Gonzalez v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 27 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 00-12636-WGY.,No. CIV.A. 00-11054-WGY.,CIV.A. 00-11054-WGY.,CIV.A. 00-12636-WGY.
• Citation: 135 F.Supp.2d 112
• Parties: Jose GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES, Respondent. Scott T. Brackett, Petitioner, v. United States, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

135 F.Supp.2d 112

Jose GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES, Respondent.

Scott T. Brackett, Petitioner, v. United States, Respondent.

No. CIV.A. 00-11054-WGY.

No. CIV.A. 00-12636-WGY.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

March 27, 2001.

Bernard Grossberg, Boston, MA, for Petitioner.

Susan M. Poswistilo, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, Chief Judge.

These cases present an extraordinary clash between the attempt of the Massachusetts legislature to provide procedural due process to those accused of crime and the will of the United States Congress to restrict such procedural protections as far as the United States Constitution permits.

Both petitioners, Jose Gonzalez ("Gonzalez") and Scott Brackett ("Brackett") bring their petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences. Specifically, Gonzalez and Brackett seek re-sentencing to a lesser term of imprisonment. Their petitions are based on recent decisions by the Massachusetts state courts to vacate their prior state court convictions. At the time of sentencing in this Court, these state court convictions were used as a basis for sentence enhancement. As both men necessarily bring their petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, they run headlong into the gatekeeping provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act¹ ("AEDPA").

Relying on AEDPA's draconian provisions, the United States has filed a Motion to Dismiss Gonzalez's petition on the grounds that this Court does not have jurisdiction or, in the alternative, that Gonzalez has missed the one-year statute of limitations. Recognizing his precarious position under AEDPA, Gonzalez beseeches this Court to apply the savings clause contained in section 2255 and to allow him to bring a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if his section 2255 motion is procedurally barred.

Brackett's petition presents the same procedural quandary but arrives in a different posture. Brackett filed his first petition December 18, 2000, and the Court dismissed the petition as untimely. Brackett seeks reconsideration of that ruling.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Jose Gonzalez

Gonzalez was born in Honduras in 1955 but later became a legal resident of the United States. Pet'r's Mem. Ex. L.² It seems he frequently skirted the edges of the law. Id. Ex. M. On September 9, 1983, the Malden District Court issued four complaints charging Gonzalez with the offenses of operating after a suspension of a license; possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute — class B; unlawful possession of a firearm; and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Id. Ex. C. Gonzalez pled guilty to each of the offenses, was given fines and a six-month suspended sentence, and was placed on probation. Pet'r's Resp. at 5.³ Despite the relatively light sentence imposed, these convictions subsequently created significant and severe consequences for Gonzalez.

Before jumping to the federal forum, it is necessary to relate a few important events that occurred in Massachusetts that impact the motion before this Court.

1. Massachusetts Expands Due Process

In 1978, the Massachusetts legislature passed a law that required a state court to provide an immigration warning prior to accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 29D. Thus, defendants in Gonzalez's position were to be told the potential effects of their guilty pleas on their resident status. In 1986, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that section 29D warnings applied equally to pleas in the Massachusetts district courts.⁴ See Commonwealth v. Mahadeo, 397 Mass. 314, 316, 491 N.E.2d 601 (1986). The decision was retroactive.

Fast forward a decade to 1994, when Gonzalez pled guilty in federal court to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine, and two counts of possessing with intent to distribute cocaine. On February 17, 1995, this Court, concluding that Gonzalez was in a Criminal History Category III under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("USSG"), enhanced his sentence accordingly and sentenced him to ten years in prison, a term of supervised release of four years, a fine of $12,500, and a special assessment of $150. United States Mem. at 4. The sentence was affirmed by the First Circuit in October 1995. Based on this sentence, Gonzalez is slated for release in 2003. Pet'r's Resp. Ex. A (Detainer Action Letter).

2. Enter AEDPA

Following Gonzalez's conviction, Congress passed AEDPA in the wake of a national tragedy. AEDPA's enactment marked the one-year anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing that took the lives of 168 men, women, and children. The American people were stunned, and Congress reacted to the public outcry. According to Senator Orrin Hatch, one of AEDPA's original authors, AEDPA "represents a landmark bipartisan effort to prevent and punish acts of domestic and international terrorism." 142 Cong. Rec. S3352-01, S3353 (Apr. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Congressman Henry Hyde described it as "maintain[ing] the delicate balance between liberty and order, between our precious freedoms and defending this country ...." 142 Cong. Rec. H3605-04, H3606 (Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde).

The AEDPA provisions at issue here were considered key to the effective implementation of the AEDPA goals. They were meant to prevent the countless appeals that often hamper the execution of a sentence. Id. The congressional record indicates that habeas reform was specifically tied to the execution of the death penalty:

Finally, the essence described as that crown jewel of this bill is the reform of habeas corpus for an effective death penalty. The bill sets time limits on the application and considerations of habeas writs; I think that is extremely important. No longer will petition after petition be filed with the courts, delaying endlessly the carrying out of sentences handed down by judges or juries. We have a paradox in our society whereby someone serves on death row for life. If, in fact, we are going to have a strong deterrence, retribution so that the victim can actually feel as though they have been vindicated, we need an effective death penalty. This bill will give it for America.

Id. at H3609 (remarks of Rep. Buyer).

The sweep of the so-called habeas "reform" net is much broader, however, catching more than convicted terrorists and petitioners on death row.⁵ Gonzalez neither is a terrorist nor was he sentenced to death, yet he falls within AEDPA's far-reaching provisions.

Included within AEDPA is a stringent one-year statute of limitations on section 2255 petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Proulx v. Marshall, Nos. 95-40182-NMG, 99-40129-NMG 2000 WL 1448600, at *2 (D.Mass. Sept. 25, 2000) (Gertner, J.) ("Effective April 24, 1996, AEDPA amended the statutes governing habeas corpus petitions by imposing a one-year statute of limitations period on the filing of all non-capital habeas petitions in the federal courts."). Gonzalez was thus given one year from the date of AEDPA's enactment to file a motion based on his federal conviction and sentence. Cognizant of this time frame, Gonzalez, acting pro se, submitted his first section 2255 petition in April 1997. The petition raised three claims: (1) that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) that he had neither knowingly nor voluntarily pled guilty; and (3) that his sentence was based on "materially inaccurate information." Pet'r's First Mot. at 5. This motion was docketed as civil action number 97-10986.

Unfortunately for Gonzalez, his petition was unaccompanied by a memorandum of law and the Court was unimpressed with its bare allegations. On May 12, 1997, the Court issued an order providing that Gonzalez had sixty days in which to file a memorandum to give substance to his claims. After the sixty days had expired, Gonzalez sought an extension, which the Court denied. The petition was dismissed and the case was closed.

Undaunted by, or perhaps unaware of, the denial, Gonzalez sent the Court a memorandum and included a copy of his original petition. The copy of the original petition was docketed under a new docket number: civil action number 97-11997. On September 4, 1997, the Court dismissed the copied petition because it had not been timely filed. Gonzalez appealed.

The First Circuit brought the double docketing to the attention of the Court and Gonzalez. In addition, the First Circuit noted that there was no final judgment in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 in docket number 97-10986. Thus, the First Circuit suggested that Gonzalez ask this Court to reconsider its denial of an extension of time to support the original petition to treat the memorandum in 97-11997 as a memorandum in support of 97-10986.

Gonzalez followed the First Circuit's suggestions. In a Memorandum and Order dated April 16, 1998, this Court readily recognized its administrative blunder and reconsidered its original decision. While this Court ultimately ruled Gonzalez's petition timely, it was still dismissed. The Court found the petition to be "utterly conclusory and frivolous." United States Mem. at 5. Moreover, a certificate of appealability was denied because Gonzalez failed to make "a substantial showing of the denial of constitutional rights" as required by section 2253.

While the case was whirling about in the federal courts, Gonzalez received verbal notice from the Immigration & Naturalization Service ("INS") that he was slated to be deported based, in part, on his state convictions. The specter of deportation caused Gonzalez to turn his attention to the state courts. On December 5, 1997, within days of the notice, Gonzalez, again acting pro se, filed a motion in the Malden District Court to vacate his sentence. He based his claim on the fact that the court had failed to advise him that his...