Poyer v. Village of Desplaines

• Decision Date: 11 November 1887
• Citation: 123 Ill. 111,13 N.E. 819
• Parties: POYER v. VILLAGE OF DESPLAINES.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

123 Ill. 111

13 N.E. 819

POYER

v.VILLAGE OF DESPLAINES.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

November 11, 1887.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

SHOPE, J.

The purpose of the bill filed in this case was to restrain the village of Desplaines, its officers, and others, from prosecuting seven suits pending against the complainant for violations of an ordinance of said village, and from instituting other prosecutions for other alleged offenses under such ordinance. The preamble to the ordinance in question recites that by reason of the holding of public picnics, etc., within the village, the disorderly and vicious classes had gathered and congregated in the village, from Chicago, and other places to which the village is adjacent, and that the peace of the community had been disturbed thereby, and the persons and the property of the residents therein rendered unsafe; that the police of the village was powerless to protect person and property within the village against such disorderly persons so gathered at picnics and like assemblages. The bill alleges, in substance, that complainant has grounds within the village, which he has fitted for picnics and other out-door amusements, and that the assemblages upon his grounds have been orderly and well conducted. It then avers the invalidity of the ordinance, and that the prosecutions, seven in number, have been maliciously brought, to ruin his business and reputation, and that he will suffer irreparable injury therefrom unless the same are enjoined, that upon trial of one of the cases he was found guilty, and a fine of $50 assessed against him, from which he has prosecuted an appeal to the criminal court of Cook county, where the same was then pending; that the other causes are pending in justices' courts for trial; and that the defendants threatened to institute other prosecutions, etc., and prays for injunction restraining such prosecution, and, if that cannot be done, that all but one of the pending suits be enjoined until the validity of the ordinance shall be determined in a court of law. A demurrer was sustained, and the bill dismissed.

It is not questioned but that the general subject-matter of this municipal legislation was within the scope of the power conferred upon the village by the act under which it is incorporated, nor that the ordinance was duly passed and published in conformity with said act, prior to the institution of the suits sought to be enjoined. Ordinances like those under consideration are intended to protect and preserve the peace and good order of society within the municipality, and proceedings under them, although civil in form, to recover a penalty, are quasi criminal in character. Courts of equity will not, as a general rule, interfere to restrain criminal or quasi criminal prosecutions, or take jurisdiction of any case or matter not strictly of a civil nature. Story, Eq. Jur. § 893; 2 Daniell, Ch. 1620; Railroad Co. v. Walton, 14 Ala. 209. The questions arising in the prosecutions sought to be enjoined can be determined in the tribunal in which they are pending, or in that to which they may be taken by appeal. The legality or illegality of the ordinance is purely a question of law, which the common-law court is competent to decide. If the defendant is not guilty of violating this provision, as alleged, the determination of that fact is peculiarly within the province of that court. In either event appellant had a full and complete defense at law. When ordinances have been enacted by the proper authority, a court of equity will not interfere by injunction, to restrain their enforcement in the appropriate courts, upon the ground that such ordinances are alleged to be illegal, or because of the alleged innocence of the party charged. Nor will that court enjoin such proceedings, under the ordinance, for the purpose of determining the validity of the ordinance in a court of law, when, as in this case, the defendant has an adequate remedy at law. West v. Major, etc., 10 Paige, 539;Cohen v. Commissioners of Goldsboro, 77 N. C. 2;Devron v. First Municipality, 4 La. Ann. 11;Davis v. American Soc., 6 Daly, 81; Yates v. Village of Batavia, 79 Ill. 500;Moses v. Mayor, etc., 52 Ala. 198;Burnett v. Craig, 30 Ala. 135;Hamilton v. Stewart, 59 Ill. 330;Davis v. American Soc., 75 N Y 362. In West v. Mayor, etc., supra, Chancellor WALWORTH, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: ‘The question as to the validity of the corporation ordinance does not properly belong to this court for decision, where the complainants, as in this case, have a perfect defense at law if the ordinances are invalid, or if they do not render the complainants, or those in their employ, liable for the penalty. And it would be a usurpation of jurisdiction by this court if it should draw to itself the settlement of such questions, when their decision was not necessary in the discharge of the legitimate duties of the court.’ If the ordinances are invalid, they furnish no warrant for prosecutions, or the imposition of fines, or the recovery of penalties, under them, and would be no shield in an action at law against those responsible for the injuries inflicted upon the complainant by such prosecutions. If the authorities of this village can be enjoined from prosecuting under an ordinance preservative of the peace, as this one certainly is, so they might be restrained from the enforcement of any other ordinance of the village. Their effort to discharge their duty to the public would be rendered unavailing, and the community left at the mercy of the lawless and vicious elements of society, until such time as the question could be settled in the courts of equity. If it should at last be determined that the ordinance was valid, that court would be powerless to enforce its provisions, or impose the penalties denounced against its violation, but must remit the cases to the courts of law, which, before the assumption of jurisdiction by the courts of equity, had the right to determine every question submitted to and determined in the equity jurisdiction. There are, however, two exceptions clearly recognized to the rule that courts of equity will not interfere to restrain trespasses, whether committed under the forms of law or otherwise, which are, (1) to prevent irreparable injury, and (2) to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Mayor, etc., v. Meserole, 26 Wend. 132;Mooers v. Smedley, 6 Johns. Ch. 28;Owens v. Crossett, 105 Ill. 356;Gartside v. City of East St. Louis, 43 Ill. 47.

In Owens v. Crossett, supra, and kindred cases, the jurisdiction is maintained upon the express ground that the trespasses were continued, and, the trespassers being wholly insolvent, there was no adequate remedy at law, and the injury was therefore irreparable. There is no allegation in the bill in this case showing insolvency of the defendants thereto, or their inability to respond in damages to any amount for which the complainant might recover damages. The bill contains only a general allegation of irreparable injury. Before a court of equity will interfere to prevent a trespass upon this ground, ‘the facts and circumstances must be alleged, from which it may be seen that irreparable mischief will be the result of the act complained of, and that the law can afford the party no adequate remedy.’ Goodell v. Lassen, 69 Ill. 145;Livingston v. Livingston, 6 Johns. Ch. 497; High, Inj. § 34, and authorities.

It is insisted by counsel that a court of equity should restrain these prosecutions in order to prevent the multiplicity of suits. Bills of peace will lie, under some circumstances, for the purpose of quieting and suppressing litigation. It is said, however, that, to entitle a party to maintain a bill on this ground, there must be a right claimed affecting many persons; ‘for if the right is disputed between two persons only, not for themselvesand all others in interest, but for themselves alone, the bill will be dismissed.’ 2 Story, Eq. Pl. § 857. § 857. the chancellor, quoting from what he had said in Oakley v. Mayor, etc.,¹ which...