Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., s. 92-8386

Citation13 F.3d 1516
Decision Date11 February 1994
Docket NumberNos. 92-8386,92-8387 and 92-8536,s. 92-8386
PartiesBen MYRICK and Emily Myrick, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FREUHAUF CORPORATION, Defendant, Freightliner Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Jack LINDSEY, Executor of the Estate of Grace C. Lindsey, Deceased, Jack Lindsey, as Surviving Spouse of Grace C. Lindsey, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee, International Harvester Company, Defendant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

James E. Carter, Madison, GA, for plaintiffs-appellants Ben Myrick and Emily Myrick in 92-8386 and 92-8536.

Edgar A. Neely, III, Richard B. North, Jr., Neely & Player, Atlanta, GA, for defendant-appellee Freightliner Corp. in 92-8386.

Foy R. Devine, Atlanta, GA, for amicus Georgia Trial Lawyers in 92-8386, 92-8387 and 92-8536.

Larry E. Coben, Philadelphia, PA, for amicus Assoc. of Trial Lawyers of America in 92-8386, 92-8387 and 92-8536.

James L. Gilbert, Birmingham, AL, for amicus Attorney's Information Exchange Group in 92-8386.

Allan R. Roffman, Lambert & Roffman, James Edward Carter, The Carter Firm, Madison, GA, for plaintiff-appellant Jack Lindsey in 92-8387.

Richard B. North, Jr., Edgar Adams Neely, III, Neely & Player, Atlanta, GA, for defendant-appellee Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp. in No. 92-8387.

James L. Gilbert, Francis H. Hare, Jr., Birmingham, AL, for Attorney's Information Exchange Group in 92-8387 and 92-8536.

Harry J. Fox, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Macon, GA, Richard B. North, Jr., Edgar A. Neely, III, Neely and Player, PC, Atlanta, GA, for defendant-appellee Freightliner Corp. in 92-8536.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before EDMONDSON and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior Circuit Judge.

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

This consolidated appeal presents the question of whether a common law tort action for failure to install anti-lock brakes in a tractor-trailer truck is pre-empted by provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("the Safety Act"), Pub.L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified at 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1381-1431). This Court answered a similar question arising under the same statute in Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065, 110 S.Ct. 1781, 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990), which held that a common law tort action for failure to install air bags was pre-empted by the Safety Act. The Supreme Court's exposition of pre-emption law in an intervening decision, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), requires that we revisit our Taylor decision in order to determine how much of it survives Cipollone, and whether the surviving portion of Taylor controls these cases.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The complaint in the Myrick case alleges that an eighteen wheel tractor-trailer was proceeding south on a highway in Morgan County, Georgia. Because of slowing traffic ahead, the driver applied the brakes which caused the rear wheels to lock and the trailer to jackknife and swing across the center divider into the path of oncoming traffic. Plaintiff Ben Myrick had the misfortune to be in a northbound vehicle on the same highway at the critical time. The jackknifing trailer collided with his vehicle. As a result, Mr. Myrick suffered serious injury; he is permanently paraplegic and brain damaged. Neither the tractor nor the trailer that collided with Mr. Myrick's vehicle had an anti-lock brake system.

Mr. Myrick filed a lawsuit in state court against the manufacturer of the tractor, the Freightliner Corporation, and the manufacturer of the trailer, the Freuhauf Corporation, alleging that the absence of anti-lock brakes was a negligent design and rendered the tractor defective. 1 His wife, Emily Myrick, asserted a separate claim for loss of consortium. The defendants removed the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship.

The facts alleged in the Lindsey case are similar. A tractor-trailer rig was proceeding south on a highway in Oconee County, Georgia, when the driver applied the brakes because an automobile stopped in front of it. The wheels locked, the trailer began to jackknife and slid across the center lane into the northbound lane of traffic. This time the victim was Grace Lindsey, whose automobile was proceeding north when it collided with the jackknifed trailer. Mrs. Lindsey was killed. Neither the tractor nor the trailer was equipped with an anti-lock brake system.

Mrs. Lindsey's husband, Jack Lindsey, filed a lawsuit in state court against Navistar International Transportation Corporation, the manufacturer of the tractor. 2 He alleged that Navistar's failure to supply anti-lock brakes was a negligent design which rendered the tractor defective and unsafe. Navistar removed the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship.

Both lawsuits were decided in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. In the Myrick case, the district court granted summary judgment on behalf of the defendants on the grounds that the action was impliedly pre-empted by the This Court consolidated the two cases for purposes of appeal. Because the issues are identical and joint briefs have been filed on both sides, we will refer to the plaintiffs in the two cases collectively as "Plaintiffs," and we will refer to the remaining defendants in both cases collectively as "Manufacturers." 3

Safety Act and the regulatory standards adopted under it. The court found the matter to be controlled by this Court's holding in Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065, 110 S.Ct. 1781, 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990). Four days after the order in the nature of an opinion was entered in the Myrick case, a different judge of the same district court reached the same result in the Lindsey case. In doing so, he adopted the reasoning of the order in the Myrick case and found the cause of action to be pre-empted by the federal act and regulatory standards.

ANALYSIS
I. PRE - CIPOLLONE PRE - EMPTION LAW

The laws of the United States are the supreme law of the land, any state constitution or law notwithstanding. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, state law may not override or interfere with federal laws. That is the core premise of pre-emption doctrine. On the other hand, "[i]n the interest of avoiding unintended encroachment on the authority of the States, ... a court interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state law will be reluctant to find pre-emption. Thus, pre-emption will not lie unless it is 'the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' " CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1737, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) (citation omitted); see also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309-10, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947). The Supreme Court has instructed us that state law is pre-empted by federal law in three circumstances:

First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law....

Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from a "scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it"....

Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Thus, the Court has found pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements....

English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990); see also Michigan Canners and Freezers Assoc. v. Agricultural Mktg. and Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469, 104 S.Ct. 2518, 2523, 81 L.Ed.2d 399 (1984); Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d 1548, 1552 (11th Cir.1991), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). We must apply these principles and relevant case law to determine if the Plaintiffs' claims, premised on the Manufacturers' failure to install anti-lock brakes, are pre-empted by the Safety Act.

II. THE SAFETY ACT AND THE TAYLOR DECISION

The Safety Act authorizes the extensive regulation of commercial trucks, including the vehicles involved in these cases. Numerous safety standards have been established by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.

pursuant to the Act, including a standard, applicable at the relevant times in these cases, that effectively gave manufacturers the choice of whether to install anti-lock brakes. The Safety Act includes a pre-emption clause which provides:

15 U.S.C. Sec. 1392(d). Additionally, the Safety Act contains a savings clause:

Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.

Id. Sec. 1397(k).

In Taylor, a panel of this Court decided the question of whether the Safety Act pre-empts state common law causes of action arising out of the failure of automobile manufacturers to install air bags in their vehicles. We addressed the pre-emption question in two parts: first, express pre-emption, and then, implied...

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