Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Bloecher & Schaff, Inc.

Citation132 A. 160
Decision Date14 January 1926
Docket NumberNo. 113.,113.
PartiesMAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE et al. v. BLOECHER & SCHAFF, Inc., et al.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
132 A. 160

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE et al.
v.
BLOECHER & SCHAFF, Inc., et al.

No. 113.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 14, 1926.


132 A. 161

Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; Charles F. Stein, Judge. "To be officially reported."

Suit by Bloecher & Schaff, Inc., and others, against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore and another. From an order declaring an ordinance void, defendants appeal. Order reversed and bill dismissed.

Argued before BOND, C. J., and PATTISON, URNEB, ADKINS, OFFUTT, DIGGES, PARKE, and WALSH, JJ.

Charles C. Wallace, Asst. City Sol., and Philip B. Perlman, City Sol., both of Baltimore, for appellants.

Joseph W. Starling and Alfred S. Niles, both of Baltimore, for appellees.

OFFUTT, J. The 71 appellees in this case have, for periods ranging from 11 to 56 years, been engaged in the city of Baltimore in the business of slaughtering animals the flesh of which is fit for food, and of the preparation and sale of the flesh thereof for human consumption.

On June 25, 1925, the mayor and city council of Baltimore adopted Ordinance No. 431, known as the "meat ordinance," the subject and purpose of which was to regulate that business so as more effectually to preserve and protect the public health.

On August 22, 1925, the appellees filed in

132 A. 162

circuit court No. 2 of that city the bill of complaint in this case, in which they prayed that that ordinance might be declared unconstitutional and void, and that an injunction issue restraining the appellees from executing or in any manner enforcing the provisions thereof. A demurrer filed to the bill was overruled, and the ordinance declared void by an order of that court passed on August 25, 1925, and from that order this appeal was taken.

It presents a single issue, to wit, is Ordinance No. 431 a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power by the mayor and city council of Baltimore City?

Much of the bill of complaint as well as the briefs is devoted to a discussion of the wisdom, the necessity, and the propriety of the ordinance, but since those are legislative rather than judicial questions, we will not refer to them further than to say this, that, in view of the decisions of this court, as well as of the courts of practically every other state and the federal government, it is now too late to deny the power of the state to regulate any business which if unregulated may menace the public health, and that the slaughtering of animals and the preparation and sale of the carcasses thereof for human food is such a business, and those propositions appear to be conceded by the appellees. Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394, and Rose's Notes; State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565, 43 A. 771, 45 L. R. A. 433, 73 Am. St. Rep. 201; Schultz v. State, 112 Md. 214, 76 A. 592; Foote v. Stanley, 117 Md. 335, 82 A. 380. Nor have we any doubt that under its charter the mayor and city council of Baltimore had the power to adopt an ordinance of the character of that under consideration. Schultz v. State, supra.

We will therefore proceed at once to those definite and specific objections to the ordinance urged by the appellees which may properly be considered by this court.

In their very careful and exhaustive brief counsel for the appellees state that their objections are confined to sections 7, 10, 14, and 15 of the ordinance, and it is not therefore necessary in referring to the other sections thereof to do more than state their general tenor so that their relations to the parts objected to by the appellees may appear.

Section 1 creates a meat inspection division in the department of health of Baltimore City, and provides for the appointment and compensation of the officers and agents thereof. Section 2 provides for licensing any business directly connected with the disposition of animal products in Baltimore City. Section 3 provides for the inspection of animals about to be slaughtered and of the carcasses of those which have been slaughtered, and for the condemnation and destruction of such as may be found unfit for human consumption. Section 4 provides for the inspection and marking of all carcasses intended for human consumption, for the condemnation and destruction of such as may be unfit for human consumption, and for revoking the licenses of such operators as refuse to destroy condemned material in the manner provided by the ordinance. Section 5 provides for the inspection and marking of all canned meat products prepared for consumption and sale in Baltimore City, for the destruction of such products as may be condemned, and for revoking the license of such persons as refuse to destroy the condemned products. Section 6 provides for labeling and marking such material as may be approved by the inspectors. Section 8 provides for the inspection of the actual slaughtering of animals. Section 9 prohibits the forgery, mutilation, destruction, simulation, or misrepresentation of the marks, tags, labels, or other identification marks used under the ordinance. Section 11 prohibits influencing inspectors in the discharge of their duties by bribes, and at the same time forbids the inspectors from accepting bribes given to influence their official acts. Section 12 relates to the revocation of licenses by the commissioner of health, and contains, among others, these provisions:

"Before the commissioner of health shall revoke any license issued under the provisions of this ordinance for any violation thereof, the said commissioner shall notify the applicant of the alleged violation, and that an opportunity will be given him to show cause why the license should not be revoked. * * * And at the hearing the commissioner shall decide the matter, aud if he shall be of opinion that a violation has been proved, he shall forthwith revoke the license and such revocation shall be for such period of time as he shall stipulate, but in no event for more than one year. * * * From any adverse action of the commissioner, there shall be an appeal to the Baltimore city court, to be taken within twenty (20) days from the date of said action. * * * The jurisdiction of the Baltimore city court on appeal shall be limited to the question of the legality of the order, decision, action or determination complained of. Provided, that pending the hearing of appeal no order of revocation shall be stayed."

Section 13 fixes the penalties for violations of the ordinance, and section 16 provides for the repeal of ordinance 204 and the refund of license fees paid thereunder.

The first part of the ordinance to which the appellees object is section 7, which is in this form:

"That the commissioner of health shall cause to be made from time to time by experts in sanitation, and by other competent inspectors, such inspection of all slaughtering, meat, canning, salting, packing, rendering or similar establishments in which cattle, sheep, swine and goats are slaughtered and the meat and meat food products thereof are prepared for sale, offered for sale, or sold in the city of Baltimore, as may be necessary to inform himself concerning the sanitary conditions of the same, and where the sanitary conditions of any establishments

132 A. 163

are such that the meat or meat food products are rendered unclean, unsound, unhealthful, unwholesome or otherwise unfit for human food, the commissioner of health shall refuse to allow said meat or meat food products to be labeled, marked, stamped and tagged 'Inspected and Passed.'"

Their objection to that provision is that it delegates to the meat inspectors an arbitrary discretion, unguided and uncontrolled by any standards, rules, or regulations under which they could, without any legitimate or legal reason, suppress at will the businesses of the several complainants, each of which embraces tangible property as well as the right to trade, which is a valuable property right.

If that construction can fairly be placed on the language of the section, it must inevitably follow that it is void, because, in the absence of any overwhelming necessity for subordinating private rights to the public safety, it would be obnoxious to those provisions of the state and the federal Constitution which guarantee to the citizen the equal protection of the laws and security in the possession of his property (Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217, 33 Am. Rep. 239; Bostock v. Sams, 95 Md. 416, 52 A....

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