People v. Rocha

• Decision Date: 31 August 1982
• Docket Number: Cr. 5748
• Citation: 186 Cal.Rptr. 132,135 Cal.App.3d 590
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frank Lupe ROCHA, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 132

186 Cal.Rptr. 132

135 Cal.App.3d 590

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frank Lupe ROCHA, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 5748.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Aug. 31, 1982.

Hearing Denied October 28, 1982

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, and Augustus E. Noland, Deputy State Public Defender, Sacramento, for defendant-appellant.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief, Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charles P. Just and Shirley A. Nelson, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for plaintiff-respondent.

ANDREEN, Associate Justice.

OPINION

Appellant, age 18 at all times mentioned herein, pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.Code, § 245, subd. (a)). The court committed him to the California Youth Authority (YA or Authority), which rejected him. Thereupon he was sentenced to prison for a term of four years.

His appeal challenges his rejection from the Authority, alleging he was denied due process, that the prohibition against ex post facto laws was violated, and that the policy under which he was excluded is void for failure to comply with the California Administrative Procedure Act (Gov.Code, §§ 11340-11528).

The facts are unimportant to our decision, so may be summarized: as a result of a street altercation, appellant stabbed the victim in his left eye.

The crime and the commitment to prison occurred in 1981.

DUE PROCESS

Appellant places primary reliance on People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622 for the proposition that his "summary" rejection violated his due process rights. He contends he should have been physically present at the YA facility, interviewed regarding the facts and circumstances of the case, and accorded the other rights accorded defendants under Ramirez.

The procedural history of this case is unremarkable. After the entry of the plea, the matter was referred to the probation office for a presentence investigation and report. (Pen.Code, § 1203.) The report as filed with the court contained information detailing appellant's prior record, commitments to institutions and performance on probation. We may assume that this report was forwarded to the Authority. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 1741; Pen.Code, § 1203, subd. (b); Keene, Cal.Crim.Trial Judges Benchbook (1981) pp. 471-473.)

The Authority used a point system to assess the level of criminality to determine whether it would accept appellant. ¹ The point system, which is detailed below, utilized five objective factors in making a determination of whether to accept appellant pursuant to section 1731.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. ² The five are, length of commitment, number and severity of priors, whether the offense pattern is escalating or de-escalating, criminal sophistication and prior secure program placements. Based upon that system, appellant earned 16 1/2 points. Anybody with over 11 points is excluded. This procedure resulted in rejection of appellant.

We turn to an analysis of Ramirez in order to determine whether appellant's due process rights were violated by the procedures used in his case.

Ramirez adjudicated the rights of a person who was committed to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) because he was, or was in imminent danger of becoming, a narcotic addict. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 3051.) After some three years of treatment, Ramirez was placed on outpatient status. Two years later he was arrested for disturbing the peace. The Director of Corrections subsequently found that he was not fit for treatment at CRC. There was then a superior court hearing on the propriety of the order excluding the defendant from CRC; the trial court held the Director of Our Supreme Court reversed on the ground that procedural protections were denied defendant prior to his exclusion from CRC. The court relied on state (Cal.Const., art. I, §§ 7, subd. (a), 15), not federal, constitutional grounds. It rejected the federal test that conditions a due process liberty interest on the existence of a state statute which permits forfeiture of the interest only on the happening of specified conditions. This was criticized by the California court as permitting a state to exclude an interest from constitutional protection by the simple expedient of placing unconditional discretion in a state officer. (People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 266-267, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622.)

Corrections did not abuse his discretion. His criminal proceedings were resumed and he was sentenced to prison.

Our court opted for a rule which weighs governmental and private interests in determining what procedural protections are warranted to promote accurate and reliable administrative decisions and to ensure freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures. This requires a consideration of four factors: the private interest involved (in Ramirez the inmate's interest in being in CRC rather than prison); the risk of a mistake--an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used--and the probable value, if any, of procedural safeguards; the dignitary interest of the individual by informing him of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action and enabling him to present his side of the story; and the governmental interest, including administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. (Id., at p. 269, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622.)

The decision made by the Director of Corrections was whether to continue Ramirez on an inpatient basis. This decision required a subjective evaluation of the probabilities of the addict's success and his effect on others in the program. (Id., at pp. 273, 275, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622.)

It was noted that an exclusion from CRC carries with it a right to judicial hearing conducted by the superior court. If the court finds an abuse of discretion it may require the director to reconsider his decision or may return the defendant to the rehabilitation center for execution of its original commitment order. The court noted that if the director's decision is based solely on incorrect considerations, subsequent judicial review may correct any mistake. However, if correct evidence supports the director's decision, a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard may lead to affirmance even though the director may have reached a contrary result had he known that certain facts upon which he based his decision were incorrect. Because of this, due process considerations entitle a patient-inmate to minimal due process safeguards: statement of grounds upon which the exclusion order was made, access to information used in reaching the decision, ³ notice of the right to respond, and a right to respond orally before a responsible official before the final exclusion decision is made. (Id., at pp. 274-275, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622.) It was deemed important to permit such oral participation in order to resolve conflicting information and to introduce subjective factors into the process, all with a view to enhancing reliability of the decision and promoting the dignity of the individual. More formal hearing rights such as the right to confrontation and cross-examination and right to counsel were not required in the context of an excluded CRC patient-inmate.

People v. Broun (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 284, 167 Cal.Rptr. 169 refused to extend Ramirez to rejection decisions by the California Youth Authority made pursuant to section 1731.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The rationale was that Ramirez had been accepted by CRC while Broun had been rejected by YA. We doubt that such a due process determination should be dependent on whether or not a person has attained the status of an inmate "... when a person is deprived of a statutorily conferred benefit, due process analysis must start not with a judicial attempt to decide whether the statute has created an 'entitlement' that can be defined as 'liberty' or 'property,' but with an assessment of what procedural protections are constitutionally required in light of the governmental and private interests at stake." (People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 264, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622.)

of an institution. As the Ramirez court stated:

This indicates to us that we should employ the four-step analysis set forth in Ramirez irrespective of whether appellant was an inmate.

We further note that although Broun purported to distinguish Ramirez, the courts faced different issues. In Broun the question presented was the availability of judicial review of an administrative decision. In Ramirez, as in the instant case, the question presented is whether there is a due process right to an administrative hearing before the agency, and if so what procedural protections should be afforded. ⁴

As noted earlier, as to the 18-to-21-year-old group, the California Youth Authority need accept only those committed to it who it believes can be materially benefited by its reformatory and educational discipline and for whom it has adequate facilities to provide such care. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 1731.5, subd. (b).) Any judicial review of a decision to reject ⁵ would be subject to the same factors as exist on review of the exclusion of an addict to the California Rehabilitation Center. Accordingly, there is a concomitant need to ensure that the Authority makes its decision based upon accurate data. Appellant contends that this requires his presence at, and participation in, the decisionmaking process.

We turn to an analysis of the four factors delineated in Ramirez in order to determine whether such presence and participation is required under the state's due process clause.

(1) The private interest. Although one incarcerated in an institution operated by the Authority is physically restrained (People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375), there is a substantial difference between incarceration in a prison and...