Stevens v. Umsted

Decision Date16 December 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-2071,96-2071
Citation131 F.3d 697
Parties122 Ed. Law Rep. 956 Ronald E. STEVENS, Individually and as Guardian of the Person and Estate of Bradley Edwin Stevens, a disabled person, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard UMSTED, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

M. John Hefner, Jr. (argued), Hefner & Eberspacher, Matoon, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Rita M. Novak, Office of the Atty. General, Chicago, IL, A. Benjamin Goldgar (argued), Office of the Atty. General Civil Appeals Div., Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., COFFEY and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

COFFEY, Circuit Judge.

Ronald E. Stevens ("Stevens"), both individually and as guardian of his son, Bradley Edwin Stevens ("Bradley") brought an action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Richard Umsted, the superintendent of the Illinois School for the Visually Impaired ("ISVI"). The complaint failed to specify whether Umsted was being sued in his official capacity, individual capacity, or both. Stevens claimed that while his blind and developmentally disabled son attended ISVI he was repeatedly sexually assaulted by other students. He asserted that Umsted violated Bradley's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect Bradley from these assaults, even after Umsted had actual knowledge that assaults had taken place. The district court granted Umsted's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) finding that the first amended complaint failed to allege that Bradley was in state custody at the time of the assaults. The district court also construed the complaint as being against Umsted in his official capacity and found that the Eleventh Amendment barred Stevens's claims for damages. Additionally, the trial court stated that even if Umsted had been sued in his individual capacity he would have been entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Bradley attended ISVI, located in Jacksonville, Illinois, as a full-time resident student from at least 1984 through 1994. 1 ISVI is operated by the Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services under the Disabled Persons Rehabilitation Act "for the education of children with visual and hearing handicaps who are unable to take advantage of the regular educational facilities provided in the community...." 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 2405/10(a); 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 2405/3(e); Ill. Admin. Code, tit. 89, § 750.10. The school offers instructional programs for students between the ages of 5 and 21, whose primary exceptional characteristic is a visual impairment or for individuals who are "deaf-blind." Ill. Admin. Code, tit. 89, §§ 755.40, 765.10(b). ISVI also maintains programs for students with secondary disabilities, including deficits in essential learning processes, deficits in intellectual development and mental capacity, and affective disorders or adaptive behavior which restricts effective functioning. Ill. Admin. Code, tit. 89, § 765.10(d). However, ISVI provides programs for these secondary disabilities only if the disabilities are "not so severe that the needs of the student cannot be met appropriately by the State School." Ill. Admin Code, tit. 89, § 765.10(d). ISVI provides its service at no cost to parents. Ill. Admin. Code, tit. 89, § 760.10.

During the period Bradley attended ISVI, Umsted was the superintendent of the school. At the school, Bradley was subjected to numerous sexual assaults by an unidentified student or students of the facility. At some point not alleged, Umsted became aware of the sexual assaults. Even after Umsted had actual knowledge of the assaults, additional attacks of a sexual nature were perpetrated against Bradley. As a result of the assaults, Bradley suffered physical and emotional harm, and incurred medical expenses.

On June 12, 1995, Stevens filed a complaint alleging that Umsted had a duty to protect Bradley from further assaults and that Umsted's failure to do so violated Bradley's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Umsted moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. After the motion was fully briefed, the district court granted the motion but allowed Stevens an opportunity to amend. Stevens then filed a first amended complaint ("complaint") which alleged that even after Umsted had been made aware of the assaults he failed to provide Bradley with a reasonably safe environment because he did not: take reasonable steps to prevent further sexual assaults of Bradley; inform Stevens, Bradley's natural father and guardian, of the assaults; remove the perpetrators of the sexual assaults from the school; or place Bradley in a residential facility offering a more secure environment. Umsted responded by moving for dismissal for failure to state a claim or alternatively for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), and further asserted that he was entitled to qualified immunity. On April 1, 1996, the district court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the action with prejudice finding that Bradley did not have a constitutional right to have Umsted protect him. The trial court further found that the Eleventh Amendment would bar Bradley's claims for damages, and that even if Umsted had been sued in his individual capacity he would be entitled to qualified immunity because no previous case recognized the constitutional duty alleged.

On appeal, Stevens argues that Bradley's substantive due process rights were violated by Umsted's failure to protect Bradley from further assaults after he had knowledge of prior attacks, and Umsted's allowance of an environment permitting sexual assaults. Stevens also argues that Umsted is not entitled to qualified immunity. In addition, he raises for the first time in this appeal, that a duty to protect an individual from other private citizens may have arisen because the state created the danger. We affirm.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Duty to Protect Under § 1983

"This court reviews a district court's decision to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim de novo." Conover v. Lein, 87 F.3d 905, 906-07 (7th Cir.1996); see Turner/ Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d 1312, 1319 (7th Cir.1997). "[L]ike the district court, we must take all [of Stevens's] ... well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to [him]." Turner/Ozanne, 111 F.3d at 1319. Dismissal of the complaint should be granted only if " 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' " Id. at 1319-20 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). "It is true that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff to set out in detail the facts upon which a claim is based. Nevertheless, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to outline the cause of action, proof of which is essential to recovery." Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir.1985).

"To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the defendant acted under color of state law." Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir.1996). Stevens argues that Umsted's failure to protect his son Bradley violated Bradley's substantive due process rights of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Bradley undoubtedly had a liberty interest in his own physical safety. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272, 114 S.Ct. 807, 812, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (plurality) (substantive due process protects "the right to bodily integrity"); Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 254 (7th Cir.1997) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 565, 139 L.Ed.2d 405 (1997); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Services, 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir.1987) (same), aff'd, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). However, Stevens's complaint failed to state a claim in that it did not allege a deprivation of Bradley's constitutional rights.

The central case defining government liability under the United State Constitution, for acts committed against individuals by private actors is DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). In DeShaney, a county department of social services had received several complaints that a child may have been abused by his father. Although the department took various steps to investigate the complaints and protect the child, they did not remove him from his father's custody. Ultimately the father beat the child so severely that he suffered permanent brain damage and was rendered profoundly retarded. The child and his mother brought a § 1983 action against the department arguing that it had violated the child's right to substantive due process by failing to protect him from his father's violence. The Supreme Court held that the government's failure to protect the child did not violate a constitutional right.

In DeShaney, the Supreme Court made clear that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the government to prevent private citizens from harming each other. "[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195, 109 S.Ct. at 1002. "Its purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other." Id. at 196, 109 S.Ct. at 1003. The Supreme Court concluded and stated that "[a]s a general matter ... we conclude that a State's failure to protect an individual...

To continue reading

Request your trial
105 cases
  • Malesevic v. Tecom Fleet Services, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • 23 d3 Setembro d3 1998
    ... ... A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 427 (7th Cir.1997); Estate of Stevens v. City of Green Bay, 105 F.3d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir.1997); Maravilla v. United States, 60 F.3d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir.1995). Even if the facts are not ... Adickes, 398 U.S. at 150, 90 S.Ct. at 1604; Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir.1998); Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir.1997); Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) ...          A. Tecom ... ...
  • Barber v. Overton
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 2 d4 Agosto d4 2007
    ... ... Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198 (5th Cir.1994) (high school student killed by a nonstudent); Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1997) (disabled student sexually assaulted by another student); S.S. ex rel. Jervis v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960 ... ...
  • Rangel v. Reynolds
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • 9 d4 Abril d4 2009
    ... ... Reynolds, and a § 1983 complaint that fails to specify capacity is usually construed to be an official capacity suit. Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 706 (7th Cir.1997). However, even if this Court were to consider Plaintiffs' pro se status, and construe Plaintiffs' ... ...
  • Kyle v. Morton High School
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 11 d1 Maio d1 1998
    ... ... See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294; Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991); Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir.1997). In our review we consider well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint to be true. We make ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT