Kayla M. v. Greene
| Citation | 136 A.3d 1,163 Conn.App. 493 |
| Decision Date | 18 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 37785 , No. 37786.,37785 |
| Parties | KAYLA M. v. Edward GREENE. Kayla M. v. Susan Greene. |
| Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
William J. Ward, for the appellants (defendant in each case).
Kayla M., self-represented, the appellee (plaintiff in each case).
BEACH, KELLER and PRESCOTT, Js.
PRESCOTT
, J.
In these appeals, we are called upon for the first time to interpret General Statutes § 46b–16a
, which protects victims of stalking through civil protection orders.1 Section 46b–16a (a) provides in relevant part: “Any person who has been the victim of ... stalking, as described in sections 53a–181c, 53a–181d and 53a–181e, may make an application to the Superior Court for relief under this section....”
The defendants, Edward Greene (husband) and Susan Greene (wife), appeal from the judgments of the trial court granting the applications of the plaintiff, Kayla M.,2 for orders of civil protection pursuant to § 46b–16a
. The defendants claim that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's applications for the orders because: (1) the court improperly interpreted § 46b–16a (a) to require that there be reasonable grounds to believe that the defendants' conduct constitutes the crime of stalking under one, but not all three, of the criminal stalking statutes, and (2) there was insufficient evidence for the court to determine that there were reasonable grounds to believe that they had stalked the plaintiff and would continue to do so in the absence of an order of civil protection. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant to our analysis. On March 9, 2015, the plaintiff filed two applications for orders of civil protection, one for each defendant, who were regular customers at the restaurant at which she was employed. In the applications and the attached affidavits, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants stalked her and that she felt threatened by them.3 The court issued two ex parte civil protection orders, which prohibited the defendants from contact with the plaintiff, including indirect contact through a third party, and coming within 100 yards of the plaintiff. The ex parte orders were to expire on March 19, 2015, the day on which the hearing on the applications for protection orders was held.
At the hearing, the court heard testimony from the plaintiff and the defendants. The court credited the plaintiff's testimony, as well as her statements in her affidavit attached to the applications.4 On the basis of this testimony, the court found the following facts, which the defendants do not challenge:5 “[The defendants] first came to know the [plaintiff] approximately two to two and one-half years ago, when they patronized the restaurant where the [plaintiff] was employed as a member of the waitstaff....
The court further found: “The [wife], when questioned about this issue, testified that she became aware of her husband's request for the nude photographs of the [plaintiff], but she expressed indifference to that conduct.
“The [husband] continued to send messages to the [plaintiff], which she ignored, hoping he would thereby understand that she did not wish to communicate with him. She followed that course of action because she was fully cognizant of the fact that [the defendants were] customers at her place of employment.
“[The husband] did not cease his interest in the [plaintiff]. He came to her place of employment and inquired of other staff members as to the [plaintiff's] home address, he asked her why her marriage had failed, and whether her children had the same biological father.
The [plaintiff], at or about that point, blocked the [defendants] on Facebook. [The husband] persisted in reaching out to the [plaintiff], using e-mail, and asking, in a January 1, 2015 e-mail, why the applicant had taken the latter action. The [husband] indicated, in that e-mail, that both [the husband and the wife] were puzzled and hurt because the [plaintiff] had blocked them on Facebook. The [defendants] thereafter came to the restaurant [where the plaintiff worked] and left a letter expressing their upset at the [plaintiff's] effort to cease communications with them, and leaving money in an envelope for the [plaintiff]. On February 22, 2015, [the husband] sent an e-mail to the [plaintiff] stating that [the defendants] were at the restaurant.... The applicant ignored the latter message.”
As the plaintiff walked past the defendants with the manager, the wife put her arm out and asked the plaintiff to talk to her and the husband, to which the plaintiff responded no. “The [defendants] left the restaurant, and thereafter the [husband] sent the following message to the [plaintiff]: ‘You're walking on very thin ice, my dear....’ ”
The court also found that the wife had “no recognition of the wrongfulness of her conduct or her husband's conduct, and that she intends to continue to frequent the [plaintiff's] place of employment, absent an order of protection barring her from doing so.” Furthermore, the court did not credit the husband's testimony that he had no intention to communicate or interact with the plaintiff again; rather, the court found that he was “unnaturally obsessed with the [plaintiff] and that he has no recognition of the wrongfulness of his conduct.”
The court concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendants had engaged in conduct that constituted the crime of stalking in the second and third degrees and that they would continue to engage in such conduct in the absence of civil protection orders. The court granted the plaintiff's applications for orders of civil protection against both defendants. The orders expire on March 19, 2016. This appeal followed. Additional facts with be set forth as necessary.
The defendants first claim that the court improperly interpreted § 46b–16a (a)
. According to the defendants, in order to obtain an order of civil protection on the basis of stalking, § 46b–16a (a) requires that the applicant prove that there are reasonable grounds to believe that their conduct constituted stalking in the first, second, and third degrees as set forth in General Statutes §§ 53a–181c, 53a–181d, and 53a–181e. Specifically, the defendants argue that the term “and” in § 46b–16a (a) is conjunctive and, thus, the elements of all three statutes must be met in order for the court to issue a civil protection order. We are not persuaded.
The defendants' claim raises a question of statutory interpretation. “[I]ssues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review.... When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... General Statutes § 1–2z
directs this court to first consider the text of the statute and its relationship to other statutes to determine its meaning. If, after such consideration, the meaning is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, we shall not consider extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute.... Only if we determine that the statute is not plain and unambiguous or yields absurd or unworkable results may we consider extratextual evidence of its meaning such as the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment ... the legislative policy it was designed to implement ... its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.... We presume that the legislature did not intend to enact meaningless provisions.... [S]tatutes must be construed, if possible, such that no clause, sentence or...
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