Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth Cnty.

• Decision Date: 03 March 1890
• Citation: 134 U.S. 31,10 S.Ct. 424,33 L.Ed. 801
• Parties: EILENBECKER et al . v. . 1
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

10 S.Ct. 424

134 U.S. 31

33 L.Ed. 801

EILENBECKER et al. v. DISTRICT COURT OF PLYMOUTH COUNTY.¹

March 3, 1890.

Wm. A. McKenney, for plaintiffs in error.

I. S. Struble and A. J. Baker, for defendant in error.

MILLER, J.

This is a writ of error to the supreme court of the state of Iowa. The judgment which we are called upon to review is one affirming the judgment of the district court of Plymouth county in that state. This judgment imposed a fine of $500 and costs on each of the six plaintiffs in error in this case, and imprisonment in the jail of Plymouth county for a period of three months; but they were to be released from confinement if the fine imposed was paid within 30 days from the date of the judgment. This sentence was pronounced by the court as a punishment for contempt in refusing to obey a writ of injunction, issued by that court, enjoining and restraining each of the defendants from selling, or keeping for sale, any intoxicating liquors, including ale, wine, and beer, in Plymouth county; and the sentence was imposed upon a hearing by the court, without a jury, and upon evidence in the form of affidavits. It appears that on the 11th day of June, 1885, separate petitions in equity were filed in the district court of Plymouth county against each of these plaintiffs in error, praying that they should be enjoined from selling, or keeping for sale, intoxicating liquors, including ale, wine, and beer, in that county. On the 6th of July the court ordered the issue of preliminary injunctions as prayed. On the 7th of July the writs were served on each of the defendants in each proceeding by the sheriff of Plymouth county. On the 24th of October, complaints were filed, alleging that these plaintiffs in error had violated this injunction by selling intoxicating liquors contrary to the law, and the terms of the injunction served on them, and asking that they be required to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of court. A rule was granted accordingly, and the court, having no personal knowledge of the facts charged, ordered that a hearing be had at the next term of the court, upon affidavits; and on the 8th day of March, 1886, it being at the regular term of said district court, separate trials were had upon evidence in the form of affidavits, by the court without a jury, upon which the plaintiffs were found guilty of a violation of the writs of injunction issued in said cause, and a sentence of fine and imprisonment, as already stated, entered against them. Each plaintiff obtained from the supreme court of the state of Iowa, upon petition, a writ of certiorari, in which it was alleged that the district court of Plymouth county had acted without jurisdiction, and illegally, in rendei ng this judgment; and, by agreement of counsel and with the consent of the supreme court of Iowa, the cases of the six appellants in this court were submitted together, and tried on one transcript of record. That court affirmed the judgment of the district court of Plymouth county, and to that judgment of affirmance this writ of error is prosecuted.

The errors assigned here are that the supreme court of Iowa failed to give effect to clause 3, § 2, art. 3, of the constitution of the United States, which provides that the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury, and also to the provisions of article 6 of the amendments to the constitution, which provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. The second assignment is that the supreme court of Iowa erred in holding that plaintiffs could be fined and imprisoned without first being presented by a grand jury, and could be tried on ex parte affidavits, which decision, it is said, is in con- flict with, and contrary to, the provisions of both articles 5 and 6 of the amendments to the constitution of the United States,—the latter of which provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted by the witnesses against him. The fourth assignment is that the supreme court erred in not holding that section 12 of chapter 143 of the Acts of the 20th General Assembly of Iowa is in conflict with article 8 of the amendments to the constitution of the United States, which provides that excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish ments inflicted. These three assignments, as will be presently seen, may be disposed of together. The third assignment is that the supreme court of Iowa erred in not holding that said chapter 143 of the Acts of the 20th General Assembly of Iowa, and especially section 12 of said chapter, is void, and in conflict with section 1 of article 14 of the amendments to the constitution of the United States, in this, that it deprives persons charged with selling intoxicating liquors of the equal protection of the laws, and it prejudices the rights and privileges of that particular class of persons, and denies to them the right of trial by jury, while in all other prosecutions the accused must first be presented by indictment, and then have the benefit of trial by a jury of his peers.

The first three of these assignments of error, as we have stated them, being the first and second and fourth of the assignments as numbered in the brief of the plaintiffs in error, are disposed of at once by the principle often decided by this court, that the first eight articles of the amendments to the constitution have reference to powers exercised by the government of the United States, and not to those of the states. Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469; Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; Walker v. Sauvinet, Id. 90; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580. The limitation, therefore, of articles 5, 6, and 8 of those amendments, being intended exclusively to apply to the powers exercised by the government of the United States, whether by congress or by the judiciary, and not as limitations upon the powers of the states, can have no application to the present case; and the same observation is more obviously true in regard to clause 3, § 2, art. 3, of the original constitution, that the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury. This article 3 of the constitution is intended to define the judicial power of the United States; and it is in regard to that power that the declaration is made that the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury. It is impossible to examine the accompanying provisions of the constitution without seeing very clearly that this provision was not intended to be p plied to trials in the state courts.

This leaves us alone the assignment of error that the supreme court of Iowa disregarded the provisions of section 1, art. 14, of the amendments to the constitution of the United States, because it upheld the statute of Iowa, which it is supposed by counsel deprives persons charged with selling intoxicating liquors of the equal protection of the law, abridges their rights and privileges, and denies to them the right of trial by jury, while in all other criminal prosecutions the accused must be presented by indictment, and then have the benefit of trial by a jury of his peers.

The first observation to be made on this subject is that the plaintiffs in error are seeking to reverse a judgment of the district court of Plymouth county, Iowa, imposing upon them a fine and imprisonment for violating the injunction of that court, which had been regularly issued and served upon them. Of the intentional violation of this injunction by plaintiffs, we are not permitted to entertain any doubt; and, if we did, the record in the case makes it plain. Neither is it doubted that they had a regular and fair trial, after due notice, and opportunty to defend themselves in open court at a regular term thereof. The contention of these parties is that they were entitled to a trial by jury on the question as to whether they were guilty or not guilty of the contempt charged upon them; and, because they did not have this trial by jury, they say that they were deprived of...