Knight v. Shelton

Decision Date07 January 1905
Docket Number5,279.
Citation134 F. 423
PartiesKNIGHT v. SHELTON et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

W. G Whipple and G. W. Murphy, for plaintiff.

Rose Hemingway & Rose and Cantrell & Loughborough, for defendants.

The plaintiff in this action claims $2,500 damages from the defendants, who, as judges of the election of the Fourth Ward of the city of Little Rock, county of Pulaski, state of Arkansas, held on November 8, 1904, for the election of a member of the House of Representatives of the United States refused to permit him to cast his vote for such a member of Congress. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a native-born citizen of the United States, having been born in the state of Wisconsin; that he is 36 years of age, and on said day of election was a resident of the said Fourth Ward in the city of Little Rock, county of Pulaski, state of Arkansas; that he had resided in said county and state for more than two years continuously next prior to said day of election, and in the said Fourth Ward for more than on year continuously next before said date; that by reason of these facts he was a duly qualified elector under the Constitution and laws of the state of Arkansas, and under the Constitution of the United states, entitled to vote for a member of the House of Representatives of the United States from said district and state, but that the defendants, as judges of said election, refused to permit him to cast his vote, upon the sole ground that he had not paid his poll tax for the year preceding, as required by pretended amendment No. 2 to the Constitution of the state of Arkansas. It is then charged that said amendment is no part of the Constitution of the state, not having been adopted as prescribed by the Constitution, it being alleged that at a general election held in 1902 the same was submitted to the people of the state for adoption, and, although more than 156,293 votes were cast at said election, only 75,740 votes were cast in favor of said amendment, which not being a majority of all the votes cast at said election, was a rejection of said amendment, and the same is no part of the Constitution of the state, although a majority of the votes cast on said amendment at the election at which it was submitted was in favor of its adoption. The present Constitution of the state of Arkansas, in force since October 30, 1874, contains the following provision as to amendments (article 19, Sec. 22):

'Either branch of the General Assembly at a regular session thereof may propose amendments to this Constitution, and, if the same be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each house, such proposed amendments shall be entered on the journals with the yeas and nays, and published in at least one newspaper in each county, where a newspaper is published, for six months immediately preceding the next general election for senators and representatives, at which time the same shall be submitted to the electors of the state for approval or rejection; and if a majority of the electors voting at such election adopt such amendments the same shall become a part of this Constitution; but no more than three amendments shall be proposed or submitted at the same time. They shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately.'

Article 3 of that Constitution, as originally adopted, and which, if the contention of plaintiff that amendment No. 2 to the Constitution was never legally adopted, is still in force, prescribes the following qualifications for electors:

'Section 1. Every male citizen of the United States, or male person who has declared his intention of becoming a citizen of the same, of the age of twenty-one years, who has resided in the state twelve months, and in the county six months, and in the voting precinct or ward one month, next preceding any election, where he may propose to vote, shall be entitled to vote at all elections by the people.'

Amendment No. 2 to the Constitution, which it is now claimed by plaintiff was never legally adopted, and for this reason is no part of the Constitution of the state, is as follows:

'Every male citizen of the United States, or male person who has declared his intention of becoming a citizen of the same, of the age of twenty-one years, who has resided in the state twelve months, in the county six months, and in the precinct or ward one month, next preceding any election at which he may propose to vote, except such persons as may for the commission of some felony be deprived of the right to vote by law passed by the General Assembly, and who shall exhibit a poll tax receipt or other evidence that he has paid his poll tax at the time of collecting taxes next preceding such election, shall be allowed to vote at any election in the State of Arkansas. Provided, that persons who make satisfactory proof that they have attained the age of twenty-one years since the time of assessing taxes next preceding said election and possesses the other necessary qualifications, shall be permitted to vote; and provided further, that the said tax receipt shall be so marked by dated stamp or written endorsement by the judges of election in whom it may be first presented as to prevent the holder thereof from voting more than once at any election.'

The defendants, with their answer, filed a demurrer to the sufficiency of the complaint, claiming that, admitting all the allegations in the complaint to be true, the plaintiff is entitled to no relief against the defendants.

TRIEBER, District Judge (after stating the facts).

The first question to be determined by the court is that of jurisdiction. As there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties, all of whom are citizens of the state of Arkansas, the jurisdiction of this court must be maintained upon the ground that the plaintiff's cause of action is one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. Whatever doubts may have been entertained on that question at one time have been removed by the later decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and it must now be conceded as a settled rule of law 'that the right to vote for members of the Congress of the United States is not derived merely from the Constitution and laws of the state in which they are chosen, but has its foundation in the Constitution of the United States. ' Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 Sup.Ct. 152, 28 L.Ed. 274; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 62, 21 Sup.Ct. 17, 45 L.Ed. 84; Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487, 493, 22 Sup.Ct. 783, 46 L.Ed. 1005. All of these cases were decided by a unanimous court. The damages claimed by the plaintiff being $2,500, this court clearly has jurisdiction, and it is its duty to determine the question raised by the demurrer-- that the facts stated do not constitute a cause of action.

That, in the absence of amendment No. 2 to the Constitution of the state of Arkansas, plaintiff was lawfully entitled to vote at the election complained of is admitted by learned counsel for the defendants. The allegations in the complaint, which by the demurrer are admitted to be true, are that plaintiff possessed all the qualifications prescribed by article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution; that he is a native male citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years, and has resided in the state of Arkansas for more than 12 months, in the county of Pulaski more than 6 months, and in the voting precinct where he offered to vote more than 1 month, next preceding said election. The defendants base their objection to the sufficiency of the complaint upon these grounds: First. That amendment No. 2 was legally adopted; that under the provisions of article 19, Sec. 22, of the Constitution, regulating amendments thereto, it is not necessary, for the adoption of an amendment, that it should receive a majority of all the votes cast at such election, but is sufficient if a majority of the votes cast on the amendment is in favor of such adoption. Section. That the amendment having been declared adopted by the speaker of the House of Representatives, it is not open to collateral attack in a proceeding in any court, and especially not in a federal court.

1. There are certain rules of law which are so well settled that it is unnecessary to refer to authorities to sustain them. Among these are the following: A Constitution can be amended only in the mode therein prescribed. The construction of constitutional provisions is governed by the same rules which apply to the construction of statutes. The language used is to be given the natural signification that the words imply in the order and grammatical arrangement in which the framers used them, and if, thus regarded, the words convey a definite meaning which involves no absurdity, and no contradiction between parts of the same writing, then the meaning apparent upon the face of the instrument is the one which alone courts are at liberty to say was intended to be conveyed. If there is no ambiguity in the language used, there is nothing to construe, and courts must follow the letter of the Constitution. It is only when the language used is not clear or unambiguous that courts are permitted to resort to the rules of construction which govern courts in ascertaining the intent of the framers. If any of the provisions are unjust, so that their enforcement will work a hardship to any class of persons, the remedy must come from the people who have adopted them. Construction can furnish no remedy under our system of government. By reference to the constitutional provision regulating amendments, it will be noticed that under that provision an amendment to the Constitution can only be submitted at a general election for senators and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
18 cases
  • Opinion of the Justices, In re
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 21 Julio 1950
    ...71 N.W. 779; Green v. State, 5 Idaho 130, 47 P. 259, 95 Am.St.Rep. 169; In re Denny, 156 Ind. 104, 59 N.E. 359, 51 L.R.A. 722; Knight v. Shelton, C.C., 134 F. 423); whether a proposed amendment is a single amendment, within the constitutional requirement that every amendment must be separat......
  • State ex rel. Linde v. Packard
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 14 Noviembre 1916
    ... ... § 202; Records of the Sessions ... of 1911 and 1913; State ex rel. McClurg v. Powell, ... 77 Miss. 543, 48 L.R.A. 652, 27 So. 927; Knight v ... Shelton, 134 F. 423; McBee v. Brady, 15 Idaho ... 761, 100 P. 97; 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. 908; ... Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala ... ...
  • Brickhouse v. Hill
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 16 Febrero 1925
    ...say. They certainly did not intend them to have the same meaning as the words "voting thereon" which they had purposely rejected. Knight v. Shelton, 134 F. 423. Thirty-one years elapsed before any question was raised as to the number of votes required under the provision of the Constitution......
  • State ex rel. Craighead County v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 11 Febrero 1924
    ...will follow the State court. 18 Wall. 71; 101 U.S. 677. However, the court's decision must be on the precise point involved. 131 F. 705; 134 F. 423; 130 F. 123 F. 480; 85 F. 180. Where a State court has decided a Federal question, its decision, though erroneous, is binding on collateral att......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT