Pleasant v. State of Texas, 97-50147

• Citation: 134 F.3d 1256
• Decision Date: 20 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-50147,97-50147
• Parties: Eddie Louis PLEASANT, Petitioner-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. STATE OF TEXAS, Respondent-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 1256

134 F.3d 1256

Eddie Louis PLEASANT, Petitioner-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. STATE OF TEXAS, Respondent-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.

No. 97-50147.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Feb. 20, 1998.

Eddie Louis Pleasant, Three Rivers, TX, pro se.

Kristen L. Worman, Austin, TX, for State of Texas.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before KING, EMILIO M. GARZA and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner-Appellant-Cross-Appellee Eddie Louis Pleasant seeks federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that he is presently serving a federal sentence that was erroneously enhanced as a result of an invalid 1961 Texas robbery conviction. The district court dismissed Pleasant's petition on the merits, finding that it was futile in relation to his federal sentence. We vacate the judgment and remand the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Pleasant is no longer "in custody" of the State of Texas as required by § 2254.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Eddie Louis Pleasant pled guilty to robbery in Texas court in June 1961, and the court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of five to nine years. Pleasant did not appeal that conviction, but in 1995 he filed an application for postconviction relief in state court, arguing that his 1961 guilty plea was involuntary as a result of the ineffective assistance of counsel. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his application for relief.

In 1992, Pleasant pled guilty in federal district court to possession of a firearm by a felon, and the court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 180 months followed by a five-year term of supervised release. This sentence was based, in part, on an enhancement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) that was applicable as a result of Pleasant's 1961 Texas conviction. ¹ Pleasant appealed, and a panel of this court affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction and sentence.

Pleasant then filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 arguing that (1) his federal trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his prior Texas convictions before allowing him to plead guilty and (2) the district court's reliance on his two prior invalid convictions for sentencing enhancement purposes was a violation of his right to due process. A panel of this court dismissed Pleasant's petition, finding that he had failed to raise any nonfrivolous issues. See United States v. Pleasant, 43 F.3d 668 (5th Cir.1994) (unpublished).

Pleasant thereafter filed the instant petition for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that he satisfies the statute's "in custody" requirement because his Texas conviction was used to enhance the federal sentence for which he is currently incarcerated. Respondent-Appellee-Cross-Appellant the State of Texas (the State) argued that the application should be construed as a § 2255 petition and that the warden of FCI Three Rivers, the federal institution where Pleasant currently is incarcerated, should replace the State as the respondent.

The district court declined to substitute the warden of FCI Three Rivers for the State because it determined that Pleasant's federal sentence cannot be challenged until the Texas conviction has been successfully challenged through a habeas corpus proceeding. It therefore assigned the matter to a magistrate judge "for disposition of non-dispositive pre-trial matters and recommendations regarding case dispositive motions."

The State thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration and, alternatively, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the State's motions, but nevertheless dismissed Pleasant's petition, holding that even a successful challenge to the 1961 Texas conviction "would not require alteration of his federal sentence as the validity of that sentence has been fully litigated." The district court explained that, as Pleasant was barred from pursuing a successive § 2255 petition under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, he would be unable to benefit from a successful challenge to his 1961 Texas conviction.

Pleasant filed a notice of appeal and asked the district court to issue a Certificate of Appealability (COA). The district court denied the request, and the State filed a cross-appeal from the district court's order denying its motion to substitute parties and its motion for reconsideration. This court granted a COA on the issues of "1) whether Pleasant is 'in custody' for purposes of challenging his 1961 state court conviction; and 2) whether Pleasant would be entitled to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to correct his sentence if his state conviction is invalidated or to seek relief pursuant to a writ of coram nobis."

II. DISCUSSION

Title 28, Section 2254 of the United States Code states, in part,

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254. This court has explained that § 2254 "affords relief to a [habeas] petitioner 'in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court.' " Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956, 108 S.Ct. 352, 98 L.Ed.2d 378 (1987). The State argues that Pleasant does not meet the "in custody" requirement of § 2254 because it no longer has custody of him. The State therefore contends that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Pleasant's § 2254 petition.

Pleasant contends that the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over his § 2254 petition because he is presently in custody in part because of the enhancement of his federal sentence, which is based on his Texas conviction. He therefore asserts that because he continues to suffer the collateral consequences of that conviction, he is "in custody" for purposes of § 2254. We disagree.

The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989). In Maleng, the petitioner, who was currently incarcerated in a federal prison, contested a 1958 Washington state conviction for which the sentence had expired. Id. at 489-90, 109 S.Ct. at 1924-25. He argued that the Washington conviction resulted in enhancement of another Washington sentence that he would be serving immediately following the expiration of his federal sentence. Id. at 489-90, 109 S.Ct. at 1924-25. ² The Court held that a petitioner whose sentence has expired is no longer "in custody" for purposes of that conviction, even if it was used to enhance his current or future sentences. Id. at 492, 109 S.Ct. at 1925-26. Thus, as Pleasant's Texas sentence has expired, he is no longer "in custody" pursuant to that conviction for purposes of § 2254.

In Maleng, however, the petitioner was allowed to proceed on the merits because the Court, in deference to the petitioner's pro se status, construed the petition as an attack on the later Washington sentence which was yet to be served but which was ensured by a detainer directing the petitioner to be delivered to Washington authorities when his federal sentence expired. Id. at 493-94, 109 S.Ct. at 1925-27; accord Herbst v. Scott, 42 F.3d 902, 905 (5th Cir.1995) (construing the pro se petitioner's attack on his expired Texas sentence as an attack on the Texas conviction for which he was currently incarcerated in order to find subject matter jurisdiction).

In contrast, Pleasant is currently in federal custody and has no unexpired Texas sentences. His Texas conviction therefore may be challenged, if at all, only through a § 2255 petition arguing that his federal sentence was illegally enhanced because the Texas conviction was invalid and naming the warden of FCI Three Rivers as the respondent. ³ See Harris v. Ingram, 683 F.2d 97, 98 (4th Cir.1982) (holding, in a similar situation, that a challenge to federal custody on the basis of a prior state conviction used for enhancement may only be made, if at all, through a § 2255 petition); see also Charlton v. Morris, 53 F.3d 929, 929 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of the petitioner's § 2254 petition because he was no longer in custody pursuant to the challenged state conviction).

Pleasant has insisted throughout this case that his petition is not a mislabeled § 2255 petition challenging his federal sentence, and he has vehemently argued...