Olmstead v. Riley
| Decision Date | 17 August 1955 |
| Citation | 286 P.2d 579,135 Cal.App.2d 117 |
| Parties | Alleen S. OLMSTEAD, formerly Alleen S. Riley, Leland Bruce Riley, Ray Loren Riley and Dale Richard Riley, by Aileen S. Olmstead, Guardian ad Litem, Appellants, v. Portia A. RILEY, in her individual capacity, and Portia A. Riley, as Executrix of the Estate of Chester J. Riley, Deceased, Respondent. Civ. 5203. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
John N. Hurtt, Los Angeles, for appellants.
Bertram H. Ross, Los Angeles, for respondent.
This is an action for reformation and enforcement as reformed of three instruments--a property settlement agreement and trust indenture, both executed on December 6, 1941, and an agreement terminating a trust executed May 26, 1947. After defendants filed their answer they filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of merit under the provisions of section 437c of the Code of Civil Procedure. This motion for summary judgment was made upon the grounds that all of the matters set forth in the complaint are res judicata and that all of the matters therein were determined in an action theretofore tried in Orange county entitled 'Ray Loren Riley and Dale Richard Riley, minors, by Aileen S. Riley, their guardian ad litem, and Leland Bruce Riley, plaintiffs, v. Portia A. Riley, defendant', being numbered 57152 in the records of the Superior Court of Orange county. The motion was granted by the trial court and plaintiffs herein appeal from the judgment thereupon entered.
The principal question involved in this appeal is whether plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action by reason of the findings and judgment in said action number 57152.
The facts relative to the material terms and the execution of the three instruments here involved are set forth in the opinion of this court in Riley v. Riley, 118 Cal.App.2d 11, 256 P.2d 1056, decided May 20, 1953, in which the judgment of the trial court in action number 57152 was affirmed on appeal. In that action the trial court construed the provisions of the agreements here involved and rendered judgment that plaintiffs therein had no right to the estate of Chester J. Riley except to legacies of $1,000 each as provided in Riley's will; that Portia Riley was entitled to said estate according to the terms of said will; and that the trust created on December 6, 1941, was terminated and revoked before any rights or benefits accrued to the three sons of Chester and Aileen Riley.
The present action was filed November 17, 1953, and plaintiffs contend, as alleged in their complaint, that prior to December 6, 1941, Aileen Olmstead and Chester J. Riley orally agreed to those matters set forth in the property settlement agreement excepting 'That each of them would be obligated to execute, and at all times to keep in force, his and her will, whereby each of them devised and bequeathed to their said children not only an undivided one-third of his and her beneficial interests under said trust during the existence thereof, but also an undivided one-third of the property of said trust to be conveyed to him and to her on termination thereof'; that the insertion of the particular wording contained in paragraph ten of the property settlement agreement and contained in the portion of the declaration of trust relating to 'rights and interests under the trust agreement' and relating to termination of the trust and the obligation of the 'trustors' on termination thereof was due to a mistake on the part of Mr. Riley and that Mrs. Olmstead's acceptance of said instruments was due to her mistake in believing that the provisions thereof contained language obligating them to execute wills whereby each of them would devise and bequeath not only his and her beneficial rights under the trust created by them, during its existence, but also, as well, one-third of the property to be conveyed to him and to her by the trustees on termination of the trust as agreed and understood by them; that Aileen S. Olmstead and her counsel in the trial believed that the language of said instruments obligated Chester J. Riley to devise and bequeath to his children not only one-third of the property conveyed by him to the trustee on termination of the trust, but as well one-third of the property conveyed to him by the trustee on termination of the trust; that the holding of the court in action number 57152 constituted the first knowledge of the plaintiffs that the language of the property settlement agreement was such that it would not obligate Chester J. Riley to devise and bequeath to his children one-third of the property conveyed to him on termination of the trust; that Aileen Olmstead executed the agreements and declaration of trust believing Riley's assurances to her that the instruments, as executed, conformed in every respect to their oral agreement; that the provisions of paragraph ten of the property settlement agreement and in the declaration of trust were inserted by Riley fraudulently and with intent to deceive plaintiff Aileen Olmstead and that defendant is estopped from denying the terms and provisions of the alleged oral agreement between Riley and Aileen Olmstead.
The doctrine of res judicata rests upon the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated, or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and vexation of his opponent. Public policy and the interest of litigants alike require that there be an end to litigation. Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Cal.2d 636, 637, 134 P.2d 242; Williams v. Krumsiek, 131 Cal.App.2d 411, 280 P.2d 486. In Krier v....
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