Fontanillas-Lopez v. Morel Bauza Cartagena & Dapena LLC
| Decision Date | 30 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 12–1206 (PG). |
| Citation | 136 F.Supp.3d 152 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
| Parties | Lourdes Del Rosario FONTANILLAS–LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. MOREL BAUZA CARTAGENA & DAPENA LLC, et al, Defendants. |
Roberto Marquez–Sanchez, Roberto Marquez Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Raymond E. Morales–Ortiz, Rosangela O. Sanfilippo–Resumil, Morell, Bauza, Cartagena & Dapena, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
JUAN M. PEREZ–GIMENEZ
, District Judge.
Before the court are the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of this court's order granting attorney fees (Docket No. 140) and plaintiff's motion to alter the judgment in favor of defendants (Docket No. 142). For the reasons explained below, the court DENIES both requests.
On March 23, 2012, plaintiff Lourdes del Rosario Fontanillas–Lopez (hereinafter "Plaintiff" or "Fontanillas"), along with her parents Mildred Milagros Lopez and Luis Alfredo Fontanillas,1 filed the above-captioned claim pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
("Title VII"), against Plaintiff's former employer Morell, Bauza, Cartagena & Dapena ("MBCD" or "the Firm") and individual defendants Pedro Antonio Morell ("Morell"), Antonio Bauza ("Bauza"), Edgardo Cartagena ("Cartagena"), Ramon E. Dapena ("Dapena"), and Lourdes M. Vazquez ("Vazquez") (collectively referred to as "Defendants"). See Docket No. 1. On February 7, 2014, the court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's claims of gender discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII. See Docket No. 94. Plaintiff's supplemental state law claims were dismissed without prejudice. See id. Judgment was entered on the same date. See Docket No. 95.
Having prevailed, the Defendants sought to recover the attorney fees and costs incurred. See Docket No. 98. Despite the Plaintiff's opposition, the court found in Defendants' favor on November 18, 2014, and granted them $53,662.50 in attorney fees. See Docket No. 109.
On December 16, 2014, the Plaintiff filed motions for reconsideration of this court's grant of summary judgment and attorney fee award in favor of Defendants. However, both motions were stricken from the record as both considerably exceeded the amount of pages the local rules allow, see Docket No. 136. The Plaintiff thus refiled her requests and the Defendants timely opposed.
A. Rule 59
775 F.3d 12, 27 (1st Cir.2014). The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Rule 59(e) motions are granted only "when the original judgment evidenced a manifest error of law, if there is newly discovered evidence, or in certain other narrow situations." Ocasio–Hernandez v. Fortuño–Burset, 777 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2015) (citing Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir.2014) ). Notwithstanding, the court's "discretion must be exercised with considerable circumspection: revising a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy and should be employed sparingly." Ira Green, Inc., 775 F.3d at 27(citing Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir.2006) ).
"Unless the court has misapprehended some material fact or point of law, such a motion is normally not a promising vehicle for revisiting a party's case and rearguing theories previously advanced and rejected." Palmer, 465 F.3d at 30
. Also, "a Rule 59(e) motion ‘does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures' or to ‘introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to judgment.’ " Quality Cleaning Products R.C., Inc. v. SCA Tissue North America, LLC, 794 F.3d 200, 208 (1st Cir.2015)(citing Emmanuel v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 25, 426 F.3d 416, 422 (1st Cir.2005) ; Aybar v. Crispin–Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1997) ).
Now, "[i]t would appear in general that the grounds for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)
may also be grounds for a new trial under Rule 59, if the motion is timely made." Perez–Perez v. Popular Leasing Rental, Inc., 993 F.2d 281, 283 (1st Cir.1993) (internal citations omitted). However, "[m]otions served after twenty-eight days are considered pursuant to Rule 60(b)." Mena–Valdez v. E.M. T–Shirts Distributors, Inc., 878 F.Supp.2d 357, 360 (D.P.R.2012)(citing Perez–Perez, 993 F.2d at 284 ). A motion for relief of a judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule 60(b) may be grounded on the following reasons:
;
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
. "A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1).
589 F.3d 505, 512 (1st Cir.2009) (citations omitted).
The Plaintiff requests that this court reconsider its order awarding attorney fees to the prevailing Defendants. According to Plaintiff, the fees awarded to "Morell Bauza Cartagena & Dapena LLC for the work performed by its employee [attorney] Sanfilippo [was] unwarranted as the same constitute [sic] a request for an award to a pro se attorney litigant, expressly prohibited by the Supreme Court in Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 111 S.Ct. 1435, 113 L.Ed.2d 486 (1991)
...."2 Docket No. 140 at page 2. According to the Plaintiff, no proof was submitted evincing the fees arrangement between attorney Sanfilippo and the co-defendant she represented, namely, Lourdes M. Vazquez. Plaintiff suggests that the lack thereof fails to establish whether Vazquez actually incurred in the costs of a legal representation. In addition, the Plaintiff points out that it stems from the time sheets Sanfilippo submitted that she spent a great deal of her time meeting with the members of co-defendant Morel Bauza Cartagena & Dapena LLC, as opposed to her own client. The Plaintiff's position thus is that because the defendant—firm was self-represented, it should not have been awarded attorney fees pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Kay.
In Kay, the Supreme Court held that a pro se litigant who also happens to be a lawyer is not entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
. See Kay, 499 U.S. at 436, 111 S.Ct. 1435. Notwithstanding, as accurately pointed out by the Defendants in their opposition (Docket No. 153), footnote 7 of the Supreme Court's opinion states as follows:
Petitioner argues that because Congress intended organizations to receive an attorney's fee even when they represented themselves, an individual attorney should also be permitted to receive an attorney's fee even when he represents himself. However, an organization is not comparable to a pro se litigant because the organization is always represented by counsel, whether in-house or pro bono, and thus, there is always an attorney-client relationship.
Kay, 499 U.S. at 436 at n. 7, 111 S.Ct. 1435
(emphasis ours). Therefore, "the Supreme Court made crystal clear ... that the exception for individual plaintiffs who represent themselves does not apply to organizations. " Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 473 F.3d 312, 325 (C.A.D.C.2006) (). "In explaining that organizations may recover fees when represented by in-house counsel, the Supreme Court did not distinguish between law firms and other types of organizations." Id.; see also Gold, Weems, Bruser, Sues & Rundell v. Metal Sales Mfg. Corp., 236 F.3d 214, 218–19 (5th Cir.2000) (); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 400 (4th Cir.2003) (); Treasurer...
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