Edinger's Estate, In re
| Decision Date | 28 June 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 8187,8187 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE of Henry H. EDINGER, Deceased. Harold EDINGER, Administrator for the Estate of Henry H. Edinger, deceased, and Victor Edinger, Ella Archer, Adeline I. Meier and Lydia E. Berndt, Petitioner, Respondent and Appellant, v. Helen EDINGER, Respondent. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A county court has power to determine whether it has jurisdiction of the subject matter of an issue presented to it for decision.
2. A county court has no jurisdiction to try and determine the validity of an antenuptial agreement.
3. Where a county court erroneously decides that it has jurisdiction of the subject matter at issue, the error is subject to review and correction upon appeal.
4. A motion to dismiss an appeal from an order or decree of a county court, upon the ground that the county court had no jurisdiction to enter the order or decree from which the appeal was taken, should be denied for the reason that one of the issues upon such an appeal is whether the county court's decision that it had jurisdiction of the subject matter was erroneous.
5. An appeal to a district court from an order or decree of a county court invokes only the appellate jurisdiction of the district court.
6. Upon an appeal to the district court from an order or decree of a county court the parties have the right to invoke the original equitable jurisdiction of the district court.
7. Although the motion to dismiss the appeal in this case was properly denied, the making of the motion raised the issue of the county court's decision as to its jurisdiction and the tendering of evidence upon other issues in the case after the denial of the motion did not constitute a voluntary submission of such issues to the original equitable jurisdiction of the district court.
8. The district court erred in holding that the county court had jurisdiction to determine the issue of the validity of an antenuptial agreement.
9. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction upon an appeal from county court, the district court has no greater jurisdiction than the county court had.
Stokes, Vaaler, Gillig & Warcup, Grand Forks, and Fabian E. Noack, Carrington, for appellants.
Mattson & Williams, New Rockford, and John J. Tebelius, Harvey, for respondent.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Foster County, which reversed and annulled an order of the county court and directed the Judge of that court to distribute the residue of the estate of Henry H. Edinger in accordance with the law of succession.
The material facts and the proceedings had, upon which this appeal arises, are not in substantial dispute. The record shows that Henry H. Edinger was a resident of the City of Carrington; that he was a widower and had planned to marry one Helen Ahl, a widow. That shortly before the marriage was solemnized on the 17 day of August, 1942, he entered into an antenuptial agreement with his fiancee (exhibit #14) by the terms of which they agreed, that in the event he preceded her in death, that she should receive only $1,500.00 in cash and a homestead estate in their dwelling house located in the City of Carrington. The parties lived together as husband and wife from the time of their marriage until October 14, 1958, when Henry H. Edinger died intestate. Thereafter Harold H. Edinger, a son of the decedent, was, upon proper petition, due notice and hearing, duly appointed as administrator of his father's estate and proceeded with the probate thereof. That he prepared and filed an inventory showing that the property of the deceased was appraised in the sum of $57,179.00, and on September 30, 1961, he filed his final report and account with a petition praying that the administration of said estate be closed and he be discharged from his trust and that the residue of the estate of said deceased be distributed in accordance with the terms of the antenuptial agreement attached thereto, which he found in the decedent's safety deposit box.
The county court gave due notice for hearing of said petition on the 24 day of October but before the hearing was had thereon the respondent, Helen Edinger, served and filed her answer thereto in which she did not object to the allowance and approval of the administrator's final report and account but did challenge the validity of the antenuptial agreement on the grounds:
(1) That said agreement was procured by the practice of fraud and deceit upon her; and
(2) That it was rescinded by the mutual consent of the parties during the lifetime of the deceased; and prayed that the residue of his estate be distributed in accordance with the law of succession.
That after the hearing on said petition and answer was had, the county court issued its order, on the 27 of October, to the effect:
(1) That the administrator's final report and account be allowed and approved; and
(2) That the residue of the estate of Henry H. Edinger, deceased, be distributed in accordance with the terms of the antenuptial agreement here in issue.
That on November 17, 1961, before a final decree of distribution was entered and within 30 days from the date of said order the respondent, Helen Edinger, perfected an appeal to the District Court of Foster County from said order and demanded a trial de novo in said court.
When the case was thereafter reached for trial upon the merits in the district court before the Honorable M. C. Fredricks, Jr., the administrator moved to dismiss the appeal, upon the ground that the county court had no jurisdiction to try the issue of the validity of the antenuptial agreement and, therefore, the district court acquired none upon appeal. The district judge denied said motion, whereupon the parties submitted their evidence on the issues of fraud, rescission and of the validity of said agreement, to the court for decision. That thereafter, on March 31, 1964, the court issued its order authorizing the entry of judgment in favor of Helen Edinger which, in so far as is here material, determined in effect:
(1) That the antenuptial agreement in issue was procured by the practice of fraud and deceit and, as such, was null and void;
(2) That the order of the county court, directing the distribution of the residue of the estate of said deceased in accordance with the antenuptial agreement, be vacated and annulled; and (3) That the county court of Foster County be directed to distribute the residue of the estate of said deceased in accordance with the law of succession.
Judgment was entered thereon accordingly, on April 1, 1964, whereupon the administrator perfected an appeal from said judgment to this court and demanded a trial de novo of the entire case.
The administrator, in his assignments of error, has presented five questions for us to decide, but according to our analysis a determination of three issues will dispose of this appeal. They are, in effect:
(1) Did the County Court of Foster County have jurisdiction of the subject matter to determine the validity of the antenuptial agreement here in issue?
(2) Was the order of the county court, approving and allowing the administrator's final report and account and directing a distribution of the residue of the estate of said deceased in accordance with the terms of the antenuptial agreement, an appealable order? and
(3) Did the parties invoke the original, equitable jurisdiction of the district court by a voluntary submission for decision of the question of the validity of the antenuptial agreement, without bringing an independent action for said purpose?
The first question for decision then is: Did the County Court of Foster County have jurisdiction of the subject matter, to try and determine the validity of said antenuptial agreement?
Counsel for the administrator contends, in effect, that after the widow challenged the validity of said agreement upon the grounds: (1) That it was procured by the practice of fraud and deceit upon her; and (2) that it had been rescinded by the mutual consent of the parties during the lifetime of the decedent; the county court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter to determine its validity and, therefore, the order of said court issued on October 27, 1961, directing the residue of the estate of said deceased be distributed according to the terms thereof, is absolutely null and void.
It is true that this court has held, in effect:
(1) That county courts derived all of their powers from the Constitution and statutes and have no common law jurisdiction. In re Anderson's Estate, 76 N.D. 163, 34 N.W.2d 413.
(2) That Section 111 of the North Dakota Constitution declares that the county court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all probate and testamentary matters. Northwestern Trust Co. v. Getz, 67 N.D. 15, 269 N.W. 53.
(3) That county courts have no equitable jurisdiction. Muhlhauser v. Becker, 74 N.D. 103, 20 N.W.2d 353; In re Randall's Estate, 77 N.D. 69, 40 N.W.2d 446; State ex rel. City of Minot v. Gronna, 79 N.D. 673, 59 N.W.2d 514.
(4) That county courts have no jurisdiction:
(a) To try and determine the validity of a contract for the adoption of minors; Muhlhauser v. Becker supra; and
(b) To try and determine legal rights in property left by decedent, when they depend not upon a will or heirship but upon contract. Goodin v. Casselman, 51 N.D. 543, 200 N.W. 94; In re Lyons' Estate, 79 N.D. 595, 58 N.W.2d 845.
Bearing these principles of law in mind, the primary question arises whether they are applicable to and decisive of the issue here involved, so as to compel and necessitate a decision that the order of the County Court of Foster County is absolutely null and void.
To answer this inquiry requires a consideration of the controlling principles of law and decisions applicable thereto.
They are:
(1) Jurisdiction means the power to inquire into the facts, apply the law, and to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Estate of Raketti, Matter of
...re Murray, 145 N.W.2d 899, 903 (N.D.1966), overruled on other grounds, Kee v. Redlin, 203 N.W.2d 423, 426 (N.D.1972); In re Edinger's Estate, 136 N.W.2d 114, 120 (N.D.1965). We have defined "judgment" as "a judicial determination on matters submitted to a court for decision which fixes the ......
-
Estate of Rohrich, Matter of, 920245
...we held that equitable matters not addressed in the county courts could be addressed in the district courts. In re Estate of Edinger, 136 N.W.2d 114 (N.D.1965). When the Legislature adopted the North Dakota version of the Uniform Probate Code, it omitted sections 1-308 and 1-309 of the Unif......
-
Gustafson v. Poitra
...has also recognized and applied the rule that subject matter jurisdiction can be given res judicata effect. See In re Edinger’s Estate , 136 N.W.2d 114, 121-22 (N.D. 1965) ; Schillerstrom v. Schillerstrom , 75 N.D. 667, 697-700, 32 N.W.2d 106, 121-24 (1948).[¶ 10] We have repeatedly said se......
-
Mills v. City of Grand Forks
...of the court does not depend upon whether its decision is right or wrong, correct or incorrect.” Matter of Edinger's Estate, 136 N.W.2d 114, 120 (N.D.1965); see also, e.g., Fredericks v. Eide–Kirschmann Ford, Mercury, Lincoln, Inc., 462 N.W.2d 164, 168 (N.D.1990); Baker v. Lenhart, 50 N.D. ......