Gibony v. Foster
Citation | 130 S.W. 314,230 Mo. 106 |
Parties | OSCAR GIBONY and LEWIS GIBONY, Appellants, v. MARY E. FOSTER, NANCY C. BANFIELD, JOHN GIBONY and GEORGE GIBONY |
Decision Date | 19 July 1910 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Appeal from Greene Circuit Court. -- Hon. Jas. T. Neville, Judge.
Affirmed.
Patterson Patterson & Delaney for appellants.
(1) A will contest is an action at law wherein parties have a right to a trial by jury, and wherein the prerogative of a jury to weigh the evidence (where there is substantial evidence) can no more be usurped than in any other action at law. The question of the weight of the evidence is for the jury. In this case there is not only substantial evidence to take the case to the jury, but it is of a character cogent and convincing. Young v. Ridenbaugh, 67 Mo. 574; McFadden v. Catron, 138 Mo. 227; State ex rel v. Guinotte, 156 Mo. 520; Roberts v. Bartlett, 190 Mo. 680; Sayre v. Trustees, 192 Mo. 120; Goodfellow v. Shannon, 197 Mo. 271; Archambault v. Blanchard, 198 Mo. 425; Knapp v. Trust Co., 199 Mo. 640; Schaff v. Peters, 111 Mo.App. 447. (2) Where evidence is conflicting as to the capacity of testator it is a question of fact for the jury. Appleby v Brock, 76 Mo. 314; Aylward v. Briggs, 145 Mo. 604; Moore v. McNulty, 164 Mo. 111; Kirchman v. Scott, 166 Mo. 214; Southworth v. Southworth, 173 Mo. 73. (3) The burden was on the proponent to show not only the due execution of the will, herein, but that testatrix had mental capacity. The burden remained with proponents throughout the case. Nor is this rule changed by the rule of procedure which declares in effect that proponents make out a prima-facie case by merely proving proper execution and attestation of will, and by merely introducing subscribing witnesses as to sanity. Cowan v. Shaver, 197 Mo. 203; Goodfellow v. Shannon, 197 Mo. 271. (4) Testamentary capacity means that the testatrix, at the time of the execution of the will, had, without the aid of other persons, sufficient understanding and intelligence to transact her ordinary business, and to understand the nature and character of her property and the persons to whom she was giving it, and to appreciate the claims of the natural objects of affection. By this standard, Mrs. Gibony was not possessed of testamentary capacity. Brinkman v. Rueggesick, 71 Mo. 553; Couch v. Gentry, 113 Mo. 248; Farmer v. Farmer, 129 Mo. 534; Roberts v. Bartlett, 190 Mo. 680; Knapp v. Trust Co., 199 Mo. 640; Archambault v. Blanchard, 198 Mo. 384. (5) The question of undue influence should have been submitted to the jury. It is a question for the jury where there is substantial evidence. Young v. Ridenbaugh, 67 Mo. 574. (6) Undue influence need not be shown by direct evidence, but may be inferred from circumstances. Garvin's Admr. v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465; Maddox v. Maddox, 114 Mo. 35; Carl v. Gabel, 120 Mo. 297; Dausman v. Ranken, 189 Mo. 677; Bradford v. Blossom, 190 Mo. 110; Roberts v. Bartlett, 190 Mo. 680; King v. Gilson, 191 Mo. 307; Meier v. Ruchter, 197 Mo. 68. (7) While the rule is that the burden of proving undue influence is upon the contestant, yet in this case, owing to the relation subsisting between Nancy Banfield and the testatrix, and the age and condition of health of testatrix, and all the circumstances preceding and surrounding the alleged execution of the alleged will, the concealment following its alleged execution, such a relation of trust is established as to put the burden of proof upon Mrs. Banfield, the chief beneficiary. Roberts v. Bartlett, 190 Mo. 680.
B. U. Massey, G. A. Watson and J. C. West for respondents.
(1) The will was properly executed, and the court did not err in admitting it. Mays v. Mays, 114 Mo. 536. (2) There being no substantial evidence, either of testamentary incapacity or undue influence, it was the duty of the court so to instruct the jury. Crowson v. Crowson, 172 Mo. 691; Hughes v. Rader, 183 Mo. 630; Wood v. Carpenter, 166 Mo. 465; McFadin v. Catron, 138 Mo. 196. (3) The proof that testatrix failed to recognize her acquaintances at times; that she lost her way; that she failed to grasp readily the details of her business, falls far short of establishing testamentary incapacity. Southworth v. Southworth, 173 Mo. 72; Hughes v. Rader, 183 Mo. 630; Wood v. Carpenter, 166 Mo. 465. (4) Although testatrix may not have been able to cope with a combination of real estate agents in making a bargain in the two instances mentioned in the testimony, this fact does not tend to establish testamentary incapacity, for a person may be capable of making a will and not be competent to make a contract or manage an estate. Crossan v. Crossan, 169 Mo. 640; Brinkman v. Rueggesick, 71 Mo. 553; Crowson v. Crowson, 172 Mo. 691. (5) The influence denounced by the law must be such as amounts to overpersuasion, coercion or force; destroying the free agency or will power of the testator and substituting the will of another. McFadin v. Catron, 138 Mo. 197. (6) The statements of testatrix as to the conduct of Mrs. Banfield and the statements of Mrs. Banfield, are not competent to show undue influence in the procurement of this will. Techenbrook v. McLaughlin, 209 Mo. 533; Sechert v. Hatcher, 205 Mo. 83.
This action to contest the will of Sarah A. Gibony, late of Greene county, Missouri, was instituted in the Greene Circuit Court on April 30, 1904. The plaintiff Lewis Gibony and the defendants are children of Sarah A. Gibony; the plaintiff Oscar Gibony is a grandchild of said Sarah A. Gibony.
The petition alleges, first, that at the time Sarah A. Gibony executed the will in contest she was of unsound mind and incapable of comprehending her property and the natural objects of her bounty, and was incompetent to make a will; and, second, that said pretended will was procured by undue influence of Nancy C. Banfield over the testatrix. The answer of the defendants Mary E. Foster, Nancy C. Banfield and George Gibony was a denial of the allegations of the petition.
The will in contest bears date December 20, 1902. At the time of its execution Mrs. Gibony was eighty-eight years of age. She died January 28, 1904, and the will was admitted to probate by the probate court of Greene county on February 3, 1904. The instrument involved in this contest is as follows:
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