Crenshew v. United States
Citation | 10 S.Ct. 431,33 L.Ed. 825,134 U.S. 99 |
Parties | CRENSHEW v. UNITED STATES |
Decision Date | 03 March 1890 |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
This is an action brought by the appellant, James D. Crenshaw, in the court of claims, for the purpose of recovering an alleged balanc of $3,763.66 due him on account of salary as a midshipman in the United States Navy. The court of claims dismissed the appellant's petition, (24 Ct. Cl. 57,) and an appeal from that judgment brings the case here.
The material facts in the case are as follows: In September, 1877, the appellant was appointed a cadet midshipman at the Naval Academy. At that time, the provisions of the Revised Statutes in force and pertinent to this inquiry were as follows: The appellant accepted the appointment, and entered on his studies at the academy. He completed the course of four years, and, after passing a successful examination received a certificate from the academic board in the following words, to-wit:
On the 25th of August following, appellant was ordered to sea by the navy department, and directed to report for duty on board the steamer Pensacola. This he did. While he was serving on that steamer, under the aforesaid order, congress passed an act, approved August 5, 1882, being the naval appropriation act, in which occurs this proviso: etc. 22 St. 284, 285. As stated above, this statute was passed while appellant was engaged in his service on the Pensacola. He continued on that vessel until the 14th of March, 1883, when he was ordered to report to the superintendent of the Naval Academy for examination. He proceeded to the academy, passed his final examination successfully, and, on the 15th of June, 1883, received from the academic board his certificate of graduation, reciting that On the 23d of June following he received this order: On the 26th of the same month an order as follows was issued: Since the date of that order, appellant has not been called on to do duty, and has not received any pay except that credited on his claim. In this state of the case, he claims that he is still a midshipman in the naval service, and, as such, entitled to pay. This claim is based upon the following propositions:
(1) That when he accepted the appointment of cadet midshipman he became an officer of the navy, and, as such, entitled to the benefits of section 1229, and article 36, § 1624, (which is to the same effect,) of the Revised Statutes; that such acceptance constituted a statutory contract with the United States, based on a valuable consideration, under which he is entitled to hold the office for life, unless removed by sentence of a court-martial, or in commutation thereof.
(2) That he was not, therefore, discharged by competent authority, because, first, since the re-enactment by congress, in 1874, of section 1229 and article 36 of section 1624 of the Revised Statutes, neither congress, the secretary of the navy, nor any department of the government, is competent, in time of peace, to discharge an officer from the naval service.
(3) That, independently of the act of July 13, 1866, (14 St. 92; section 1229, and art. 36 of section 1624, aforesaid,) the act of 1882 is unconstitutional, as applied to him; for the reason that he held an office by contract with the United States, and was entitled on graduation to be a midshipman to serve for life, or during good behavior.
(4) That not only was the act of August 5, 1882, inoperative, as to him, for the reason stated, but also for the further reason that to apply it to his class would be to make congress appoint to the office of naval cadet all such students as were in his situation; but that, while congress had the power, under the constitution, to create the office, it did not have the power to designate the officers,—that being the constitutional duty of the executive. And
(5) that the case of appellant did not fall within the terms of the act of 1882; that he was not, at the date of its passage, an undergraduate of the academy, but had graduated; and that therefore his discharge was not authorized by that act.
H. O. Claughton, for appellant.
Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for the Unie d States.
Mr. Justice LAMAR, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The primary question in this case—one which underlies the first, second, and third of appellant's propositions, stated above is, whether an officer appointed for a definite time, or during good behavior, had any vested interest or contract right in his office of which congress could not deprive him. The question is not novel. There seems to be but little difficulty in deciding that there was no such interest or right. The question was before this court in Butler v. Pennslyvania, 10 How. 402. In that case, Butler and others, by virtue of a statute of the state of Pennsylvania, had been appointed canal commissioners for a terms of one year, with compensation at four dollars per diem, but during their incumbency another statute was passed, whereby the compensation was reduced to three dollars; and it was claimed their contract rights were thereby infringed. The court drew a distinction between such a situation and that of a contract, by which 'perfect rights, certain definite, fixed, private rights of property, are vested.' It said: ...
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