Gastineau v. Fleet Mortg. Corp.
| Decision Date | 23 February 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-3145,96-3145 |
| Citation | 137 F.3d 490 |
| Parties | 79 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 485, 72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,220, 48 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1197 Kim GASTINEAU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FLEET MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Scott Quick, Indianapolis, IN, Margaret M. Landers (argued), Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Robert L. McLaughlin (argued), Michael Rabinowitch, Wooden & McLaughlin, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
Kim Gastineau sued his former employer Fleet Mortgage Corporation and three of its employees for sexual discrimination under Title VII. The district court dismissed the individual defendants. Gastineau appeals that decision, as well as the district court's decisions not to admit certain evidence and not to grant relief from the judgment. We affirm.
Kim Gastineau worked as a loan originator at Fleet Mortgage Company ("Fleet") from September 1991 until Fleet terminated his employment in November 1992. Loan originators at Fleet solicit mortgage business and take loan applications. Loan originators work on commission, which they receive only when a loan closes. After taking a loan application, loan originators hand the application over to a loan processor who verifies the information in the application and obtains any needed documentation. Fleet assigned Katrina Johnson to process Gastineau's loan applications.
Gastineau claims that during his year at Fleet, Johnson sexually harassed him. Gastineau claims Johnson would frequently wear low-cut blouses and short skirts and sit on his desk to expose her breasts and underwear to him or put her foot in his crotch. He also claims that she frequently called him at home to discuss romantic or sexual matters and would often leave him voice mails or answering machine messages of a similar nature. Gastineau alleged that Johnson refused to process his loan applications unless he agreed to have sex with her. Johnson denied ever harassing Gastineau; rather, she asserts it was he who pursued a relationship with her.
Gastineau allegedly complained on several occasions to the Indianapolis branch manager, Julie Trimble, about Johnson's behavior. Gastineau alleged that on November 16, 1992, Trimble called Gastineau into her office and handed him a memorandum (the "Trimble Memorandum") which read:
To: Dan Negele
From: Julie Trimble
Date: November 16, 1992
Was advised by Kim that Katrina continues to harass him in the office. I know that it goes on, she obviously has a thing for him she wont [sic] let go. I'm tired of hearing him complain about it. I think we should get rid of him, it's easier to hire a new [loan originator] than find a processor right now.
Talk to you about it on Friday.
Plaintiff's Tr. Exh. 1, Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 884 F.Supp. 310 (S.D.Ind.1994). Gastineau alleged that he also received a copy of this memorandum in the mail from Fleet's corporate headquarters in January 1993. While Trimble admitted at trial that the memorandum appears to bear her signature, she denied ever writing it, signing it, or seeing it before the beginning of this litigation. She also denied that Gastineau ever complained to her, verbally or in writing, about sexual harassment in the office.
Fleet's regional manager Dan Negele discharged Gastineau over the telephone on November 20, 1992. Gastineau allegedly told Negele during that conversation that Johnson was harassing him. Negele denied that Gastineau ever complained to him about sexual harassment in the office. Furthermore, Negele denied ever seeing the Trimble Memorandum before the litigation, even though it was addressed to him.
Gastineau experienced other problems during his employment at Fleet. In July 1992, Fleet asked all loan originators to sign new compensation agreements. Gastineau objected. In September 1992, Fleet began requiring that loan originators match refinance loans with purchase loans. Gastineau also objected to this change.
Gastineau talked at the office about lawsuits he had filed against former employers. He hinted that he might sue Fleet as well. On one occasion, he walked out of Fleet's office announcing he was going to see his attorney. On another occasion, he brought a gun to work. This line of discussion and the gun incident prompted Trimble to keep a diary on Gastineau in case he sued Fleet.
Gastineau did in fact sue Fleet claiming it violated Title VII, which prohibits sexual discrimination in the workplace. He also sued Trimble, Negele, and Johnson individually. The individual defendants moved to dismiss the counts against them, and the district court granted that motion.
Gastineau testified that he suffered severe emotional distress due to the sexual harassment and his unfounded discharge. Three psychiatric experts testified that Gastineau suffered various psychological harms resulting from the harassment at Fleet. However, trial testimony revealed that Gastineau never told these experts about unsavory events with his former employers other than Fleet or the lawsuits against those employers.
One of the conflicts with a former employer, Railroadmen's Federal Savings & Loan ("Railroadmen's"), revolved around a pay dispute. Gastineau claims that a contract between him and Railroadmen's (the "Railroadmen's Contract") specifies certain terms of compensation with which Railroadmen's now refuses to comply. In fact, the Railroadmen's agent whose signature appears at the bottom of the contract denies making this contract with Gastineau. He agrees that his signature appears on the document, but he is unable to explain how it arrived there. Fleet introduced evidence of the Railroadmen's Contract and the possibility that it is a fraudulent document to show Gastineau's intent and motive of using fraudulent documents in litigation with his employers.
The jury found for Fleet on all counts, and the district court entered judgment for Fleet. Thirty-one days later, Gastineau filed a pro se motion to Correct Errors and to Set Aside Jury Verdict, which the district court treated as a motion for relief from judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). In this motion, Gastineau brought to the court's attention newly discovered evidence and allegations of misconduct by Fleet's witnesses and counsel. The district court denied Gastineau's motion. Gastineau appeals to this Court.
Gastineau raises three issues on appeal. First, he questions the district court's decision to dismiss the individual defendants. Second, he argues that the court erred in admitting evidence of his lawsuits against other employers and of the Railroadmen's Contract. And third, he asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for relief from judgment.
Gastineau originally named as defendants Fleet, Johnson, Trimble, and Negele. He asserted that the individual defendants, as well as Fleet, should be liable under Title VII as "employers" as that term is defined in the statute. After a thorough analysis, the district court concluded that although the Seventh Circuit had not yet determined whether individual employees can be liable under Title VII, the clear trend is to interpret Title VII not to impose liability on individual employees. As such, the district court granted the individual defendants' motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
"We review a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Mallett v. Wisconsin Div. of Vocational Rehabilitation, 130 F.3d 1245, 1248 (7th Cir.1997). "[A] complaint [or part of a complaint] should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
The district court concluded that Gastineau could prove no facts making the individuals liable. The court recognized that the covered entity under Title VII is the "employer," defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added). The district court noted and followed the current trend in other courts to interpret the statute not as imposing personal liability on agents, but as invoking the doctrine of respondeat superior to make employers responsible for the actions of their agents. See Gastineau, 884 F.Supp. at 313. The court correctly anticipated our ruling on this precise issue in an unrelated case.
In Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir.1995), a female employee sued her male supervisor for sexual harassment under Title VII. The district court granted the supervisor's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. We affirmed that decision, holding that while Title VII's definition of "employer" does include the term "agent," Congress intended only for employers to be liable for their agent's actions under the traditional respondeat superior doctrine, not for agents to be personally liable. See id. at 554. Williams controls the case before us, and the district court correctly dismissed the individual defendants as not covered by Title VII.
Gastineau filed a motion in limine requesting that Fleet be forbidden from presenting any evidence regarding the Railroadmen's Contract or other lawsuits that Gastineau has brought against his former employers. The district court denied the motion with regard to the other lawsuits. It also denied the motion with regard to the Railroadmen's Contract, but provided that Fleet may be allowed to present evidence of the...
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