Stoneham v. Rushen

• Decision Date: 24 November 1982
• Citation: 188 Cal.Rptr. 130,137 Cal.App.3d 729
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Elvry STONEHAM, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Ruth RUSHEN, etc., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 53017.

Page 130

188 Cal.Rptr. 130

137 Cal.App.3d 729

Elvry STONEHAM, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Ruth RUSHEN, etc., Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 53017.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Nov. 24, 1982.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., William D. Stein, Asst. Atty. Gen., Karl S. Mayer, Thomas P. Dove, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

Michael Satris, Donald Specter, Prison Law Office, San Quentin, for plaintiffs and respondents.

RACANELLI, Presiding Justice.

This appeal arises against the following background: Under the provisions of the Penal Code (to which all statutory references apply unless otherwise noted) the Director of Corrections (Director), as manager of the state prison system, is charged with the responsibility for the "care, custody, treatment, training, discipline and employment" of all prisoners (§ 5054). Upon arrival at a state prison facility, an inmate is required to undergo an examination of his personal background which thereafter serves as a basis of the Director's decision to "classify [the prisoner] and determine the prison in which the [prisoner] shall be confined." (§ 5068.) The prisoner may also undergo reexaminations to determine whether existing orders should be modified. (§ 5068.)

Historically this classification process entailed an evaluation by a classification committee of the inmate's offense, personal life history and institutional behavior. In February 1980, however, pursuant to an "administrative bulletin" from the Director, the staff of the Department of Corrections (Department) began to employ a classification score sheet (Form 839) for new male inmates and a classification review sheet (Form 840) for previously classified male inmates in order to compile a numerical score. That score is employed by the Department for purposes of determining the proper level of custody and place of confinement as well as for planning and budgeting considerations. ¹

On April 18, 1980, the Director's predecessor in office adopted regulations broadly defining the classification process. (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 15, §§ 3375-3376.) On June 25, 1980, the Director issued a superseding administrative bulletin reflecting changes made in Forms 839 and 840 and expressly acknowledging that the promulgated score sheets constituted "an integral part in the development of the new classification system."

On November 17, 1980, respondents Stoneham, a San Quentin inmate, and the Prison Law Office, an incorporated association, filed a petition for writ of mandate and declaratory relief seeking to halt implementation of this new classification system until the Director had complied with the notice and hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (Act). (See Gov.Code, § 11342 et seq.). ²

On November 19, 1980, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order restraining the Director from making involuntary transfers of San Quentin inmates under the challenged classification system (excluding permissible transfers for reasons of institutional security).

On December 8, 1980, in response to the restraining order, the Director purported to issue an "emergency" regulation without notice as authorized under Government Code section 11346.1. That action resulted in a continuance of the hearing on the order to show cause to allow briefing on the issue of emergency.

On December 17, 1980, the Office of Administrative Law ordered the repeal of the emergency regulation pursuant to Government Code section 11349.6. Thereafter the Director argued for the first time in the trial court that the Act did not apply to the classification rules.

Meanwhile, on December 17, 1980, the trial court entered an interim judgment mandating the Director to discontinue involuntary transfers based solely upon the challenged regulations (excluding classification of new inmates and consensual transfers.)

On December 30, 1980, in response to the terms of the interim judgment, petitioners filed a first amended petition seeking the same relief while challenging respondents' claim of emergency in enacting the proposed classification scheme.

On February 26, 1981, following further hearing, the trial court entered its final judgment granting a peremptory writ commanding the Director to cease classification and involuntary transfer of inmates under the challenged rules and regulations contained in the administrative bulletins pending proof of satisfactory compliance with the provisions of the Act. ³ The Director thereafter filed her notice of appeal.

Venue

Preliminarily we address the Director's contention that proper venue lay in the county of her official residence, namely, Sacramento. (Code Civ.Proc., § 395.) Since the underlying litigation seeks to compel the Director to enact a rule or regulation in compliance with the Act in Sacramento County, it is argued, trial venue in Marin County is improper.

Under the relevant venue provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, an action against a public officer must be tried in "the county in which the cause, or some part thereof, arose...." (§ 393.) ⁴ In Cecil v. Superior Court (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 793, 140 P.2d 125 [upholding local venue in licensee's mandamus action to set aside Department of Agriculture's revocation order executed in Sacramento County] the court focused on the locus of the injury by enforcement of the order in determining venue under section 393, subdivision (b), reasoning that "It is where the shaft strikes [a citizen], not where it is drawn, that counts.... Surely a cause of action does not arise in the county in which a state officer happens to affix his name to an order which is to become operative in another county." (Id., at p. 799, 140 P.2d 125.) (Accord Duval v. Contractors State License Board (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 532, 535, 271 P.2d 194.) The Cecil rule confirming venue in the county in which the alleged injury occurs as a result of official action has been consistently reinforced by our highest state court. (See Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 529, 538-539, 542, 91 Cal.Rptr. 57, 476 P.2d 457; accord Tharp v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 496, 502-503, 186 Cal.Rptr. 335, 651 P.2d 1141.)

As noted, the official action complained of is the Director's implementation of a classification system without compliance with the provisions of the Act. Although the Director's actions may have occurred in the County of Sacramento, the effects of such action (reclassification of the individually named plaintiffs and threatened transfer to another facility) occurred in Marin County, the county in which the resulting injury was sustained. (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 529, at p. 542, 91 Cal.Rptr. 57, 476 P.2d 457.) ⁵ We conclude that Marin County was the proper place for trial.

Mootness

The record discloses that since the date of entry of judgment, the Director initiated proceedings under the Act to amend the 1980 regulations and to incorporate the classification scoring process. ⁶ Although adoption of the amended regulations would appear to fulfill the conditions of the judgment, the parties contend that the instant appeal is not moot because unsettled questions remain as to the scope and effect of the Act in relation to the administrative bulletins implementing the new classification process. We agree and consider such unresolved questions only insofar as the matters are properly before us.

Compliance with the Act

The primary question is whether the Director was required to comply with the notice and hearing requirements of the Act (Gov.Code, § 11342 et seq.) before issuing "administrative bulletins" implementing the new standardized classification system established under the regulations. As earlier noted, the Director is statutorily empowered to examine each prisoner and thereupon to classify the prisoner to determine the prison in which he will be confined. (§ 5068.) The Director is further authorized to "prescribe and amend rules and regulations for the administration of the prisons." (§ 5058.) The Legislature has expressly declared that such rules and regulations must be promulgated and filed in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act. (§ 5058.)

But, not all directives are subject to the Act. The Act does not apply to (1) a rule relating "only to the internal management of the state agency" or (2) "any form prescribed by a state agency or any instructions relating to the use of the form." (Gov.Code, § 11342, subd. (b).)

The Director argues that the procedural details contained in the administrative bulletins merely implement the statement of policy set forth in Regulation 3375 and fall within either or both of the statutory exemptions. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, steadfastly insist that because the classification system determines the custody level of a prisoner and the institution in which he will be housed, the critical point-scoring system represents a rule of general application which must be adopted in compliance with the Act. We agree.

In Armistead v. State Personnel Board (1978) 22 Cal.3d 198, 149 Cal.Rptr. 1, 583 P.2d 744, the court determined that a board rule relating to an employee's withdrawal resignation did not fall within the "internal management" exemption. The court reasoned that the implementing rule involving termination of employment was "a matter of import to all state civil service employees. It is not a rule governing the board's internal affairs." (Id., at p. 203, 149 Cal.Rptr. 1, 583 P.2d 744; see also Ligon v. State Personnel Board (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 583, 176 Cal.Rptr. 717 [policy relating to out-of-class experience].) In so holding the Supreme Court cited with approval our decision in City of San Marcos v. California Com. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 383, 131 Cal.Rptr. 804, involving a state agency's...