Arnold and Others v. the United States

• Decision Date: 23 February 1815
• Citation: 9 Cranch 104,13 U.S. 104,3 L.Ed. 671
• Parties: ARNOLD AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

13 U.S. 104

9 Cranch 104

3 L.Ed. 671

ARNOLD AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED STATES.

Feb. 23, 1815

ERROR to the Circuit Court, for the district of Rhode Island,

in an action of debt, upon a bond in the penalty of 3400 dollars, given July 2d, 1812, for duties at the custom house. The cause was decided below upon demurer to the pleas of the Defendants who were the principal and sureties in the bond.

It was an action of debt on a bond, dated July 2, 1812, given to the United States for $3400. The condition of the bond, is as follows, viz. 'The condition of this obligation is such, that if the above bounden, S. G. Arnold, &c. shall and do, on or before the 2d day of October next, well and truly pay or cause to be paid unto the collector of the customs for the district of Providence for the time being, the sum of $1700, or the amount of duties to be ascertained as due, and arising on certain goods, wares and merchandize entered by the above bounden S. G. Arnold, as imported in the brig Dover, R. Fenner, master, from Havanna, as per entry dated this day, then the above obligation to be void, &c.' The following indorsement is on the bond, viz.

'Amount of duties ascertained as due, 1708 dollars and 38 cents.

THOMAS PECKHAM, Junr.

Deputy Collector.'

The Defendants pleaded, that, as to 1708 dollars and 38 cents, part and parcel of said sum of 3400 dollars demanded by the Plaintiffs, with the interest thereon from the day whereon the same was payable, to the time of the plea, being 13 dollars and 38 cents, they owe the Plaintiffs the same, being in the whole the sum of 1721 dollars and 76 cents; and that as to the whole residue of the sum demanded, the Defendants say, that therefor the Plaintiffs, their said action ought not to have and maintain, because they say, 'that the brig Dover in the condition of the said bond mentioned, sailed from Havanna, on the 16th day of June, A. D. 1812, bound to the said district of Providence, and that she arrived within the United States, on the 30th day of June, 1812, and within the said district of Providence, on the 1st day of July, A. D. 1812, having on board the said goods, &c. mentioned in the condition which said goods, &c. were imported into the said United States, on the said 30th day of June, 1812, and into the said district of Providence, on the said 1st day of July, 1812, in the brig Dover, &c. that Providence is the sole port of entry in the said district of Providence, and that on the said 2d of July, 1812, the said goods, &c. were duly entered at the custom house in the said district of Providence, as imported in the said brig Dover, &c. the Defendants further aver, that the bond aforesaid, was made, executed and given by them to the Plaintiffs as aforesaid, for securing the duties due on the said goods, so imported as aforesaid, in conformity with, and by virtue and in pursuance of, the act of the congress, & c. passed on the 10th day of August 1799, entitled 'an act making further provision for the payment of the debts of the United States,' and also a certain other act of congress, passed on the 7th day of June, 1794, entitled 'an act laying additional duties on goods, &c. imported into the United States.' The Defendants also aver, that the duties due by the acts aforesaid, on the importation of said goods, &c. in manner aforesaid, amounted at the time of the importation of the same as aforesaid, to the aforesaid sum of 1708 dollars and 38 cents, and no more, and were then and there ascertained by the said deputy collector, to that sum and no more, according to the condition of said bond, and in pursuance of the provisions of said statutes. They also aver, that at the time of the entering of the said goods, &c. at the custom house, as aforesaid, on the said 2d day of July, 1812, neither they, the Defendants, nor the collector of the customs for said district of Providence, had any knowledge of the act, entitled 'an act for imposing additional duties upon all goods, &c. imported from any foreign port or place, and for other purposes,' passed on the 1st day of July, 1812; nor was the said last mentioned act promulgated, published and made known, at the district of Providence as aforesaid, at the time of making the said entry, as aforesaid, and this the Defendants are ready to verify, &c.

To this plea, the Plaintiffs demurred.

In the Circuit Court, judgment was rendered for the Plaintiffs, for 3428 dollars and 90 cents.

PITKIN, On the part of the Plaintiffs in error, contended,

1. That the act imposing double duties could not, on principles of law, or justice, be considered as in operation until the 2d day of July. The words of that act are: that 'an additional duty, &c. shall be levied and collected upon all goods, &c. which shall, from and after the passing of this act, be imported into the United States, &c.'

The act was approved by the president on the 1st day of July, 1812. By the sound construction of the words 'from and after the passing of this act,' it is contended that the first day of July, must be excluded; that the meaning is the same, as if the words used had been from and after the 1st day of July, in which case the 1st day of July would certainly be excluded, and the act would not be in force until after that day. 'From and after the passing this act,' have also the same meaning, as from and after the time, of passing the act. The question would then occur, as it now does, when or at what time was the act passed, the answer is on the 1st day of July, and of course, unless there are fractions of a day, the duties could not be levied and collected until after that day. The act repealing the duty on salt passed in 1807, declares, 'that from and after the 31st day of December next, so much of any act as lays a duty on imported salt, be and the same is hereby repealed, and from and after the day last aforesaid, salt shall be imported, &c. duty free.'

No one has ever pretended, that salt could be imported duty free, until the 1st day of January, because it could not be so imported, until from and after the day preceding. The Court must undoubtedly give such a construction to the act, as that no citizen can, by possibility be subjected to its operation before it had actually passed. In order to prevent this, the Court must either exclude the 1st day of July altogether, or they must admit fractions of a day, and suffer an enquiry into the very moment of time on that day, when the act received the signature of the president, and was lodged in the office of the secretary of state.

If a vessel had arrived in the morning of the 1st day of July, and the act was not in fact approved by the president, until the afternoon of that day, it cannot be pretended, that the goods brought in such vessel, were imported 'from and after the passing of the act.' It is well known, that acts are not generally presented to the president for his approbation, until about the middle of the day, and on the last day of the session, frequently not until nearly the last hour of the day. The difficulties however, attending an enquiry of this nature, as well as the impropriety of calling on the president for information, as to the moment when a law received his sanction, may perhaps be sufficient inducements for the Court to say, that when the rights and interests of the citizens are so materially involved, and when by the express words of the act, it is not to take effect, until from and after the passing of the same, they will, as a general rule exclude the day on which it passed. The authorities, which have a bearing on this question are various and contradictory. In the case of Pugh & wife v. Duke of Leeds, Cowper 714, these authorities are referred to and commented upon by lord Mansfield with his usual ability and sound sense.

Much more subtlety than argument has been used to prove a difference in the meaning of words made use of, in instruments, to shew the time, when they should take effect. When the words have been 'from the date,' the Court have sometimes said, it should include the day, and where the words have been 'from the day of the date,' it should exclude the day. In some cases the Courts have entirely rejected this distinction, and have said, that they do or may mean the same thing. In the case of Bellasis v. Hester, 1 Lerd Raymond, 280, on a bill of exchange, payable 10 days after sight, the Court, two judges against one, decided, that the day on which the bill was presented for payment was included. This opinion, however, was against the custom and practice of merchants. In the case of Hatter v. Ash, 1 Lord Raymond, p. 85, the following distinction is made by counsel, and is admitted by one of the judges, and not contradicted by the others, 'that the words' from the date when used to pass on interest included the day, aliter, when used by way of computation on matters of account.' This distinction is in some measure recognized by lord Mansfield, in the above case of Pugh & Leeds, in Cowper. In this last case lord Mansfield says, that the words 'from the date,' or 'from the day of the 'date,' may be either inclusive or exclusive, according to the subject matter, and may be construed either way, to give effect to the transaction, or for the furtherance of justice between parties. In the case now before the Court, it is not necessary to include the day, for the purpose of giving effect and validity to the law; and in case the day is included, manifest injustice may, and in all probability will happen to the citizens of the United States. For, if there can he no fractions of a day, the act must in legal contemplation be considered as in force from the first monent of the day, on which it received the sanction of the president. It is understood, that by the construction at the treasury, the 1st day of July, is excluded, and that the accounts of the collectors of the customs are all settled, excluding double duties, on goods which arrived on that day.

2. Even if ...