Wyman v. Uphaus

Decision Date27 March 1957
Citation130 A.2d 278,100 N.H. 436
PartiesLouis C. WYMAN, Attorney General, v. Willard UPHAUS.
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court

Louis C. Wyman, Atty. Gen., pro se.

Royal W. France, New York City, Nighswander, Lord & Bownes and Hugh H. Bownes, Laconia, for defendant.

PER CURIAM.

New Hampshire World Fellowship Center, Inc. is a New Hampshire corporation which maintains accommodations for the public at Albany, New Hampshire, during the summer season. By means of a sign near the highway the public is invited to stop there at specified rates. The defendant, a native of Indiana and resident of New Haven, Connecticut, has been executive director of the Center since 1953. He described the Center thus: 'The World Fellowship of Faiths is a religious-motivated movement in the highest sense which seeks to bring together for fellowship and discussion the representatives of all faiths to the end that there may be peace, brother-hood and plenty for all men, women and children. It is a movement world-wide in its purpose.'

In the course of interrogation by the Attorney General, both privately and before the Court, the defendant furnished the names of persons who spoke or conducted discussions at the Center in the course of the 1954 and 1955 seasons. Some twenty persons, all non-residents, were named by the witness as speakers in 1954, and over twenty-eight as speakers in 1955, a number of the latter being persons who had spoken in 1954. Information in the possession of the Attorney General concerning some of these persons and their connection with organizations or agencies considered to be communist-influenced or controlled, was contained in his report to the 1955 Legislature, which was before the Trial Court. Attorney General's Report on Subversive Activities, New Hampshire, 1955, pp. 136-156. Likewise, information concerning the defendant's connections with and support of similar organizations was before the Court in the same report. Id., pp. 162-175.

The defendant in the course of the proceedings has placed no reliance upon the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, or the Fifteenth Article of the New Hampshire Bill of Rights. He testified that he was not a Communist and never had been, and that none of the speakers at the Center, or its guests, were to his knowledge Communists, although he was aware of the connections held by many of them and frankly conceded his own activities in past years. He testified that at no time at the Center was there any advocacy of overthrow of the government by force or violence. A teacher by profession, and holding a Ph.D. degree in religious education from Yale, he described himself as a pacifist, and believer in a 'form of Christian social society.'

The witness testified that the Center could accommodate a maximum of sixty persons for a meal, and that the guest register for the 1954 season consisted of approximately three hundred sixty names and addresses, upon three by five cards, kept by him 'in an office' in New Haven. He testified that the register for 1955, similarly kept, consisted of about two hundred fifty names and addresses up to August 31, 1955, and 'something over three hundred' for the summer. In refusing to produce the registrations, the witness characterized the inquiries of the Attorney General as an 'attempt * * * to harass and intimidate me and to destroy the work of the World Fellowship of Faiths' and 'a direct invasion of Christian conscience, and authority higher than that of the state.' He refused upon the ground of conscience to give the names and addresses 'of people who to my knowledge have never done anything to injure their country and who came to World Fellowship Center solely for vacation, recreation and friendly discussions'; because to do so 'would turn [him] into a contemptible informer' and he could not 'involve innocent people in the Attorney General's network.' Specifically he relied upon the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Articles 4th, 5th and 19th of the New Hampshire Bill of Rights.

In this court, the defendant has relied upon the same constitutional provisions. He contends that the investigation is unconstitutional and invalid by reason of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S.Ct. 477, 100 L.Ed. 640. He further contends that the information sought by the petitioner has not been shown to be relevant or pertinent to the subject of the investigation, that information before the Trial Court was incompetent because hearsay, and that the order committing him until he should purge himself of his contempt is invalid because indefinite and constituting cruel and unusual punishment. Constitution of the United States, Amend. VIII.

I. We are confronted at the outset by the contention that the investigation is shown to be invalid by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra. The same contention was advanced without success on motion fo rehearing in Wyman v. Sweezy, 100 N.H. 103, 121 A.2d 783 and was strongly urged in Kahn v. Wyman, 100 N.H. 245, 123 A.2d 166, 167. In the latter case, after full consideration the opinion was expressed that Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra, did not preclude conduct of the 'investigations of subversive activities within the state as distinct from * * * the prosecution of crimes.' See also, State v. Raley, 100 Ohio App. 75, 136 N.E.2d 295, 307. We see no present reason to recede from the views previously expressed.

In this connection it may be of interest to note that courts of other jurisdictions which have thought it necessary because of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania decision, supra, to dismiss prosecutions charging offenses against the state as well as the federal government have done so with reservation of the possibility that some 'kind of sedition [might be] directed so exclusively against the State as to fall outside the sweep of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson.' Commonwealth v. Gilbert, Mass., 134 N.E.2d 13, 16. See also, Braden v. Commonwealth, Ky. 291 S.W. 843, 844.

The circumstance that the usefulness of the investigation authorized by the resolutions of 1953 and 1955 has been diminished by the holding of the Pennsylvania case does not preclude continuance of the investigation for any purposes which may remain open. See 70 Harvard L.R. 95, 119, and footnote 148; Note, 31 Ind.L.J. 270, 281-5. The defendant's argument that the investigation is invalid cannot be adopted.

II. The witness Uphaus contends that the record fails to establish the relevancy of the evidence sought and ordered to be produced. It is fundamental that 'the power exercised by a committee * * * must be within both the authority delegated to it and also within the competence of the [legislative body] to confer upon the committee.' United States v. Lamont, D.C., 18 F.R.D.27, 33, affirmed 2 Cir., 236 F.2d 312. Although as a result of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra, the State is without authority to prosecute offenses against the federal government, the power to investigate to determine 'whether subversive persons as defined in said [1951] act are presently located within this state' [Laws 1953, c. 307] and whether 'necessary legislation' should on that account be recommended (Id.) remains unimpaired. In this connection it may be well to observe that any questions of policy regarding this legislation are not for the court but belong exclusively to the Legislature and this distinction we are bound to respect. Chronicle & Gazette Pub. Co. v. Attorney General, 94 N.H. 148, 151, 48 A.2d 478, 168 A.L.R. 879. If through its legally authorized committee, the Attorney General Wyman v. Sweezy, 100 N.H. 103, 105, 121 A.2d 783, the Legislature has asked for relevant information it is entitled to it. The test to determine whether the question is relevant is to inquire whether 'the question is directed at a possible answer * * * which would be reasonably concerned with the main object of the investigation.' Wyman v. Sweezy, supra, 100 N.H. 106, 121 A.2d 787.

To establish relevancy in the case before us, the petitioner relied substantially upon the content of Uphaus' answers, and the information concerning him and speakers at the Center which is summarized in the report to the 1955 Legislature hereinbefore cited. The witness objected to the latter information as hearsay and incompetent. This objection has not been strongly urged before us and we have already rejected this argument in Wyman v. Sweezy, supra, decided since the hearings of the Attorney General in this case were held. The petitioner is clearly entitled to act upon 'reasonable or reliable' information, Laws 1953, c. 307, which he may present to the Court, even though in hearsay form to establish the relevancy of his inquiry. Wyman v. Sweezy, supra, 100 N.H. 111, 121 A.2d 790. As was observed in United States v. Sacher, D.C., 139 F.Supp. 855, 860, in considering a similar objection: 'Obviously hearsay, testimony * * * may sufficiently establish * * * pertinency of the questions here involved and the reasons for asking them.'

The witness refuses to produce the guest registrations of World Fellowship, claiming in effect that they cannot possibly be reasonably concerned with 'whether subversives are presently located within the state.' Laws 1953, c. 307. In determining the worth of this objection it appears necessary to detail some of the information disclosed by the record as being in the Attorney General's possession and bearing on whether the question as to the guest cards was relevant, since the context in which a question is asked may 'indicate its relevancy * * *.' Wyman v. Sweezy, supra, 100 N.H. 107, 121 A.2d 788.

It appears that the witness was a supporter of numerous...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Uphaus v. Wyman
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 8, 1959
    ...were subversive persons or organizations present in the State of New Hampshire. Upon the first appeal from the New Hampshire court, 100 N.H. 436, 130 A.2d 278, we vacated the judgment, 355 U.S. 16, 78 S.Ct. 57, 2 L.Ed.2d 22, and remanded the case to it for consideration in the light of Swee......
  • Wyman v. De Gregory
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of New Hampshire
    • December 31, 1957
    ...Court was not properly or constitutionally imposed is not valid. This issue was decided adversely to his contentions in Wyman v. Uphaus, 100 N.H. 436, 448, 130 A.2d 278, and we have not altered the views there Exceptions overruled. WHEELER, J., did not sit. DUNCAN, J., dissented; the others......
  • Wyman v. De Gregory
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of New Hampshire
    • April 14, 1961
    ...See Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 38, 39, 105 A.2d 756; Wyman v. Sweezy, 100 N.H. 103, 110, 113, 121 A.2d 783; Wyman v. Uphaus, 100 N.H. 436, 441, 450, 130 A.2d 278; Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 236, 246, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311; Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79 S.Ct......
  • Manna, In re
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division
    • July 3, 1973
    ...pocket. Staley v. South Jersey Realty Co., 83 N.J.Eq. 300, 90 A. 1042 (1914). He need not be incarcerated at all. In Wyman v. Uphaus, 100 N.H. 436, 130 A.2d 278 (1957), the New Hampshire Supreme Court considered a similar argument and rejected it. That result was affirmed by the United Stat......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT