Deputron v. Young

• Citation: 134 U.S. 241,33 L.Ed. 923,10 S.Ct. 539
• Parties: DEPUTRON v. YOUNG
• Decision Date: 10 March 1890
• Court: United States Supreme Court

10 S.Ct. 539

134 U.S. 241

33 L.Ed. 923

DEPUTRON v. YOUNG.

March 10, 1890.

This was an action of ejectment brought in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Nebraska, June 14, 1884, by Rowena Young, a citizen of Ohio, against John C. Deputron, a citizen of Nebraska, to recover certain premises in the petition named. The defendant answered, denying plaintiff's ownership and right to possession; and setting up title under a taxdeed and purchase in good faith, and without notice, for $10,000 paid, being the full value, and 10 years' adverse possession. To this answer a reply, specifically denying its a verments, was filed by the plaintiff. At the November term, 1885, of said court, a trial was had, which resulted in a verdict for the defendant, and judgment thereon, which was set aside on motion of plaintiff, and a new trial awarded. In March, 1886, the cause was tried a second time, and a special verdict of 41 findings rendered by the jury, as follows: note ¹ The defendant excepted to the tenth, seventeenth, moved to set aside each of the same, and for a judgment for the defendant, and against the plaintiff, upon the verdict as thus amended; and the plaintiff filed his motion for judgment on the verdict according to the prayer of the petition. On the 10th day of May, 1886, these motions coming on to be heard, were submitted to the court on briefs to be filed within 60 days, and on the 24th day of June 1886, the court entered an order, by agreement of the parties, that the time to settle and sign a bill of exceptions be, and the same was thereby, extended to the second Monday in November following. The record contains no such bill of exceptions.

On the 9th day of November, 1887 Deputron filed his petition, alleging that Rowena Young was not the real party in interest, and that the title of the property in controversy was collusively and fraudulently transferred to her for the sole purpose of vesting apparent jurisdiction in the federal court; that the case did not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within its jurisdiction; and that Rowena Young had been improperly and collusively made a plaintiff for the purpose of creating a case cognizable under the laws of the United States; and praying that the cause be dismissed; to which the plaintiff answered, denying any fraud and collusion, and averring that she was the real party interested. On the 16th day of November, 1888, the following order was entered: 'This cause, coming on for hearing on the petition and application of the defendant to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, was tried by the court, Messrs. Hall and Webster appearing for the plaintiff, and Messrs. Lamb, Ricketts and Wilson, and Harwood, Ames and Kelly, for the defendant; whereupon, after hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, it is now, on this day ordered and adjudged by the court that said petition and application be, and the same are hereby, denied; to which ruling and order of the court said defendant, by his attorneys, then and there duly excepted.' An opinion on the merits was given by the circuit judge December 17, 1888, (37 Fed. Rep. 46;) and thereupon the motion of the defendant for judgment was overruled, the motion of the plaintiff for judgment sustained, and judgment entered that the plaintiff recover from the defendant the real property described in the petition and the costs of the action. A bill of exceptions, containing the petitions, answers, and proceedings and evidence adduced upon the question of jurisdiction, was signed and filed in due time. The pending writ of error was then sued out from this court.

W. J. Lamb and Ricketts & Wilson, for plaintiff in error.

John F. Dillon, S. Shellabarger, and J. S. R. Webster, for defendant in error.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

It is contended that the circuit court erred in entering judgment on the special verdict, because the citizenship of the parties was not found by the jury. But that fact stood admitted on the record. The plaintiff averred in her petition that she was 'a citizen and resident of the state of Ohio,' and that the defendant was 'a citizen and resident of the state of Nebraska.' The answer set up three defenses: (1) An affirmative claim of title under a taxdeed; (2) ten years' adverse possession; (3) 'and this defendant, further answering, denies that the said plaintiff is the owner of the premises described in her petition; and this defendant also denies that the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the said premises, and prays to be hence dismissed with his costs, to be taxed.' The averment of diverse citizenship was not controverted by the answer and, as the petition would have been insufficient without that allegation, the averment must be taken as true, under the practice in the courts of record in Nebraska. Code Civil Proc. Neb. §§ 134, 135; Comp. St. 1885, p. 645. Clearly, where the jurisdictional allegation is not traversed, no question involving the capacity of the parties in the cause to litigate in the circuit court can be raised before the jury, (Railroad Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202, 214,) or treated as within the issues they might be impaneled to determine. The circuit court properly proceeded to judgment, although the special verdict contained no finding upon this point.

After the case had been twice tried on its merits, and stood on the special verdict upon motions by the parties for judgment in their favor, respectively, the defendant assailed the jurisdiction of the court by petition, upon the ground that the title had been placed in the plaintiff collusively, and with the view of enabling suit to be brought in the United States court, when in fact the plaintiff did not own the property, and had accepted the title only for the collusive purpose aforesaid. Prior to the passage of the act of 1875, such a question could only be raised by a plea in abatement in the nature of a plea to the jurisdiction; but the fifth section of that act provided that if 'it shall appear to the st isfaction of said circuit court at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this act, the said circuit court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit; * * * but the order of said circuit court dismissing or remanding said cause to the state court shall be reviewable by the supreme court on writ of error or appeal, as the case may be.' 18 St. 472. The application here was made more than a year and a half after the second trial, and, although the petitioner avers that he 'did not have knowledge of the above facts before the trial of this cause,' we remark in passing that such an objection ought to be raised at the first opportunity, and delay in its presentation should be consid- ered in examining into the grounds upon which it is alleged to rest.

The issue of fact raised upon this petition was tried by the circuit court without a jury, and the application denied. No question of law was reserved by the defendant during the hearing, but he entered an exception to the final order, and now asks us to hold that it was the duty of the circuit court to dismiss the case because collusively brought. We do not care to enter upon a discussion as to how far in an action at law, where there are no special findings upon an issue of fact such as this, a party has the right to demand a review of the final order of the circuit court on the merits, as, upon the evidence in this record, we are content with the conclusion arrived at. In Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 501, it was held that a suit cannot properly be dismissed by a circuit court of the United States, as not involving a controversy within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the facts when made to appear on the record create a legal certainty of that conclusion. 'Nothing less than this,' said Mr. Justice MATTHEWS, 'is meant by the statute when it provides that the failure of its jurisdiction, on this account, 'shall appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court." The question was whether the conveyance by Jane Y. Irwin to Rowena Young was colorable merely. The plaintiff testified positively that she was the real owner of the land, and that it was conveyed to her by her sister, Mrs. Irwin, partly in consideration of what Mrs. Irwin owed her, and partly because she herself had a share in it; that 'the land was entered with money coming out of my father's estate belonging in part to me, being the joint fund of Jane and myself.' And her testimony is corroborated by that of her brother, William P. Young. We have carefully examined the evidence, and especially the matters urged as constituting badges of colorable transfer, but do not find any substantial ground for overthrowing the deed, or questioning the passing of the title. Such conflict as exists has been determined by the circuit court, and it would subserve no useful purpose to restate the circumstances in detail, as we think the facts fell far short of establishing petitioner's contention.

Upon the rendition of the special verdict the defendant moved to set aside the tenth, seventeenth, and nineteenth findings as not supported by the evidence, and for judgment upon the verdict as so amended; but the court overruled the motion, and entered judgment for the plaintiff upon the special verdict as returned. We cannot review the action of the court in reference to the findings objected to, and, no exceptions having been saved, are restricted to the question whether there was error in...