U.S. v. Cooper
Decision Date | 26 January 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 96-3240,96-3240 |
Citation | 133 F.3d 1394 |
Parties | 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1014 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dwayne Berman COOPER, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Clinton Lyle Doud, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.
Charles Wilson, U.S. Atty., Tampa, FL, Kimberly Ann Selmore and Linda McNamara, Assts. U.S. Attys., Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, and TJOFLAT and COX, Circuit Judges.
The primary issue in this case is whether appellant-driver legitimately expected Fourth Amendment-level privacy in an overdue rental car that the rental company had not repossessed at the time of law enforcement's warrantless search. We (1) affirm the district court's conclusion that a law enforcement officer permissibly stopped appellant; (2) resolve the issue of first impression in appellant's favor, reversing the district court's conclusion that he lacked standing to challenge the search; and (3) remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On January 6, 1996, appellant, Dwayne Cooper, rented a car from Budget Rent-A-Car (Budget) in West Palm Beach, Florida. The contract specified January 20 as the return due date and West Palm Beach as the return location. 1 The contract also included the following terms and conditions:
Government's Ex. Three (capital letters and bold print in original). Aside from its warning about late fees in paragraph fifteen, the contract does not address the renter's ability to extend the due date. Budget's established policy, however, is that it will extend the due date if the renter makes a request over the telephone and sufficient funds exist on his or her credit card. Through his past course of dealings with Budget, Cooper knew of this unwritten policy. It had also been Cooper's experience that returning a rental car after the due date was "no problem" with Budget as long he had "room" on his credit card for the extra days and applicable fees.
On January 24, four days after the rental contract expired, Michael King of the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) saw the rental car on Interstate 95 in Jacksonville, Florida. King, traveling in the center northbound lane of Interstate 95 in a marked car, noticed Cooper in his rear-view mirror unsuccessfully attempting to merge from the left to the center lane to continue on Interstate 95 after the highway "splits." 2 Finding himself on Interstate 10 rather than Interstate 95, Cooper accelerated past King, cut across King's lane, drove over an apex and exited the highway. Cooper's car came too close to King's vehicle during the lane change, causing King to apply his brakes in order to avoid an accident. Intending to issue Cooper a citation for an improper lane change, King signaled for Cooper to pull over into the exit's emergency lane. 3
Complying with King's requests, Cooper identified himself, stepped out of the car and proffered his driver's license and the rental contract. King inquired about the rental car being four days overdue, and Cooper explained that he had extended the due date. Using his car telephone, King directed the FHP dispatcher to contact Budget and verify this information. Budget informed the dispatcher that Cooper had not requested an extension past January 20 and asked that the car be towed and returned. Budget had not reported the car stolen, sought a warrant for Cooper's arrest or otherwise notified Cooper that it intended to repossess the car. The dispatcher relayed this information to King, and he asked the dispatcher to contact a private towing service.
Soon thereafter, a second FHP trooper, Michael Smith, arrived to assist King. The troopers informed Cooper about Budget's plan to tow the car. Cooper requested to speak with a Budget representative, but the troopers would not permit him to use the telephone. Instead, King asked Cooper for consent to search the car. The parties dispute, and the district court did not resolve, whether Cooper consented. 4 In any event, King reached in through the passenger door, turned off the ignition, "swept" under the car seats and opened the glove compartment. Although he did not find anything under the seats, King found a loaded firearm in the glove compartment and arrested Cooper for concealing a firearm.
While Cooper remained in custody inside the patrol car, King and Smith decided to proceed with a full inventory search of the rental car, a procedure which FHP policy required. King opened the trunk and noticed garbage bags covering two square boxes. Also, on the floor of the trunk, King saw several plastic sandwich bags. Before the inventory proceeded any further, however, it started to rain. King told the dispatcher to cancel the towing service so that he and Smith would not have to search the car in the rain.
With assistance from another trooper, King and Smith drove the rental car to a covered overpass near the FHP station. Resuming the search, they discovered that the boxes in the trunk were actually safes, in which Cooper denied having any ownership stake. After Smith's K-9 unit detected narcotics upon sniffing the exterior of the safes, Smith pried them open with a crowbar and found cocaine, cocaine base, scales and other drug paraphernalia. Eventually, after a "thorough search," the car was towed and returned to Budget. Budget charged Cooper's credit card for use of the car through January 25.
On February 28, a federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment against Cooper, charging him with: (1) conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and possess cocaine with intent to manufacture cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (3) possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 5 Cooper moved to suppress the evidence found inside the rental car, contending that King stopped him without probable cause and that the FHP's warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Cooper's motion and adopted the magistrate judge's recommended conclusions that: (1) the stop was permissible; and (2) Cooper lacked standing to challenge the search because "[a]fter the rental agreement expired and he failed to seek its extension, [Cooper] did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental car." 6 The jury convicted Cooper on all three counts, and the district court sentenced him to life in prison. 7
Cooper raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court clearly erred in finding that the FHP conducted a permissible traffic stop; and (2) whether the district court erred in concluding that he lacked standing to challenge the search of the rental car and the items therein.
As to the first issue, Cooper contends that King's testimony that he stopped Cooper for an improper lane change was not credible. Cooper insists that he did not violate any traffic laws and that King stopped him only to investigate for drugs. The government points to the record, arguing that sufficient evidence supports the district court's finding and credibility assessment.
As to the second issue, Cooper argues that he subjectively and objectively expected privacy in the rental car, regardless of his failure to extend the due date. In support of his subjective expectation, Cooper points to his prior course of dealings with Budget and its leniency regarding overdue rental cars. Cooper further contends that society is willing to accept his expectation as reasonable because Budget had not acted upon its contractual right to repossess the vehicle at the time of the FHP's warrantless search. The government, conversely, maintains that the rental car's overdue status renders unreasonable any expectation of privacy on Cooper's part. The government further contends that Budget exercised its right to repossess through the FHP and, therefore, Cooper was neither an authorized driver nor in possession of the rental car at the time of the inventory search.
We review the district court's findings of fact, including the permissibility of a stop, for clear error. See United States v Smith, 39 F.3d 1143, 1144 (11th Cir.1994). We review the district court's application of law to facts, including the legitimacy of a driver's expectation of privacy, de novo. See United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1063 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 897, 112 S.Ct. 270, 116 L.Ed.2d 222 (1991).
As the district court correctly stated, law enforcement "may stop a vehicle when there is probable cause to believe that the driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and...
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