Hudson v. C., & N.W. R.R. Co.

Decision Date20 October 1882
Citation13 N.W. 735,59 Iowa 581
PartiesHUDSON v. C., & N.W. R. R. CO
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Appeal from Marshall Circuit Court.

THE plaintiff claims damages in the sum of one hundred dollars for an injury to a horse, alleged to have been caused by a defective crossing over defendant's road; the defect consisting in placing the plank on the inside of one of the iron rails of the road so far from the rail that, in driving the horse over the crossing, he stepped into the aperture thus made, and was injured and crippled.

There was a trial by jury and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

REVERSED.

Hubbard Clark & Dawley, for appellant.

Sutton & Childs, for appellee.

OPINION

ROTHROCK, J.

I.

The amount in controversy as shown by the pleadings does not exceed one hundred dollars, and certain questions are certified to this court for an opinion. The first question is as follows: "Did the court err in refusing to set aside the verdict as being contrary to the evidence?" Objection is made to this question upon the ground that it involves no such matter of law as to authorize its certification. On the other hand, it is claimed that, when a verdict is so contrary to the evidence as in this case, it is the duty of the trial court as a matter of law to set it aside, and the matter then becomes a question of law proper to be certified to this court.

The object and purpose of the statute (Code, § 3173) was to prohibit appeals in unimportant cases. Such of these cases as involve questions of law upon which it is desirable to have the opinion of the Supreme Court are saved from the operation of the statute. The object is that where new and important questions arise in cases of this character appeals shall be allowed for the purpose of settling the questions involved and making the decisions thereon authority in cases afterwards arising in the courts. Now, although the question as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict may in a certain sense be said to become a question of law, yet it could not have been intended that this court should be required to take up the case on its facts, examine and weigh the evidence, and determine whether the jury were justified from the evidence in finding the verdict. A determination of such a question would be desirable to no one but the parties to the suit, and would be no authority in the future trial of cases.

II. Plaintiff introduced a witness who testified that, some six months before the accident complained of, a horse driven by him over the crossing in question got his foot between the plank and the rail at the same place where plaintiff's horse was injured. The defendant objected to this testimony as incompetent. The objection was overruled and an exception taken. Upon this point in the case the Circuit Court certified the following question: "Ought the court to have admitted evidence of former accidents at the same place to parties other than the plaintiff?"

In Collins v. Inhabitants of Dorchester, 60 Mass. 396 6 Cush. 396, the plaintiff was injured by driving against a post in a highway. He sought to prove that another person had met with precisely the same kind of accident before, at the same place, and from the same cause.

In determining the question the court said: "The testimony of Sprague that he, before the injury complained of by the plaintiff, received a similar injury at or near the same place, without any negligence on his part, was not competent for the purpose of proving that the road was defective at the time and in the place of the plaintiff's injury. It was testimony concerning collateral facts which furnish no legal presumption as to the principal facts in dispute, and which defendants were not bound to be prepared to meet. 2 Stark. on Ev., 381; 1 Green Ev., § 52."

Parker v. Portland Publishing Company, 69 Me. 173, was an action to recover damages for negligence in not properly lighting a passage way. Evidence was received tending to show at different times the condition of the hall way and the entrance to the rooms of the building as to light--whether more or less or none--and of what had happened to other men at other times, and of their fortunate escape from peril. The court, APPLETON, J., said: "These facts were all collateral to the main issue, and...

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13 cases
  • Eisentrager v. Great N. Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • December 13, 1916
    ...to the effect that deceased charged with contributory negligence was in the habit of jumping on trains. In Hudson v. Railway, 59 Iowa, 581, 13 N. W. 735, 44 Am. Rep. 692, we said of evidence to the effect that a day or two after the accident the employés of defendant changed the crossing in......
  • Eisentrager v. Great Northern Railway Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • December 13, 1916
    ...after the transaction which constituted the principal one. In Mathews v. City, 80 Iowa 459, at 466, we felt constrained, by reason of the Hudson case, to exclude evidence to the effect that other had fallen into the same opening into which plaintiff had, and that defendant had been informed......
  • Lindquist v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • December 16, 1947
    ... ... inadmissible 'both upon principle and authority.' ... Hudson v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 59 Iowa 581, 13 N.W. 735, ... 736; 44 Am.Rep. 692; Mathews v. City of ... ...
  • Kirchoff v. Hohnsbehn Creamery Supply Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • November 20, 1909
    ... ... the witness [148 Iowa 514] was allowed to answer: "No; ... never." This was error. Hudson v. Railway, 59 ... Iowa 581; Bell v. Railway, 64 Iowa 321; ... [123 N.W. 213] ... Mathews v ... ...
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