State ex rel. and to Use of Donelon v. Deuser

• Decision Date: 14 December 1939
• Docket Number: 36070
• Citation: 134 S.W.2d 132,345 Mo. 628
• Parties: State of Missouri at the relation and to the use of Martin Donelon, Appellant, v. Phil G. Deuser and Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, a Corporation
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

134 S.W.2d 132

345 Mo. 628

State of Missouri at the relation and to the use of Martin Donelon, Appellant, v. Phil G. Deuser and Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, a Corporation

No. 36070

Supreme Court of Missouri

December 14, 1939

Appeal from Circuit Court of St. Louis County; Hon. Julius R Nolte, Judge.

Reversed and remanded (with directions to set aside the order granting new trial and reinstate the verdict for plaintiff.)

James J. Milligan, John H. McNatt, Frank L. Johnson and Redick O'Bryan for appellant.

(1) The trial court erred in sustaining the motion for a new trial setting aside the unanimous verdict and judgment, and ordering a new trial. (a) The language of Instruction 5, relative to shame, humiliation, mortification, wrong and outrage suffered by plaintiff, was proper, because all are recoverable under the general allegation of assault and battery. Black's Law Dictionary (2 Ed.), p. 863; McKinley v. C. & N.W. Ry. Co., 44 Iowa 320; Mumford v. Starmont, 139 Mich. 188, 102 S.W. 683; Stewart v. Watson, 133 Mo.App. 44, 112 S.W. 764; West v. Forrest, 22 Mo. 347; Hickey v. Welch, 91 Mo.App. 14; Johnson v. Daily, 136 Mo.App. 534, 118 S.W. 531; Wingate v. Bunton, 193 Mo.App. 470, 186 S.W. 35; Hinson v. Morris, 298 S.W. 258; Evans v. Clapp, 231 S.W. 86; Knoche v. Knoche, 160 Mo.App. 257, 142 S.W. 767; Edelman v. Wells, 242 S.W. 991; Mason v. Down Town Garage Co., 227 Mo.App. 297, 53 S.W.2d 413; Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. 246; Craker v. C. & N.W. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 679; Lake Erie & Western Ry. v. Fix, 88 Ind. 387; Wolf v. Trinkle, 103 Ind. 357; Cox v. Vanderkleed, 21 Ind. 164; Coine v. C. & N.W. Ry. Co., 99 N.W. 136; Krehbiel v. Henkle, 133 N.W. 115; Mentzer v. Western Union, 62 N.W. 5; Ill. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Sutton, 53 Ill. 397; Indianapolis v. St. Louis Ry. Co., 62 Ill. 320; Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Flagg, 43 Ill. 368; Fell v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 44 F. 253; Quigley v. C.P. Ry. Co., 11 Nev. 370; Smith v. Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & Chicago Ry. Co., 23 Ohio St. 19; Philadelphia B. & W. Railroad Co. v. Crawford, 112 Md. 508, 77 A. 280; Prentiss v. Shaw, 96 Am. Dec. 475, 56 Me. 479; Wadsworth v. Treat, 43 Me. 166; Smith v. Holcomb, 99 Mass. 552. (b) The injuries and attendant circumstances indicate the award was reasonable. Sharum v. Sharum, 82 Okla. 266; Kress & Co. v. Crosby, 98 So. 439; Loeb v. Kimmerle, 215 Col. 143, 9 P.2d 199; Ward v. De Martini, 108 Cal.App. 745; Shea v. Cassidy, 257 Ill.App. 557; Newsome v. Starns, 174 La. 955, 142 So. 704; Graves v. Peck, 114 Neb. 745, 209 N.W. 617. (c) Defendants' counsel saw the instruction, made no objection to its language before or at the time it was read to the jury, and offered no instruction themselves defining the measure of damages. Busch v. L. & N. Ry. Co., 322 Mo. 469, 17 S.W.2d 340; Browning v. Wab. Western Ry. Co., 124 Mo. 71, 27 S.W. 648; Hancock v. Kansas City Term. Ry. Co., 339 Mo. 1237, 100 S.W.2d 574; Brunk v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 334 Mo. 517, 66 S.W.2d 905; Stanton v. Jones, 332 Mo. 631, 59 S.W.2d 651; Kleinlein v. Foskin, 13 S.W.2d 659.

Lyon Anderson, Herbert W. Ziercher and A. E. L. Gardner for respondents.

(1) Plaintiff's Instruction 5 was erroneous for the reason that it broadened the issues beyond the scope of the pleadings by permitting the assessment of punitive damages. The action of the trial court in sustaining defendants' motion for new trial was, therefore, proper. Boyd v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 236 Mo. 54, 139 S.W. 561; Barth v. K. C. Elevated Ry. Co., 142 Mo. 535; Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469; State ex rel. Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Ellison, 270 Mo. 645, 195 S.W. 722; Secs. 766, 767, R. S. 1929. (2) The court erred in giving and reading to the jury Instruction 1, for the reason that said instruction submitted a question of law to the jury. Barree v. Cape Girardeau, 132 Mo.App. 182, 112 S.W. 724; Carpenter v. C. & A. Ry. Co., 95 S.W. 985, 119 Mo.App. 204; Barnhill v. Poteet, 211 S.W. 106; Macklin v. Fogel Const. Co., 31 S.W.2d 14, 326 Mo. 38; Briscoe v. Laughlin, 161 Mo.App. 76; Cooper v. St. Louis, M. & S. E. Ry. Co., 123 Mo.App. 141, 100 S.W. 494; City Trust Co. v. Crockett, 309 Mo. 683; Henry v. Ill. Cent. Ry. Co., 282 S.W. 423; Brock v. Ry. Co., 266 S.W. 691, 305 Mo. 502. (3) The court erred in giving and reading to the jury plaintiff's Instruction 2, for the reason that it did not apply the proper principles of law with respect to the use of force by a police officer in making an arrest. State v. Rose, 142 Mo. 418; State v. Totman, 80 Mo.App. 125; Gillespie v. State, 64 S.W. 947. (4) The court erred in refusing to discharge the jury on account of misconduct on the part of plaintiff's counsel. Trent v. Printing Co., 141 Mo.App. 437; Crapson v. United Chautauqua Co., 27 S.W.2d 722; Robinson v. McVey, 44 S.W.2d 238; Melvin v. Cater, 221 Mo.App. 1212; Olian v. Olian, 59 S.W.2d 673; Rytersky v. O'Brine, 70 S.W.2d 538, 235 Mo. 22; O'Hara v. Lamb Const. Co., 197 S.W. 163; Gore v. Brockman, 138 Mo.App. 231, 119 S.W. 1082. (5) The verdict of the jury was so grossly excessive as to be conclusive evidence of the fact that it was the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. Partello v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 217 Mo. 645; Chlanda v. Railroad Co., 213 Mo. 244. (6) Where the trial court sustains a motion for a new trial, on an appeal therefrom all the assignments of error in the motion for a new trial are for review. Cole v. St. L.-S. F. Ry. Co., 332 Mo. 999, 61 S.W.2d 344; Manthey v. Kellermann Contr. Co., 311 Mo. 147, 277 S.W. 927; Gaty v. United Rys. Co., 286 Mo. 503, 227 S.W. 1041.

Westhues, C. Cooley and Bohling, CC., concur.

OPINION

WESTHUES

Relator, Martin Donelon, brought this suit against the defendants, Phil G. Deuser, sheriff of St. Louis County, Missouri, and the Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, a corporation, surety on the sheriff's bond, to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by reason of an assault committed upon plaintiff by Clarence R. Zahner, a deputy sheriff. A trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $ 15,000. The trial court granted a new trial at defendants' request because of an alleged erroneous instruction given on the measure of damages. Plaintiff duly appealed.

Plaintiff, in his petition, did not seek punitive damages. The portion of the instruction questioned read as follows:

"The Court instructs the Jury that, if your verdict is for the plaintiff, under the other instructions in this case, then you may take into consideration, any and all bodily pain and mental anguish, if any, which you find and believe from the evidence plaintiff has suffered, as a direct result of the assault, if you do so find; and the Jury may also consider the sense of shame, mental suffering, humiliation, mortification, wrong, and outrage, if any, which you may find and believe that the plaintiff has suffered, now suffers, or will in the future suffer, as a direct and proximate result of the assault if any."

The facts, as supported by plaintiff's evidence, may be briefly stated as follows: On the night of November 14, 1933, plaintiff and three of his companions were in Wellston, Missouri. They had been drinking beer and at about 2:00 A. M. started home. They proceeded on their way walking in twos. Plaintiff and a young man named Burns were walking together, and as they passed some people a difficulty arose between Burns and these parties. Burns was struck on the head with a bottle containing whiskey. The bottle broke and Burns was cut on the head. The blow also caused him to stagger toward the street. Plaintiff followed Burns intending to aid him and prevent him from being struck by cars. About that time the deputy sheriff, Zahner, appeared on the scene and without any investigation as to who was causing the disturbance struck plaintiff over the head with a club, referred to in the evidence as a "policeman's billy." Evidence introduced by plaintiff justified the inference that Zahner struck plaintiff a number of times and then placed him in a car. He was taken to the Clayton jail where he was held for about twenty hours then discharged. If the evidence of plaintiff and his witnesses be true, and the jury found that it was, then the assault was unprovoked, unjustified and brutal. The effect of the blows upon plaintiff will be discussed later in the opinion on the question of the excessiveness of the verdict.

Most of the authorities cited by respondents in support of the contention that the instruction was erroneous are negligence cases. We must remember, however, that this is not a negligence case but a case based upon a deliberate and unjustified assault. Respondents insist that since plaintiff did not seek punitive damages the words "wrong" and "outrage" should not have been in the instruction. Before we proceed to examine the authorities let us take a glance at Webster's New International Dictionary, second edition. There we find synonyms to "outrage" to be affront, insult, abuse; and synonyms to "insult" to be indignity and outrage. With the word "wrong," in law, we find: "A violation of the legal rights of another; an invasion of right to the damage of the party who suffers it; esp., a tort." Bearing in mind the above definition and synonyms let us see what the authorities have to say with reference to the use of the words wrong, insult, outrage, indignity, etc., in instructions on compensatory damages in cases of assault. In the case of Mumford v. Starmont, 102 N.W. 662, 139 Mich. 188, the court approved an instruction on actual damages in a false arrest case which contained the following:

"'The sense of shame and mortification, of wrong and of outrage for which the plaintiff may recover, is not limited to the actual time he was under restraint, but includes all such sense of...