City of Chetopa v. Board of Com'rs of Labette County

Citation133 P.2d 174,156 Kan. 290
Decision Date23 January 1943
Docket Number35686.
PartiesCITY OF CHETOPA v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS OF LABETTE COUNTY et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Kansas

Syllabus by the Court.

Estoppel and laches are "affirmative defenses" and cannot be proven by the evidence on a general denial.

Rule that action on part of official of a municipality cannot work an estoppel against the municipality is based on the necessity of protecting the public interest.

As to matters within the scope of the powers of a municipal corporation, the doctrine of estoppel and the doctrine that an agreement made in behalf of such corporation may be ratified by acquiescence, and by accepting the benefits of the agreement with knowledge of the facts, apply as well to municipal corporations as to natural persons.

"Equitable estoppel" is a rule which in its proper field prevails over all other rules and stays the operation of other rules which have not run their course, when to allow the further operation of such other rules would be a greater wrong than to enjoin such operation permanently.

Estoppel may in proper cases operate to cut off a right or privilege conferred by statute or even by the constitution.

The law will not lend itself to the unjust enrichment of one person at the expense of another.

Where city had requested county to set aside 35 percent. of the county and township road fund for maintenance of the city streets used as connecting links in the county highway system, and county by resolution complied with city's request and in reliance on resolution thereafter collected only 65 percent. of the fund and city received benefit of the money so obtained and city, over a ten-year period, made no claim to the larger amount to which city was by statute entitled, city was guilty of "laches" and was "estopped" from claiming the larger amount. Gen.St.1935, 68-416, 68-424, 68-506e.

1. In an action by a city to recover money from a board of county commissioners the defendants pleaded in their answer that the city had taken a position in dealing with the county that was inconsistent with its position in the action and that the county commissioners had relied on that position and other facts and circumstances, and would lose money unjustly if the city should prevail. Held, that the foregoing allegations stated a good ground of defense of estoppel on the part of the city in favor of the county commissioners and it was error for the trial court to strike these allegations from the answer.

2. In an action such as that described in the foregoing paragraph of this syllabus, the allegations of a paragraph ordered stricken from the answer are examined and it is held that these allegations pleaded a good defense of laches on the part of the city in favor of the county commissioners.

Appeal from District Court, Labette County; Vernor J. Bowersock Judge pro tem.

On petition for rehearing, or modification.

Petition denied.

For former opinion, see 155 Kan. 886, 130 P.2d 614.

Glenn Jones, Co. Atty., of Parsons, and Jack L. Goodrich, Asst. Co. Atty., of Oswego, for appellant.

Elmer W. Columbia, of Parsons, and Hugh Randall, of Chetopa, for appellee.

SMITH Justice.

The opinion reversing the judgment of the trial court was filed in November, 1942. See City of Chetopa v. Labette County Com'rs, 155 Kan. 886, 130 P.2d 614. Whereupon both the appellants and the appellee filed a motion for a rehearing.

The action was brought by the city to recover from the county commissioners money it claimed should have been paid it over the course of ten years from 1933 for the maintenance of portions of the streets of the city that had been connecting links in the county highway system, pursuant to G.S. 1935 68-506e. Among other things the county commissioners alleged in paragraph 7 of their answer that the plaintiff had received payment for any claims it had against the defendants for the maintenance of any streets located in the city pursuant to the terms of a resolution adopted by the board of county commissioners on July 20, 1934; that by that resolution the defendants exercised their election to operate under the provisions of G.S. 1935, 68-416 and G.S.1935 68-424, and that this election was made at the request of plaintiff, together with other cities of the county. A copy of this resolution was attached to the answer.

The answer also alleged in paragraph 8 that the plaintiff in good conscience ought not to be permitted to recover under the provisions of G.S.1935, 68-506e, for the reason that it had requested defendant to set aside thirty-five percent of the county and township road fund, as provided by G.S.1935 68-424, and that this action had been taken after a meeting between the board of county commissioners and the city authorities, and that at that time the city authorities knew of the provisions of G.S.1935, 68-506e; that since July 20, 1934, plaintiff had received the benefit of the money obtained from that fund and no claim was filed prior to filing this suit, and that up to the time this claim was filed plaintiff had not made demand from defendant, and that defendant in good faith relying on the resolution adopted July 20, 1934, had collected only sixty-five percent of the fund and made no provision for paying plaintiff pursuant to G.S.1935, 68-506e, and that money received by the defendant pursuant to G.S.1935, 68-416, had been budgeted and spent, and that at the time plaintiff requested defendants to adopt the resolution referred to defendant was under no obligation to set aside for plaintiff any money of the fund, but defendant in good faith had performed this part of the resolution, and that by reason of these facts the plaintiff was estopped from making any claim against defendant for $10,385.39, for the reason it would be unconscionable and inequitable to defendant and that the defendant would suffer...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • United States v. Georgia-Pacific Company
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 8 Enero 1970
    ...548. Equitable estoppel is a rule of justice which, in its proper field, prevails over all other rules. City of Chetopa v. Board of County Com'rs., 156 Kan. 290, 133 P.2d 174, 177 (1943). An equitable estoppel will be found only where all the elements necessary for its invocation are shown ......
  • Boone County By and Through Butcher v. Blue Cross Hospital Service, Inc. of Missouri, KCD
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 7 Julio 1975
    ...the privilege of arrest by failing to reveal that she was a married woman when suit was begun against her; City of Chetopa v. Board of County Com'rs, 156 Kan. 290, 133 P.2d 174 (1943), where the city sought to recover under a statute money for the maintenance of streets which connected with......
  • Hudson v. J.E. Ketchum
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 23 Enero 1943
    ... ... from District Court, Neosho County; LeRoy Bradfield, Judge ... Action ... ...
  • Cobb County Rural Elec. Membership Corporation v. Board of Lights & Water Works of Marietta
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 14 Marzo 1955
    ...ex rel. City of California v. Missouri Utilities Co. 339 Mo. 385, 96 S.W.2d 607, 106 A.L.R. 1169; City of Chetopa v. Board of County Commissioners, 156 Kan. 290, 133 P.2d 174. Applying the above principles to the allegations of the petition, which are treated as true in dealing with the dem......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT