State v. Hyde

Decision Date11 April 1911
Citation136 S.W. 316,234 Mo. 200
PartiesSTATE v. HYDE.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

An indictment, in a prosecution where a physician was accused of poisoning one of his patients, charged that the physician administered strychnine and other deadly and poisonous substances, to the grand jury unknown. There was evidence that both before and after the alleged crime the physician purchased capsules containing cyanide, and that, on a subsequent visit to the same house where it was claimed that he poisoned another member of the same family, the physician threw away capsules which were found and were claimed to have contained cyanide. There was no expert testimony before the grand jury that cyanide was found in the viscera of the deceased patient. Held, that there was no variance between the proof tending to show that the deceased died by means of cyanide and strychnine poisoning, and the allegation in the indictment that he met his death by means of strychnine and other poisons unknown to the grand jury.

2. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 1159)—APPEAL—FINDINGS—CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES.

The credibility of expert witnesses is a question for the jury and cannot be determined by the appellate court.

3. HOMICIDE (§ 268) — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY.

Evidence, in a homicide case alleged to have been committed by means of poisoned capsules, held sufficient to go to the jury.

4. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 369)—EVIDENCE—OTHER OFFENSES—IN GENERAL.

Where a defendant is on trial for one crime, evidence of unrelated crimes is not admissible to prove his guilt in the particular instance.

5. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 369)—EVIDENCE—OTHER OFFENSES—CONSTITUTION.

Bill of Rights, § 22, provides that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to demand the nature of the accusation, and, as the indictment must reveal the nature of the accusation, evidence of unrelated crimes is not admissible in a prosecution for a particular offense, because the admission of such evidence compels accused to meet charges of which the indictment gives him no information.

6. CRIMINAL LAW (§§ 369, 371, 372)—EVIDENCE—OTHER OFFENSES — ADMISSIBILITY— IN GENERAL.

Evidence of other crimes is admissible in a prosecution for a particular one, when relevant to the issues and showing either motive or intent, absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan, or the identity of the persons charged with crime.

7. HOMICIDE (§ 7)—MURDER—"MOTIVE."

In murder, "motive" is the impulse or purpose that induces the murderer to kill his victim.

8. HOMICIDE (§ 9)—MURDER—"INTENT."

In murder "intent" is the purpose to make effective the means adopted for the commission of the crime.

9. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 374)—EVIDENCE—OTHER OFFENSES.

Where, for any reason, evidence of any other crime is admissible, there must be substantial proof that the other crime has been committed.

10. HOMICIDE (§ 166)—EVIDENCE—MOTIVE.

On the trial of a physician accused of poisoning his wife's rich uncle to prevent him from making a new will which would cut off the wife's share in her uncle's residuary estate, to show motive, evidence, tending to show that the physician killed another relative of his wife who was an executor of and a legatee under the uncle's will, was offered on the theory that the physician hoped to be an executor of the new will or that he committed this first crime so that the executor's legacy would lapse and increase his wife's share in the residuary estate. It was not shown that the physician knew that the executor had any legacy. Held, that this evidence was inadmissible: First, because killing the executor to supplant him in the new will is inconsistent with the killing of the uncle to prevent him making a new will; and, second, because it was not shown that the defendant knew that the executor had a legacy under the old will.

11. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 374)—EVIDENCE—OTHER OFFENSES—MOTIVE—PROOF OF OTHER OFFENSES.

In a prosecution for homicide, where it was sought to show motive by showing that defendant had killed another person, evidence held not to substantially prove that defendant had killed that other person.

12. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 371)—EVIDENCE—OTHER OFFENSES—INTENT.

Where a physician was accused of murder by administering a poisoned capsule, evidence that he administered to others capsules containing the identical poison and with the same effect is admissible to show intent; but, where the post mortem of the deceased person for whose death he was on trial showed the presence of strychnine and cyanide, and the post mortem in the other case failed to show cyanide and only showed a trace of strychnine, evidence of the last transaction is not admissible, for the fact that defendant gave to others a capsule containing a different poison would not tend to obviate the possibility of mistake or accident in the first case.

13. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 371)—EVIDENCE—OTHER OFFENSES.

In a prosecution for homicide by means of poisoned capsules, the state may, in its case in chief, introduce evidence of identical crimes to show the intent with which the defendant administered the capsule in question.

14. HOMICIDE (§ 7)—MOTIVE—MURDER.

Where it is demonstrated that the defendant murdered the deceased, no question of motive need arise.

15. HOMICIDE (§ 166)—EVIDENCE—MOTIVE.

Where a defendant denies that he committed the act, motive is important as tending to show guilt, while absence tends to show innocence.

16. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 371)—EVIDENCE—OTHER OFFENSES—MOTIVE.

Where a physician was accused of murdering his wife's uncle, evidence that, after the uncle was dead, the physician killed or attempted to kill his wife's immediate family, who received legacies from the uncle and from whom the wife would inherit, was admissible to show motive for the first murder; the death of the other members of the family being a necessary step to secure the uncle's money.

17. HOMICIDE (§ 236) — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY.

Failure to prove by chemical analysis that poison was in the organs of one supposed to have been poisoned is most persuasive evidence, if not conclusive, that the deceased was not poisoned.

18. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 374)—HOMICIDE (§ 269) —EVIDENCE—OTHER OFFENSES—PROOF.

Where it was sought to establish motive by showing that the defendant had killed another person, evidence held not to substantially show that he had committed the second murder, and not to be sufficient to go to the jury as proof of motive of the offense for which he was on trial.

19. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 374)—EVIDENCE—OTHER OFFENSES—PROOF.

Where a physician was accused of murdering one member of a family, evidence that he attempted to poison another member of the same family, offered as proof of motive, held insufficient to substantially show the attempt.

20. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 374)—EVIDENCE—OTHER OFFENSES.

Where defendant, a physician, was accused of poisoning his wife's uncle, and it was sought to show motive by showing that he inoculated the remaining members of her family with germs, evidence held insufficient to establish that defendant inoculated them.

21. HOMICIDE (§ 166)—EVIDENCE—INFERENCES BASED ON INFERENCES.

Where a physician was accused of murdering his wife's uncle, and to show motive evidence was introduced that he later attempted to inoculate other members of the wife's family with typhoid germs, expecting to poison those sick with typhoid, this evidence was inadmissible, being an inference based on an inference.

22. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 374)—EVIDENCE—OTHER OFFENSES—PRELIMINARY PROOF.

Where evidence of other crimes is admitted, it need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the other crimes were committed, yet, before such evidence is admitted, the trial court should satisfy itself either from a preliminary hearing or from offers of proof that the evidence substantially establishes the other crimes.

23. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 485)—OPINION EVIDENCE—EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS — HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS.

Though in some cases, such as insanity, an expert may give his conclusions, a hypothetical question to an expert witness, when the facts upon which it is based are in issue, should not call for an opinion or conclusion as to the facts directly in issue, and hence it was erroneous to ask an expert, testifying in a poison case, as to what in his opinion the man died from.

24. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 485)—OPINION EVIDENCE—EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS — HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION.

A hypothetical question to an expert witness on facts assumed from the testimony is not objectionable because it did not include all the facts testified to; that being a matter for cross-examination.

25. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 448)—EVIDENCE—ADMISSIBILITY—OPINIONS.

Where a physician on trial for poisoning a patient was accused of trying to kill a whole family, evidence that another physician, who was attending the same family, gave orders that all the medicines in the house should be destroyed, and the reasons for a second physician invading the defendant's office and removing certain germs found there, and conversations between the nurses and the physician who ordered the medicines destroyed, which took place in the defendant's absence, and that certain of the nurses would not stay with the patients if the defendant attended them, and that one of the nurses carried her medicines in her shirt waist when the defendant was in the house, was inadmissible, being opinion evidence, getting before the jury that these persons had condemned and found the defendant guilty.

26. CRIMINAL LAW (§§ 419, 420)—EVIDENCE—ADMISSIBILITY—HEARSAY.

On the trial of a physician accused of poisoning a patient, testimony that there was no disagreement among the physicians, who performed the autopsy upon the deceased patient one being dead and others absent, was inadmissible as hearsay.

27. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 656)—TRIAL—REMARKS OF COURT.

It was error for the court to remark concerning a witness that, "When she said she...

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