McCardle v. Haddad
| Decision Date | 21 November 1997 |
| Docket Number | 2040,D,Nos. 1613,s. 1613 |
| Parties | Patricia McCARDLE, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. Jonathan HADDAD, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant. ockets 96-9133(L), 96-9503. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Norman A. Pattis, New Haven, CT (Williams, Polan & Pattis, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
Martin S. Echter, Deputy Corporation Counsel, New Haven, CT, for Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
Before: KEARSE and CALABRESI, Circuit Judges, and MUNSON, District
Judge *.
Plaintiff Patricia McCardle appeals from so much of a judgment and supplemental judgment (collectively "judgment") of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Alfred V. Covello, Judge, as awarded her $1.00 in nominal damages and $0.33 in attorneys' fees on her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) against defendant Jonathan Haddad for violation of her right under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches. Judgment was entered following a jury verdict finding that McCardle's automobile had been unreasonably searched, but awarding no damages. On appeal, McCardle contends that the district court erred (1) in failing to instruct the jury that it could award her punitive damages, and (2) in calculating her award of attorneys' fees. Haddad cross-appeals, contending that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law either because his actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment or because he was entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons that follow, we reject Haddad's contention that there was no violation, and we conclude that his defense of qualified immunity was not properly preserved. We also reject McCardle's contentions that she was entitled to have the jury instructed on punitive damages and was entitled to an award of substantial attorneys' fees.
The events that gave rise to this lawsuit occurred on March 24, 1992. McCardle was employed part-time by the Connecticut Department of Corrections as a drug counselor and part-time as a clerk in a bookstore. Haddad was a police officer of the City of New Haven, Connecticut. As McCardle was driving in New Haven that afternoon, she was stopped by Haddad and given citations for various traffic infractions. McCardle brought the present action, contending that Haddad stopped her and searched her car in violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment.
The testimony at trial presented sharply conflicting versions of what happened during the stop. Except in recounting Haddad's testimony, we describe the evidence with respect to the claim of illegal search in the light most favorable to McCardle, as the party in whose favor the jury found on that claim and against whom judgment is sought as a matter of law.
A. The Events
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on March 24, 1992, McCardle was driving to her bookstore job. As she drove along Edgewood Avenue, several young men were standing in the street, blocking her way. McCardle slowed and stopped to avoid hitting them; as they moved to the sidewalk, she rolled down her window and upbraided them for having blocked the street. After McCardle resumed driving, she immediately noticed a patrol car following her and signaling her to pull over.
Haddad, the driver of the patrol car, testified that when he first saw McCardle's car, it was stopped in the middle of a traffic lane, near a corner known for heavy drug activity. He saw several young black males standing facing the driver's side of McCardle's car; the closest was a few feet away from her car, looking in the window. When Haddad turned the corner onto Edgewood Avenue, the males quickly walked away. McCardle began to accelerate quickly, whereupon Haddad signaled her to pull over. Haddad testified that he had not seen anything pass between McCardle's car and the young men.
When McCardle pulled over and stopped, Haddad approached her window and asked to see her driver's license and registration, which she gave him along with her wallet, telling him that her license had expired. Haddad instructed McCardle to step out of her car and said to her, He At Haddad's request, McCardle got into the back of his patrol car. The back was separated from the front seats by metal grillwork. McCardle testified that she did not remember there being any interior handles on the back doors; Haddad testified that he did not know whether or not there were such handles. According to Haddad's trial testimony, McCardle was not under arrest or in custody:
said, "Nobody stops on Edgewood Avenue unless they're copping drugs."
Q. .... [T]his was an arrest, or a custodial stop, at least, and an investigation?
A. No, sir.
Q. She wasn't in custody?
A. No, sir.
Q. She was free to leave?
A. Absolutely.
Q. So if from the back of that car with the grill and possibly without a [back door] handle she said I want to go, you would have let her go?
A. Absolutely.
(Trial Transcript ("Tr.") 122.)
McCardle testified that, from the back seat of Haddad's car, she watched Haddad return to her car, thrust his head and most of his body inside, and search it for approximately 10 minutes. She could see him look beneath the seats and into the compartments on the driver's side. When Haddad returned to his car, he inquired about McCardle's Department of Corrections identification card--which had been in McCardle's wallet when she handed it to him--asking, "Are you a guard?" After McCardle explained that she was a part-time drug counselor, Haddad asked, "So how do you get to get a badge if you're a counselor?" McCardle testified that she had not mentioned having a badge; that when she was off duty, as she was when stopped by Haddad, she kept her badge in the glove compartment of her car; and that the badge was still in that compartment when she eventually returned to her car. Accordingly, McCardle inferred that Haddad had also searched the car's glove compartment.
Haddad, in contrast, denied at trial that he had conducted any search whatever. He testified that he understood that at the time he stopped McCardle he could lawfully have "patted her down" to check for a weapon, but he stated that he did not do so. He also said he understood the plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, and he testified that he did not inspect the car except to look into it from the outside for objects in plain view:
Q. ... in fact, you were aware, based on your skill and training and experience as a police officer, that you needed a warrant to search an automobile, or that there were certain exceptions that might apply?
A. Correct.
Q. And one of them is the so-called plain view exception, right; that's what you were trained?
A. Correct.
Q. So you walked around the car looking in the windows to see if you saw anything that was suspicious, fair enough?
A. I don't know if I walked around it, but I looked in it.
Q. Did you see anything suspicious?
A. No.
Q. What did you do other than looking in the car?
A. I had it towed.
Q. What did you do with respect to the car? Did you go in it?
A. No.
Q. Did you check what was under the seat?
A. No.
Q. Did you look in the glove box?
A. No.
Q. Look behind in the back seat?
A. No.
Q. How carefully did you search the interior of the car when you looked at it from outside?
(Tr. 126-27.)
Haddad eventually issued McCardle various traffic tickets. He did not allow her to drive her car away because she had no current
license, and he caused a private towing company to be called to tow the car. McCardle eventually left with the tow truck driver.
McCardle commenced the present action in 1994 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that both the stop and the search violated her Fourth Amendment rights, and requesting compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. At the close of the evidence at trial, the district court refused to instruct the jury that it might award McCardle punitive damages. The case was submitted to the jury only on her claims for compensatory damages.
The jury found that McCardle had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Haddad's stop of her car constituted an unreasonable seizure; but it found that Haddad had violated her Fourth Amendment rights by searching the car. On the latter claim, however, the jury awarded no damages. The district court eventually entered judgment in McCardle's favor on the unlawful search claim in the amount of $1 as nominal damages.
Following the conclusion of the trial, as discussed in Parts II.A. and B. below, Haddad moved for judgment dismissing the unlawful search claim as a matter of law. The district court denied the motion. As discussed in Part II.D. below, McCardle moved pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) for attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $5,330. In an endorsed order dated October 15, 1996 ("Fee Order"), the court stated that, "[c]onsidering the amount of damages awarded compared to the amount sought, ... the plaintiff's degree of success was minimal." Fee Order. It awarded McCardle "$0.33 dollars in attorney fees and costs, this representing one third of the judgment." Id.
McCardle has appealed, challenging the district court's refusal to instruct the jury that it could award her punitive damages, and contending that the court erred in limiting her award of attorneys' fees to 33 cents. Haddad has cross-appealed, contending that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing McCardle's claim for unconstitutional search, principally on the ground that the search was lawful. He adds a terse assertion that, alternatively, he was entitled to dismissal on the ground of qualified immunity. Because Haddad's arguments, if accepted, would moot...
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