United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Ramlose

• Citation: 231 Mo. 508,132 S.W. 1133
• Parties: UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CO. v. RAMLOSE.
• Decision Date: 21 June 1910
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

132 S.W. 1133

231 Mo. 508

UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CO. v. RAMLOSE.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

June 21, 1910.

Rehearing Denied December 17, 1910.

1. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1097)—QUESTIONS REVIEWABLE—LAW OF THE CASE.

Where a case, reversed by the Supreme Court, is retried in conformity with the principles in the decision of the Supreme Court, cogent reasons must exist to induce a re-examination on a subsequent appeal of the former rulings; but where intermediate decisions of the Supreme Court, though not purporting to overrule or notice the prior appeal, are inconsistent therewith, and the questions involved are of great importance, the former rulings will, generally, be reconsidered.

2. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1097)—QUESTIONS REVIEWABLE—LAW OF THE CASE.

Where the questions chiefly relied on on a subsequent appeal are federal questions which were not presented on the former appeal and which could not have been presented until the second trial, the federal questions are reviewable on the subsequent appeal.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 296)—DUE PROCESS OF LAW—DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY.

Where a lease of chattels by a foreign corporation to a citizen is void, because the corporation has not complied with Rev. St. 1899, §§ 1024, 1026 (Ann. St. 1906, pp. 886, 890), prohibiting foreign corporations, not complying therewith, from doing business in the state, no right to the chattels passes to the lessee, and the corporation is not deprived of its property by reason of the statutes in violation of the due process of law clause of Const. U. S. Amend. 14.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 240)—EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

Nor is it deprived of its property in violation of the equal protection of the laws clause of Const. U. S. Amend. 14.

5. CORPORATIONS (§ 661)—FOREIGN CORPORATIONS—RIGHT TO SUE.

The rule that the courts will not aid a foreign corporation to recover the possession of property it has leased in violation of Rev. St. 1899, §§ 1024, 1026 (Ann. St. 1906, pp. 886, 890), prohibiting a foreign corporation not complying therewith from doing business in the state, only applies where the maintenance of the suit necessarily results in the giving of effect to the void lease, and the court will lend its aid to the protection of the rights of the parties growing out of a void lease, where it may do so without giving effect thereto.

6. CORPORATIONS (§ 661)—FOREIGN CORPORATIONS—RIGHT TO SUE.

Where a foreign corporation which had not complied with Rev. St. 1899, §§ 1024, 1026 (Ann. St. 1906, pp. 886, 890), prohibiting a foreign corporation not complying therewith from doing business in the state, made a lease of its chattels to a citizen of the state for use in the state, the lease was void, and the corporation could maintain replevin for the chattels.

7. CORPORATIONS (§ 642)—FOREIGN CORPORATIONS—"DOING BUSINESS IN THE STATE."

The enforcement of a contract in the courts of the state by a foreign corporation is not the "doing of business in the state" within the statute prohibiting foreign corporations from doing business within the state until they comply with the laws thereof.

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, pp. 2155-2160; vol. 8, pp. 7640, 7641.]

8. REPLEVIN (§ 83)—DAMAGES.

A defendant in replevin, who had no legal or equitable right or interest in or to the chattels taken from him and delivered to plaintiff, may not recover damages for the taking and detention of the property.

9. PATENTS (§ 212)—RIGHTS OF PATENTEE— LICENSES.

Under Rev. St. U. S. 4884 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3381), providing that machinery covered by letters patent may not be used by one without permission from the owner, a lessee of patented machines who holds them merely under a void lease from the patentee has no right to use the machines.

10. REPLEVIN (§ 83)—DAMAGES.

One not entitled to the use of a patented machine on the ground that he holds it merely under a void lease from the patentee is not entitled to damages for the taking and detention of the machine by the patentee.

11. CORPORATIONS (§ 657)—CONTRACTS—VALIDITY.

Where a contract of sale of machinery by a citizen to a foreign corporation which had not complied with the laws regulating foreign corporations and a lease of machinery by the corporation to the citizen were one entire transaction, and the lease was void, because of the failure of the corporation to comply with the laws of the state, the contract of sale must also fail, so that the corporation acquired no title thereunder.

Graves, J., dissenting.

In Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Jos. J. Williams, Judge.

Action by the United Shoe Machinery Company against Annie M. Ramlose. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

The following is the opinion of Woodson, J., in division:

"Statement.

"This is a suit in replevin to recover the possession of several shoe manufacturing machines; and this is the second appeal of this cause to this court. The opinion disposing of the former appeal is reported in 210 Mo. 631, 109 S. W. 567. After the cause was remanded, both parties appeared in the circuit court and announced ready for trial, and, after the jury had been selected and duly impaneled, the court, prior to the introduction of any evidence and over the objection of the appellant, instructed the jury as follows: `The court instructs the jury that their verdict must be for the defendant. The court further instructs the jury to ascertain and find from the evidence as follows: (1) What portion of the property that was heretofore, on April 8, 1903, taken under the writ of replevin from the defendant, belonged absolutely to the defendant? (2) The value of the property belonging to the defendant that was so taken. (3) The damage suffered by the defendant for the taking and detention of such property from April 8, 1903, to this date. (4) The damage suffered by the defendant from the 8th of April, 1903, to this date, by reason of the taking and detention of the plaintiff from the defendant of the machines that had been leased by the plaintiff to the defendant. (5) The value of the machines leased by the plaintiff to the defendant. (6) Whether or not the plaintiff has or has not in his possession the property that belonged to the defendant absolutely that was taken under the writ of replevin, and also of the machines that had been leased by the plaintiff to the defendant.' To the giving of which instruction the plaintiff objected and saved its exceptions, on the ground that it is contrary to section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, for the reason that it tends to deprive the plaintiff of its property without due process of law, and that it is further repugnant to said section of said amendment, in that it denies to the plaintiff the equal protection of the laws of Missouri; and that it is contrary and repugnant to article 1, § 8, of the Constitution of the United States, in that it is an attempt on the part of the state of Missouri to regulate commerce between states.

"All of the testimony introduced at the first trial was preserved in the defendant's bill of exceptions and the record, and that was offered in evidence at the second trial by the plaintiff under an agreement that such testimony could be so offered instead of placing each witness on the stand. The court excluded all testimony on the part of the plaintiff except such as tended to prove the value of the machines which the defendant contended her decedent actually owned, and also excluded all of the evidence on the part of the plaintiff tending to show that the machines were patented machines and could not, under section 4884 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3381), be used by the defendant's decedent without a license from the owner thereof, and hence were utterly useless to the defendant's decedent. To which ruling of the court the plaintiff duly excepted.

"It will be unnecessary to restate what the evidence tended to show at the second trial, for the reason that Judge Burgess, who wrote the former opinion, fully and fairly stated what it tended to prove at the former trial, and reference is made to it for a full statement of the case.

"Counsel for plaintiff made the following objection to the introduction of evidence: `The plaintiff objects to the introduction of any evidence upon the question of damages sustained by the defendant or to the defendant's decedent, Christian E. Ramlose, for the reason that any assessment of, in this suit damages would be a violation of section 1, Amend. 14, of the Constitution of the United States, in that such assessment of damages would deprive the plaintiff of its property without due process of law of the state of Missouri, and would also be a denial to plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws of the state of Missouri, and it would also be a violation of article 1, § 8, Const. U. S., in that the same would be a regulation of the commerce by the state of Missouri, between the state of Massachusetts and the state of Missouri; the right of such regulation of commerce among the several states of the Union belonging alone to the Congress of the United States.' The objections were overruled and exception saved.

The instruction, given at the opening of the case, was again given at the close of all the evidence; but was afterward modified by the court striking out the fifth clause of said instruction and by giving an instruction to the effect that the jury could assess no damages for the value of the leased machines. To all of which plaintiff objected and duly excepted. Counsel for plaintiff then requested the court to give the instructions which had been given for the plaintiff at the former trial, which the court refused to do, and exceptions were duly saved. The plaintiff also asked the following instructions, which the court refused to give, to which action of the court plaintiff duly...