Minski v. United States, 9157
| Decision Date | 15 February 1943 |
| Docket Number | 9179.,No. 9157,9157 |
| Parties | MINSKI v. UNITED STATES. DELIA v. SAME. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Harold H. Armstrong, of Detroit, Mich. (Harold H. Armstrong and Lawrence J. Verdier, both of Detroit, Mich., on the brief), for appellant William Minski.
Morton A. Eden, of Detroit, Mich. (Jack N. Tucker and Morton A. Eden, both of Detroit, Mich., on the brief), for appellant Frank Delia. John C. Ray, of Detroit, Mich. (John C. Lehr and John C. Ray, both of Detroit, Mich., on the brief), for the United States.
Before HICKS, ALLEN, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
These cognate cases are disposed of by one opinion.
Appellant Minski was convicted upon the first and second counts of an indictment which alleged violations of sub-section (f) of Sec. 2 of the Federal Firearms Act, 52 Stat., ch. 850, p. 1250 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 902, sub-section (f), (i), and upon a third count which alleged a violation of sub-section (i) of Sec. 2 of the same Act (§ 902 subsec. (i).
Appellant Delia was convicted upon both counts of an indictment which alleged violations of sub-section (f) of the statute. Sub-section (f) is as follows: "(f) It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime of violence or is a fugitive from justice to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, and the possession of a firearm or ammunition by any such person shall be presumptive evidence that such firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported or received, as the case may be, by such person in violation of this Act chapter." (Italics ours.)
Sub-section (i) is as follows: "(i) It shall be unlawful for any person to transport, ship, or knowingly receive in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm from which the manufacturer's serial number has been removed, obliterated, or altered, and the possession of any such firearm shall be presumptive evidence that such firearm was transported, shipped, or received, as the case may be, by the possessor in violation of this Act chapter." (Italics ours.)
The facts are, that Minski was on November 10, 1921, convicted in the Recorder's Court of Detroit of robbery while armed, and a sentence of 10 to 20 years was imposed. There was substantial evidence that on September 22, 1941, Minski, while driving along the streets of Hamtramck, Mich., was stopped by police officers, who found on the floor of his car a 45 caliber Colt, frontier model, single action, revolver, from which the manufacturer's serial number had been obliterated. The revolver was loaded with five Remington 45 caliber ball cartridges. There was stamped thereon the name and address of the maker and the place of manufacture, to wit, Hartford, Conn. The cartridges were manufactured by Remington Cartridge Company of Bridgeport, Conn. There was evidence that the revolver was 40 or 50 years old.
In Delia's case the facts are, that on October 4, 1930, he was convicted in the Recorder's Court of Detroit of robbery while armed and was given an indeterminate sentence of from 12½ to 25 years. There was substantial evidence that on September 25, 1941, he was found in Detroit in possession of a Victor 38 caliber, double action, No. 19435 revolver, containing two 38 caliber Peters cartridges and three R.W.S. 38 caliber cartridges. This revolver was made about 1920 by Harrington Richardson in Worcester, Mass. Some of the cartridges were made in Ohio and the others in Germany.
The caption of this act is: "To regulate commerce in firearms." Sub-section (f) applies to two classes of persons, to wit: (1) those who have been convicted of a crime of violence; and (2) those who are fugitives from justice, but not to either unless they have received a firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Sub-section (i) applies to all who transport, ship or knowingly receive in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm from which the manufacturer's serial number has been obliterated or altered.
Ordinarily it would not be difficult for the Government to prove that a defendant found with forbidden firearms or ammunition was a convict of the class mentioned, or a fugitive from justice, but to establish that the forbidden articles had been shipped, transported or received in interstate commerce, would raise for it an almost insuperable burden unless the law should bring to its aid some character of presumptive evidence. This is true because the circumstances under which the defendant has acquired possession of the forbidden articles are in most cases peculiarly within his knowledge. For this reason the Congress undertook to bring to the aid of the Government, in its task of enforcing the statute, the "presumptive evidence" clauses which we have italicized.
The principal question here is whether the presumptions provided by sub-sections (f) and (i) were violative of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Statutory presumptions, whereby the proof of one fact or group of facts shall constitute prima facie or presumptive evidence of the main or ultimate fact, are not, per se, illegal. Such statutes have been upheld even in criminal cases. Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 45 S. Ct. 470, 69 L.Ed. 904; Copperthwaite et al. v. United States, 6 Cir., 37 F.2d 846, 848.
In Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, Adm'r, 219 U.S. 35, 42, 31 S.Ct. 136, 138, 55 L.Ed. 78, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 226, Ann.Cas.1912A, 463, the court upheld legislation which provided, as a rule of evidence, that the proof of one fact shall constitute prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue, but it pointed out a well-recognized qualification to the rule that it is "essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate."
In McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U.S. 79, 36 S.Ct. 498, 501, 60 L.Ed. 899, the court reviewed a statute of Louisiana, which created the rebuttable presumption that any person systematically paying in that state a lower price for sugar than he paid in any other state is a party to a monopoly or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Quoting, as we have done from the Turnipseed case, the court said further: (Italics ours.)
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