Gates v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

Decision Date01 July 2010
Docket NumberNo. 19350–05.,19350–05.
Citation135 T.C. 1,135 T.C. No. 1
PartiesDavid A. GATES and Christine A. Gates, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
CourtU.S. Tax Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Ps owned and used a house as a principal residence for 2 years. Ps wanted to enlarge and remodel the house but were advised by an architect that more stringent building and permit restrictions had been enacted since the house was built. In 1999, rather than remodel the house, Ps voluntarily demolished it and constructed a new house on the property. Ps never occupied the new house, and in 2000 they sold it for $1,100,000. Ps realized capital gain of $591,406 on the sale of the new house. On their untimely 2000 Federal income tax return Ps did not report any of the gain from the sale of the new house. Ps subsequently agreed that $91,406 of the gain was taxable, but they claimed that $500,000 of the gain was excludable from income under sec. 121(a), I.R.C. In a notice of deficiency, R determined that Ps are not entitled to the $500,000 exclusion under sec. 121(a), I.R.C., and that Ps are liable for a deficiency in income tax and an addition to tax under sec. 6651(a)(1), I.R.C., for 2000.

Held: Ps may not exclude from their income, under sec. 121(a), I.R.C., the gain on the sale of the new house because the new house was never used as Ps' principal residence.

Held, further, Ps are liable for the addition to tax under sec. 6651(a)(1), I.R.C., for failure to timely file their 2000 Federal income tax return.

George J. Tomlinson, Jr., for petitioners.

Kris H. An and Jonathan H. Sloat, for respondent.

OPINION

MARVEL, Judge:

Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioners' Federal income tax of $112,553 and an addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1) 1 of $11,211 for 2000. Petitioners filed a timely petition contesting respondent's determination.

After concessions,2 the issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioners may exclude from gross income $500,000 of capital gain from the sale in 2000 of property on Summit Road in Santa Barbara, California (Summit Road property), under section 121(a); and (2) whether petitioners are liable for the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax.

Background

The parties submitted this case fully stipulated pursuant to Rule 122. We incorporate the stipulation of facts into our findings by this reference. Petitioners resided in California when the petition was filed.

On December 14, 1984, petitioner David A. Gates (Mr. Gates) purchased the Summit Road property for $150,000. The Summit Road property included an 880–square–foot two-story building with a studio on the second level and living quarters on the first level (original house).3

On August 12, 1989, Mr. Gates married petitioner Christine A. Gates. Petitioners resided in the original house for a period of at least 2 years from August 1996 to August 1998.

In 1996 petitioners decided to enlarge and remodel the original house, and they hired an architect. The architect advised petitioners that more stringent building and permit restrictions had been enacted since the original house was built.4

Subsequently, petitioners demolished the original house and constructed a new three-bedroom house (new house) on the Summit Road property. 5 THE NEW HOUSE COMPlied with the building and permit requirements existing in 1999. During 1999 petitioners had outstanding mortgage loans, but the record does not disclose the identity of the property or properties that secured the mortgage loans or the dates, amounts, or purposes of the loans. 6

Petitioners never resided in the new house.7 On April 7, 2000, petitioners sold the new house for $1,100,000. The sale resulted in a $591,406 gain to petitioners.

On April 15, 2001, petitioners applied for an automatic extension of time for filing their 2000 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (2000 return). However, petitioners failed to file their 2000 return by the August 15, 2001, due date. On September 17, 2001, petitioners filed their 2000 return.8

On their 2000 return, petitioners did not report as income any of the $591,406 capital gain generated from the sale of the Summit Road property. Petitioners subsequently agreed that $91,406 of the gain should have been included in their gross income for 2000, but they asserted that the remaining gain of $500,000 was excludable from their income under section 121. On September 9, 2005, respondent mailed petitioners a notice of deficiency for 2000 that increased petitioners' income by $500,000 9 and explained that petitioners had failed to establish that any of the gain on the sale of the Summit Road property was excludable under section 121. Respondent also determined an addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for petitioners' failure to timely file their 2000 return.

Petitioners timely petitioned this Court seeking a redetermination of the deficiency and addition to tax. Petitioners assert that respondent erred in determining that they were not entitled to exclude $500,000 of the gain under section 121. Petitioners also argue that because they are not liable for a deficiency, respondent erred in determining that they were liable for the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax.

Discussion
I. Burden of Proof

Ordinarily, the Commissioner's determination is entitled to a presumption of correctness, Rapp v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir.1985), and the burden of proving error in the determination generally rests with the taxpayer, Rule 142(a). Petitioners argue that because respondent's determination in the notice of deficiency is arbitrary, excessive, and without foundation, respondent's determination is not entitled to any presumption of correctness and that respondent bears the burden of proof.10 Petitioners also contend that respondent has failed to meet his burden of producing evidence in support of his determination that petitioners have unreported income.

Petitioners do not dispute that they received proceeds from the sale of the Summit Road property or that the sale resulted in gain that is taxable to them unless some part of the gain is excluded under section 121(a). Accordingly, we hold that respondent's determination is entitled to the presumption of correctness and that petitioners have the burden of proof. We note, however, that this case is fully stipulated and that there is no disputed issue of fact that might be affected by our assignment of the burden of proof.

II. Sale of the Summit Road Property

Gross income means all income from whatever source derived, unless excluded by law. See sec. 61(a); sec. 1.61–1(a), Income Tax Regs. Generally, gain realized on the sale of property is included in a taxpayer's income. Sec. 61(a)(3). Section 121(a), however, allows a taxpayer to exclude from income gain on the sale or exchange of property if the taxpayer has owned and used such property as his or her principal residence for at least 2 of the 5 years immediately preceding the sale. Section 121(a) specifically provides:

SEC. 121(a). Exclusion.—Gross income shall not include gain from the sale or exchange of property if, during the 5–year period ending on the date of the sale or exchange, such property has been owned and used by the taxpayer as the taxpayer's principal residence for periods aggregating 2 years or more. [Emphasis added.]

The maximum exclusion is $500,000 for a husband and wife who file a joint return for the year of the sale or exchange. Sec. 121(b)(2). A married couple may claim the $500,000 exclusion on the sale or exchange of property they owned and used as their principal residence if either spouse meets the ownership requirement, both spouses meet the use requirement, and neither spouse claimed an exclusion under section 121(a) during the 2–year period before the sale or exchange. Sec. 121(b)(2)(A).

The issue presented arises from the fact that section 121(a) does not define two critical terms—“property” and “principal residence”. Section 121(a) simply provides that gross income does not include gain from the sale or exchange of property if “such property” has been owned and used by the taxpayer “as the taxpayer's principal residence” for the required statutory period.

Respondent contends that petitioners did not sell property they had owned and used as their principal residence for the required statutory period because they never occupied the new house as their principal residence before they sold it. Respondent's argument interprets the term “property” to mean, or at least include, a dwelling that was owned and occupied by the taxpayer as his “principal residence” for at least 2 of the 5 years immediately preceding the sale. Respondent urges this Court to conclude that a qualifying sale under section 121(a) is one that includes the sale of a dwelling used by the taxpayer as his principal residence. Because petitioners never resided in the new house before its sale in 2000, respondent maintains that the new house was never petitioners' principal residence.

Predictably, petitioners disagree. Petitioners argue that any analysis of section 121(a) must recognize that the exclusion thereunder applies to the gain on the sale of property that was used as the taxpayer's principal residence. Petitioners' argument focuses on two facts—petitioners used the original house as their principal residence for the period required by section 121(a) and they sold the land on which the original house had been situated. Petitioners contend that the term “property” includes not only the dwelling but also the land on which the dwelling is situated. Petitioners seem to argue that the requirements of section 121(a) are satisfied if a taxpayer lived in any dwelling on the property for the required 2–year period even if that dwelling is not the dwelling that is sold. Petitioners contend that because they used the original house and the land on which it was situated as their principal residence for the required term, the Summit Road property qualifies as their principal...

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1 cases
  • Gates v. Commissioner, Docket No. 19350-05.
    • United States
    • U.S. Tax Court
    • 1 July 2010
    ...135 T.C. 1DAVID A. GATES AND CHRISTINE A. GATES, Petitioners,v.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.Docket No. George J. Tomlinson, Jr., for petitioners. Kris H. An and Jonathan H. Sloat, for respondent. [135 T.C. 2] OPINION MARVEL, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in petit......
2 books & journal articles
  • Taxpayers not entitled to exclude gain from sale of principal residence.
    • United States
    • The Tax Adviser Vol. 41 No. 10, October 2010
    • 1 October 2010
    ...the ability to avoid capital gains tax on sales of their principal residences throughout their lifetimes. The Gates Case In Gates, 135 T.C. No. 1 (2010), all the facts were stipulated by both parties. The taxpayer purchased the home in 1984 for $150,000. In 1989, he married his current spou......
  • Taxpayer denied exclusion for gain on the sale of a principal residence.
    • United States
    • The Tax Adviser Vol. 41 No. 9, September 2010
    • 1 September 2010
    ...be. It would therefore seem to be more prudent, as the concurring opinion suggests, to make this decision on a case-by-case basis. Gates, 135 T.C. No. 1(2010) TAXPAYER DENIED EXCLUSION FOR GAIN ON SALE OF PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE * TAX LIEN ATTACHED TO PROPERTY TRANSFERRED IN James A. Beavers, J......

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