Ulrich v. Ulrich

• Decision Date: 29 November 1892
• Citation: 136 N.Y. 120,32 N.E. 606
• Parties: ULRICH v. ULRICH.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

136 N.Y. 120

32 N.E. 606

ULRICH

v.ULRICH.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 29, 1892.

Appeal from superior court of New York city, general term. See 17 N. Y. Supp. 721.

Action by Charles Ulrich against Edward Ulrich, as executor of Barbara Ulrich, deceased. Reversed.

Andrews, Finch, and O'Brien, JJ., dissenting.

Nelson Smith, for appellant.

Edward P. Orrell, (Edward W. S. Johnston, of counsel,) for respondent.

GRAY, J.

The plaintiff brought this action against the executor of his mother's will to recover from her estate the value of services, which he alleged had been rendered by himself and his wife to his mother at her request. A jury rendered a verdict for the defendant, and the only question which demands our consideration, upon the plaintiff's appeal from a judgment affirming the defendant's recovery, arises upon the exception of the plaintiff to a part of the trial judge's charge. After stating what the action was for, the trial judge said: ‘As a general rule, children are bound to care for their parents in their old age, and filial affection should prompt children to do so. The consequence is that the presumption of law is against such a claim as has been advanced in this action.’ The plaintiff excepted to this portion of the charge, and insists that it was an erroneous instruction to the jury. The trial judge, it is true, continued by charging that ‘if the plaintiff has overcome the presumption by proof, and has clearly shown that the services sought to be recovered for were rendered by himself and his wife pursuant to his mother's express promise, * * * the plaintiff is entitled to recover.’ Under the facts of the case, as they had appeared in the evidence, the charge relating to the obligations of children, and as to the legal presumption, was such as possibly to convey to the minds of the jurors an erroneous understanding of the law. It may well be that the trial judge had before his own mind the moral aspect of the case, and did not intend that his observations should have any other weight with the jury than as moral reflections; but the nature of the case, the sequence of the remarks, and the stage of the case, or the circumstances under which uttered, were such as, in my judgment, to require us to grant a new trial. There is no presumption of law against the maintenance of such a claim. If the plaintiff had established to the satisfaction of the jury the existence of an agreement between his parent and himself, under which he and his wife were to attend upon and to care for her, and she was to pay for such services, he was entitled to their verdict, as much as he would be upon any other valid claim.

A ‘presumption’ has been defined to be a rule of law that courts and judges shall draw a particular inference from particular facts, or from particular evidence, unless and until the truth of the inference is disproved. Steph. Dig. Ev. c. 1, art. 1. No presumption existed here as a presumption of law. The right to draw any presumption as to the fact of an agreement having been made from the other fact of the relationship between the parties was within the exclusive province of the jury. Justice v. Lang, 52 N. Y. 323. There is no rule of law which compels an inference, from the fact of such a relationship, against the existence of an agreement by the parent to compensate the child for services to be rendered. The law does presume, where there is no proof of a contract, under which the services were performed, that there was no promise or agreement to pay for them; that is, that they were gratuitous. That is the general rule. So far as the relation of parent and child is concerned, it is quite as competent for the parent to contract with his adult child for support and care, and a claim for the compensation due thereunder is quite as valid, as it would be in any other case between individuals. The liability of a child to support its parents, who are infirm, destitute, or aged, was created in England and here by statute. The statute in that respect created duties unknown to the common law. Reeve, Dom. Rel. 284; 1 Bl. Comm. 448; Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281. Had the trial judge confined his observations to the suggestionthat filial affection should prompt children to take care of their parents in their old age, I should find no reason for criticising the correctness of his charge. But the state of the case was such as that, with the moral sense alert, and naturally quick to respond to impressions adverse to the plaintiff's claim, the jury would readily attach great weight to all expressions of...