DREW, Justice.

This is appeal ¹ from a final decree of the trial court directly passing upon the validity of a state statute. ²

Appellant, an attorney at law, a citizen of this State and a member of The Florida Bar in good standing for at least ten years prior to March 1, 1960 paid a qualifying fee of $875 to the Secretary of State in accordance with the requirements of Sections 99.031 and 99.061, Florida Statutes (1959), F.S.A. and filed his oath of candidacy in Group 1 for Justice, Supreme Court of Florida. Simultaneously with the payment of said qualifying fee, he filed his written protest with the Secretary of State alleging that Sections 99.031 and 99.061 were contrary to and in violation of the Constitution of the State of Florida in that they required from him as a candidate for the office of Justice of the Supreme Court additional qualifications to those set forth in Article V, Section 13 of the Constitution of the State of Florida; and further, that said sections were contrary to and in violation of the Constitution of the State of Florida and the laws of the State of Florida in that the charges for the filing fee and the party assessment were arbitrary and unreasonable. In said written protest, he demanded the repayment of said sums forthwith, which demand was refused by the Secretary of State.

Appellant then filed a bill for declaratory decree in the Circuit Court of Leon County ³ asserting the unconstitutionality of said sections, praying for an injunction restraining the Secretary of State from enforcing the provisions thereof and for an order directing the Secretary of State of refund the sums paid pursuant to said statutes. The litigation resulted in the final decree described in the first paragraph hereof.

Two points are presented for our consideration. The first is the constitutionality of the foregoing statutes. The second is that, if the said statutes be held to be constitutional, the amount of the charges required under the provisions thereof are excessive, arbitrary and unreasonable and, therefore, invalid. Both points will be disposed of together.

We first turn to the argument of appellant that the questioned sections of the statute are in violation of the Constitution because they amount to a legislative imposition of qualifications to hold the office of Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Florida in addition to those set forth in Article V, Section 13 of the Constitution of the State of Florida. The designated provision of the Constitution provides 'No person shall be eligible for the office of justice of the supreme court * * * unless he is a citizen of this state and unless he is at the time a member of the Florida Bar in good standing and for a period of at least ten years has been, a member of the bar of Florida.'

It is quite clear from the quoted provision of the Constitution that the qualifications placed there are upon the eligibility to hold the office mentioned. The questioned statute imposes no additional qualification upon the right to hold the office. It deals with the requirements to become a candidate for the office. The payment of the fee mentioned is not required of a person, otherwise qualified to fill such an office by appointment nor is such a fee required of any candidate who might be elected in the general election to such office as a condition precedent to assuming the office. ⁴ In other words, the statute is concerned solely with the fee which is required of any candidate seeking the nomination of his party for such office.

While there are authorities holding to the contrary, ⁵ the great weight of authority supports the view that reasonable fees may be exacted from candidates for public office. ⁶

This Court, although it has not directly passed upon this particular proposition, has consistently followed the majority view in related questions.

In Mairs v. Peters, Fla.1951, 52 So.2d 793, 795 we were presented with an attack on Section 102.29, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which required the filing of a candidate's party loyalty oath. In that case this Court observed, in upholding the validity of said statute 'Conceding, as any student of free government must, that the party system is essential to our political life, we can well understand how short lived the party would be unless some means was afforded to maintain party integrity.'

Moreover, in that opinion, we reached certain definite conclusions as to the necessity of party regulations in the democratic society in which we live. In the later case of Crowells v. Petersen, Fla.1960, 118 So.2d 539, where we were confronted with an attack upon the constitutionality of 99.021, Florida Statutes (1957), requiring every candidate to subscribe to an oath or affirmation that he did not register as a member of any other political party during the two years immediately preceding the date of said oath, we upheld that provision and reaffirmed what was said in Mairs v. Peters.

The rationale of these and other cases in a similar vein is clearly applicable to the questioned statutes levying the assessment complained of. We conclude that, so long as the amounts of such assessments are not palpably arbitrary and unreasonable, they are valid ...