134 U.S. 306 (1890), De Witt v. Berry

Citation:134 U.S. 306, 10 S.Ct. 536, 33 L.Ed. 896
Party Name:DE WITT et al. v. BERRY et al.
Case Date:March 17, 1890
Court:United States Supreme Court

Page 306

134 U.S. 306 (1890)

10 S.Ct. 536, 33 L.Ed. 896

DE WITT et al.


BERRY et al.

United States Supreme Court.

March 17, 1890

In error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

[10 S.Ct. 536] This action was commenced in the marine court of the city of New York to recover $1,687.51, alleged to be due plaintiffs for a quantity of varnish, etc., sold and delivered to defendants between November 9, 1881, and May 15, 1882. It was duly removed into the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York on the petition of the defendants,--the plaintiffs being citizens of Michigan; the defendants, citizens of New York; and the amount sought to be recovered, exclusive of costs, exceeding $500.

The record appears to contain substantially all the evidence. It shows the material facts to be as follows. On the 24th of June, 1881, a contract was made between the parties in these terms:

'Brooklyn, N. Y., June 24th, 1881. We hereby agree to deliver to Messrs J. H. De Witt & Son, at their factory in Brooklyn, in N. Y., eighty (80) barrels of japan and twenty (2) barrels of varnish within one year from date. These goods to be exactly the same quality as we make for the De Witt Wire Cloth Company of New York, and as per sample bbls. delivered.

'Turpentine copal varnish, at 65c. per gallon.

'Turpentine japan dryer, at 55c. per gallon.

'Each shipment to consist of eight (8) barrels japan and two (2) barrels varnish, to be made once a month, commencing September next. Terms on each shipment, six months, without interest.


'Per A. HOOPER, Manager.'

'We hereby accept the above proposition. J. H. DE WITT & SON. Brooklyn, June 24th, '81.'

At the time stipulated, the defendants in error, Berry Bros., delivered the proper number of barrels of varnish and of dryer; but the plaintiffs in error claim that the dryer did not conform to the contract, in quality. They not only resist the payment of a balance due of the purchase money, but also present a cross-demand for $17,500 for alleged breach of contract. The precise point of controversy is as to the relative quantities of turpentine and of benzine in the dryer. It appears that plaintiffs in error were manufacturers of wire gauze for screens, etc., and bought the dryer to use in their factory, and that the plaintiffs in error knew of these facts. The japan dryer and the copal varnish were used to mix with the paint that was put on wire goods. The process was that the wire cloth ran through a trough filled with the paint so mixed, and passed between felt rollers into a drying chamber heated by steam to 140 deg. At the further end of such chamber the cloth passed into the cold air. The rolls then stood four or five days, after which they were rolled into tight rolls, wrapped, and put into the store-house. The plaintiffs in error allege that the paint and varnish in this case were adulterated by the excessive use of benzine in their manufacture, and that for that reason the paint did not adhere to the wire cloth, but scaled off. Plaintiffs in error commenced using the dryer and varnish in question about their business in August, 1881; but the goods [10 S.Ct. 537] prepared with them did not, in the ordinary course of business, reach the consumers until May, 1882. It was then that plaintiffs in error first discovered the defect; the composition of the goods being unknown to them, and only discoverable either by a chemical analysis or by the results of use. In the fall of 1882, large quantities of the wire cloth were returned because the paint came off; and the balance that plaintiffs in error had on hand unsold proved to be unsalable for the same reason, and had to be cleaned off and repainted; there being some 3,500,000 square feet damaged one-half cent per squarefoot, or $17,500. Plaintiffs in error further claim that, under the contract, the defendants in error were obliged to furnish articles of a grade that commercially answered to the description of 'turpentine copal varnish,' and 'turpentine japan dryer,' and that such grades were commercially known; that the articles so known contain either very little or no benzine, and are made of turpentine, whereas, if made of benzine, without turpentine, they are called in trade a 'benzine copal varnish,' and a 'benzine japan dryer,' and if they contain half benzine and half turpentine, they are called a 'turpentine and benzine japan dryer,' or a turpentine and copal varnish.' They claim further that the defendants in error had fraudulently substituted inferior goods for those sold; that whereas, by the description in the bill of sale, they were to have received goods with little or no benzine, they were furnished with goods which on analysis were shown to have 38 parts of benzine to 6 1/3 of turpentine, and were known to the trade as 'benzine goods.' The defendants in error, on the other hand, maintain that the contract did not call for goods known to the trade as 'commercial turpentine' goods, for two reasons: (1) By the very terms of the contract, the quality was agreed to be tested by a different standard, which was that the goods sold were to be 'exactly the same quality as we make for the De Witt Wire Cloth Company of New York, and as per sample bbls. delivered;' and (2) because there was no such standard of uniform manufacture and terminology in the trade, as to these goods, as was claimed by the plaintiffs in error, they themselves having discovered that their process was bad, and afterwards changed it. It appears further from the record that, in a previous contract between the defendants in error and the De Witt Wire Cloth Company,--not the plaintiffs in error,--a stipulation had been inserted that the goods should be 'the best of their kind, and equal to those formerly furnished.' Plaintiffs in error maintained that this contract of quality is, by reference, a part of the contract. This view the court rejected. In the course of the trial there were several exceptions taken to the introduction, or the refusal to permit the introduction, of evidence. The plaintiffs in error also made several exceptions to the charges as given, and to the refusals to charge as requested. The trial resulted in a...

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