Cunningham v. Neagle
| Citation | 34 L.Ed. 55,135 U.S. 1,10 S.Ct. 658 |
| Parties | CUNNINGHAM, Sheriff, v. NEAGLE. 1 |
| Decision Date | 14 April 1890 |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
[Syllabus from pages 1-3 intentionally omitted]
This is an appeal by Cunningham, sheriff of the county of San Joaquin, in the state of California, from a judgment of the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of California, discharging David Neagle from the custody of said sheriff, who held him a prisoner on a charge of murder. On the 16th day of August, 1889, there was presented to Judge SAWYER, the circuit judge of the United States for the ninth circuit, embracing the northern district of California, a petition signed, 'DAVID NEAGLE, Deputy United States Marshal,' by A. L. Farish on his behalf. This petition represented that the said Farish was a deputy-marshal duly appointed for the northern district of California by J. C. Franks, who was the marshal of that district. It further alleged that David Neagle was, at the time of the occurrences recited in the petition, and at the time of filing it, a duly-appointed and acting deputy United States marshal for the same district. It then proceeded to state that said Neagle was imprisoned, confined, and restrained of his liberty in the county jail in San Joaquin county, in the state of California, by Thomas Cunningham, sheriff of said county, upon a charge of murder, under a warrant of arrest, a copy of which was annexed to the petition. The warrant was as follows:
In the justice's court of Stockton township. State of California, county of San Joaquin—as.: The people of the state of California to any sheriff, constable, marshal, or policeman of said state, or of the county of San Joaquin: Information on oath having been this day laid before me by Sarah A. Terry that the crime of murder, a felony, has been committed within said county of San Joaquin on the 14th day of August, A. D. 1889, in this, that one David S. Terry, a human being then and there being, was willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with malice aforethought, shot, killed, and murdered, and accusing Stephen J. Field and David Neagle thereof, you are therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above-named Stephen J. Field and David Neagle, and bring them before me, at my office in the city of Stockton, or, in case of my absence or inability to act, before the nearest and most accessible magistrate in the county. Dated at Stockton this 14th day of August, A. D. 1889. H. V. J. SWAIN, Justice of the Peace.
The petition then recites the circumstances of a rencounter between said Neagle and David S. Terry, in which the latter was instantly killed by two shots from a revolver in the hands of the former. The circumstanceso f this encounter, and of what led to it, will be considered with more particularity hereafter. The main allegation of this petition is that Neagle, as United States deputy-marshal, acting under the orders of Marshal Franks, and in pursuance of instructions from the attorney general of the United States, had, in consequence of an anticipated attempt at violence on the part of Terry against the Honorable STEPHEN J. FIELD, a justice of the supreme court of the United States, been in attendance upon said justice, and was sitting by his side at a breakfast table when a murderous assault was made by Terry on Judge FIELD, and in defense of the life of the judge the homicide was committed for which Neagle was held by Cunningham. The allegation is very distinct that Justice FIELD was engaged in the discharge of his duties as circuit justice of the United States for that circuit, having held court at Los Angeles, one of the places at which the court is by law held, and, having left that court, was on his way to San Francisco for the purpose of holding the circuit court at that place. The allegation is also very full that Neagle was directed by Marshal Franks to accompany him for the purpose of protecting him, and that these orders of Franks were given in anticipation of the assault which actually occurred. It is also stated, in more general terms, thAT MARSHAL NEAGLE, in killing Terry under the circumstances, was in the discharge of his duty as an officer of the United States, and was not, therefore, guilty of a murder, and that his imprisonment under the warrant held by Sheriff Cunningham is in violation of the laws and constitution of the United States, and that he is in custody for an act done in pursuance of the laws of the United States. This petition being sworn to by Farish and presented to Judge SAWYER, he made the following order: The writ was accordingly issued and delivered to Cunningham, who made the following return: . Various pleadings and amended pleadings were made, which do not tend much to the elucidation of the matter before us. Cunningham filed a demurrer to the petition for the writ of habeas Corpus; and Neagle filed a traverse to the return of the sheriff, which was accompanied by exhibits, the substance of which will be hereafter considered, when the case comes to be examined upon its facts.
The hearing in the circuit court was had before Circuit Judge SAWYER and District Judge SABIN. The sheriff, Cunningham, was represented by G. A. Johnson, attorney general of the state of California, and other counsel. A large body of testimony, documentary and otherwise, was submitted to the court, on which, after a full consideration of the subject, the court made the following order: From that order an appeal was allowed, which brings the case to this court, accompanied by a voluminous record of all the matters which were before the court on the hearing.
Z. Montgomery, for appellant.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 12-20 intentionally omitted]
Jos. H. Choate, and Jas. C. Carter, for appellee.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 31-40 intentionally omitted]
S. Shellabarger, and J. M. Wilson
If it be true, as stated in this order of the court discharging the prisoner, that he was held 'in custody for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, and in custody in violation of the constitution and laws of the United States,' there does not seem to be any doubt that, under the statute on that subject, he was properly discharged by the circuit court. Section 753 of the Revised Statutes reads as follows: 'The writ of habeas corpus1 shall in no case extend to a prisoner in jail, unless where he is in custody under or by color
of the authority of the United States, or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof; or is in custody in violation of the constitution, or of a law or treaty of the United States; or, being a subject or citizen of a foreign state, and domiciled therein, is in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations; or unless it is necessary to bring the prisoner into court to testify.' And section 761 declares that when, by the writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner is brought up for a hearing, the 'court or justice shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice require.' This, of course, means that if he is held in custody in violation of the constitution or a law of the United States, or for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, he must be discharged.
By the law, as it existed at the time of the enactment of the Revised Statutes, an appeal could be taken to the circuit court from any court of justice or judge inferior...
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