Rheinfrank v. Abbott Labs., Inc.

• Citation: 137 F.Supp.3d 1035
• Decision Date: 02 October 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:13-cv-144
• Parties: Rheinfrank, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

137 F.Supp.3d 1035

Rheinfrank, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Abbott Laboratories, Inc., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-cv-144

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.

Filed October 2, 2015

137 F.Supp.3d 1036

Barry David Jacobson Levy, O'Connor Acciani & Levy, Calvin S. Tregre, Jr., David C. Harman, Janet Gilligan Abaray, Melanie Sue Bailey, Sanna-Rae Taylor, Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh & Jardine, P.C., Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiff.

Kathleen F. Sullivan Hardway, Andrea S. Andrews, Christina Lee Gaarder, Dino S. Sangiamo, Jason C. Rose, Jason Sayers, James E. Gray, John A. McCauley, Michael B. MacWilliams, Paul Farrell Strain, Stephen E. Marshall, Thomasina E. Poirot, Venable LLP, Baltimore, MD, Brian J. Mooney, Gordon & Rees LLP, San Francisco, CA, Jeffrey Daniel Geoppinger, Joseph P. Thomas, Ulmer & Berne LLP, Cincinnati, OH, for Defendants.

Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Order Pursuant to Rule 60 Based Upon Fraud, Misrepresentation and Misconduct; and Request for Sanctions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927

Judge Susan J. Dlott, United States District Court

This is a product liability case under Ohio law arising from Plaintiff Pamela Rheinfrank's ingestion of the antiepileptic drug, Depakote¹ , during her pregnancy with her daughter, M.B.D. Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Order Pursuant to Rule 60 Based Upon Fraud, Misrepresentation and Misconduct; and Request for Sanctions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (Doc. 259). The Court has reviewed the Motion, Defendants' Response in Opposition (Doc. 265), and Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of their Motion (Doc. 267). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion will be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 10, 2015, the Court issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Rheinfrank v. Abbott Lab., Inc. , No. 13–cv–144, –––F. Supp. 3d ––––, 2015 WL 4743056 (S.D.Ohio Aug. 10, 2015). Plaintiffs' challenge the Court's granting summary judgment for the Defendants on Plaintiffs' strict liability design defect claim in its Order.

Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), because Defendants misrepresented the record evidence applicable to their design defect claim, which influenced the Court's ruling. Plaintiffs also argue Defendants mistake the law on design defect. Plaintiffs contend they are entitled to sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court's inherent authority. In response, Defendants argue Plaintiffs have failed to identify admissible evidence

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in response to Abbott's argument that there was an absence of proof on an element of their design defect claim. Further, Defendants contend Plaintiffs have not met the demanding standard for reconsideration of a judgment under Rule 60(b)(3), and there are no proper grounds for sanctions.

II. STANDARDS GOVERNING MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION

A. Rule 60(b)(3)

Plaintiffs moved the Court for relief from its judgment on their design defect claim under Fed. R. Civ. P 60(b), which states:

(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

'Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Plaintiffs assert that under Rule 60(b)(3), they must, as the moving party, demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the three types of misbehavior identified under Rule 60(b)(3) occurred. Jordan v. Paccar, Inc. , No. 95–3478, 97 F.3d 1452 (Table), 1996 WL 528950, at *8 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1996). Once demonstrated, "[the court's] abiding concern with the finality of judgments leads to the conclusion that the non-moving party should be permitted to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the misbehavior which occurred had no prejudicial effect on the outcome of the litigation." Id."If the non-moving party cannot make such a showing, however, then the moving party should be granted appropriate relief." Id.

The Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiffs move the Court for reconsideration under the wrong rule, as Rule 60 applies only to "final" orders, rendering it inapplicable to the court's ruling on summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 ; see Payne v. The Courier – Journal , 193 Fed.Appx. 397, 400 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming district court's denial of Rule 60(b) motion on the basis that it was not a proper basis for a challenge to a motion to transfer, which is not a final order); McWhorter v. ELSEA, Inc. , No. 2:00–cv–473, 2006 WL 3483964 (S.D.Ohio Nov. 10, 2006) ("an order of partial summary judgment is in nature"); see 12 Moore's Federal Practice § 60.23 ("Rule 60(b) does not govern relief from interlocutory orders...."). Even the case cited by Plaintiffs in support of their motion, Paccar, emphasizes the overriding concern in regarding the finality of a judgment being challenged with respect to a Rule 60 motion. 97 F.3d 1452 (Table), 1996 WL 528950, at *8. On this basis alone, Plaintiffs' motion should be denied.

b. Rule 59(e)

However, the Court will consider the motion from the perspective of Rule 59(e) governing motions for reconsideration. "[D]istrict courts have inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders and reopen any part of a case before entry of a final judgment." Dunn v. Savage (In reSaffady) , 524 F.3d 799, 803 (6th Cir.2008)

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(citing Mallory v. Eyrich , 922 F.2d 1273, 1282 (6th Cir.1991) ). This inherent power to vacate orders prior to entry of final judgment is recognized by Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and is "distinct from the power explicitly granted by Rule 60 to reopen cases well after final been entered." Id.

Motions for reconsideration are treated as motions to amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There are three grounds for amending a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) : "(1) to accommodate, an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at the time of trial; and (3) to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice." Berridge v. Heiser , 993 F.Supp. 1136, 1146–47 (S.D.Ohio 1997)...