United States v. Geddes

• Decision Date: 08 June 1904
• Docket Number: 1,270.
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. GEDDES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

131 F. 452

UNITED STATES v. GEDDES.

No. 1,270.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

June 8, 1904

This was a suit on behalf of the United States for the recovery of penalties provided by Act Cong. March 2, 1893, c. 196, Sec 6, 27 Stat. 532, as amended by Act Cong. April 1, 1896, c 87, 29 Stat. 85 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 31751, known as the 'Safety Appliance Act.' The sections of the act involved are:

'Section 1. That from and after the 1st day of January, 1898, it shall be unlawful for any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to use on its line any locomotive engine in moving interstate traffic not equipped with a power driving wheel brake and appliances for operating the train brake system, or to run any train in such traffic after said date that has not a sufficient number of cars in it so equipped with power or train brakes that the engineer on the locomotive drawing such train can control its speed without requiring brakemen to use the common hand brake for that purpose.'

'Sec. 2. That on and after the 1st day of January, 1898, it shall be unlawful for any such common carrier to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars.'

'Sec. 6. That any such common carrier using any locomotive engine, running any train, or hauling or permitting to be hauled or used on its line any car in violation of any of the provisions of this act, shall be liable to be a penalty of one hundred dollars for each and every such violation, to be recovered in a suit or suits to be brought by the United States District Attorney in the district court of the United States having jurisdiction in the locality where such violation shall have been committed; and it shall be the duty of such District Attorney to bring such suits upon duly verified information being lodged with him of such violation having occurred; and it shall also be the duty of the Interstate Commerce Commission to lodge with the proper district attorney's information of any such violations as may come to its knowledge,' etc.

The petition contains four causes of action, alleging four violations of the law, based upon the movement of four cars used in moving interstate traffic, but not equipped with automatic couplers. A jury was waived and the court found in favor of the defendant on the ground that the railroad operated by him was not engaged in interstate commerce and that the cars complained of were not used in moving interstate traffic.

The Ohio River & Wester Railway Company (operated by the defendant as receiver) was, at the time of the acts complained of, a common carrier owning and operating a narrow gauge railroad about 100 miles long, wholly within the state of Ohio, from Bellaire, on the Ohio river, to Zanesville, a town in the interior. At Bellaire it connected with the Baltimore & Ohio road, in the sense that it received from the Baltimore & Ohio freight from other states marked for points on its line, and delivered to the Baltimore & Ohio freight from points on its line marked for other states, in the following manner: There was no interchange or common use of cars, the gauges of the two roads being different. The cars of the defendant road were used only on its own line. But a transfer track ran from the main line of the Baltimore & Ohio to the terminal station of the defendant road, so that the freight cars of the two roads could be placed alongside adjoining platforms and the transfer of freight made by the use of trucks handled by the Baltimore & Ohio men. No through bills of lading for such freight were issued by either road, no through rate was fixed by mutual arrangement, and no conventional division of a through freight charge was made. Each road charged and collected its local freight rate in this way: Freight transported to Bellaire by the defendant road and marked for a point in another state was delivered to the agents of the Baltimore & Ohio, with an expense of transfer bill, which stated the original point of shipment, the consignee and place of consignment, and the freight charges of the delivering road. Waybills also accompanied the traffic. On taking charge of the freight, the Baltimore & Ohio would assume the payment of the freight charges of the defendant road collecting the entire charges on delivering the freight at its destination. The same method was pursued with respect to freight coming from outside Ohio, and destined for a point on the line of the defendant road within Ohio, except that the agents of the Baltimore & Ohio at Bellaire would bring the traffic to and put it in the cars of the defendant road. On receiving the freight, with the expense of transfer bill, the defendant road would assume the charges of the Baltimore & Ohio, collecting the entire freight charges at the collections and the payment of any balance found to be due on such settlements; but each road became responsible for the freight charges of the other, whether they were ever collected from the consignee or not. Such transfers of traffic were made nearly every day. Each company's freight charges were in accordance with its own rates.

The acts upon which the suit was based were the hauling in a car not equipped with automatic couplers, from Summerfield, Ohio, to Bellaire, Ohio, of 37 cases of eggs destined for Pittsburg, Pa., and delivered at Bellaire to the Baltimore & Ohio road for shipment there; and the hauling in three separate cars not equipped with automatic couplers, from Bellaire, Ohio, to Woodsfield, Ohio, of certain coils of wire rope shipped from Philadelphia, consigned to Woodsfield, and transferred from the Baltimore & Ohio to the defendant road at Bellaire for shipment to Woodsfield. It does not appear that any through bills of lading were issued for this freight. The form of bill of lading used by the defendant company was produced. It had on it the following printed notice: 'This blank must in no case be filled with the name of any station or place beyond the line of this company's road.'

Sherman T. McPherson and L. A. Shaver, for the United States.

W. F. Hunter, for defendant in error.

Before LURTON, SEVERENS, and RICHARDS, Circuit Judges.

RICHARDS Circuit Judge, after making the foregoing statement of the case, .

In the cases of The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 565, 19 L.Ed. 999 (decided in 1870), and Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 528, 6 Sup.Ct. 475, 479, 19 L.Ed. 715 (decided in 1885), it was held that: 'Whenever a commodity has begun to move as an article of trade from one state to another, commerce in that commodity between the states has commenced.'

In the former case it is said:

The fact that several different and independent agencies are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting entirely in one state, and some acting through two or more states, does in no respect affect the character of the transaction. To the extent in which each agent acts in that transportation, it is subject to the regulation of Congress. ' Page 565, 10 Wall., 19 L.Ed. 999.

And in the latter:

'But this movement (from state to state) does not begin until the articles have been shipped or started for transportation from the one state to the other. The carrying of them in carts or other vehicles, or even floating them to the depot where the

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