Texas Ry Co v. Southern Pac Ry Co

• Decision Date: 03 November 1890
• Parties: TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. SOUTHERN PAC. RY. CO
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

137 U.S. 48

11 S.Ct. 10

34 L.Ed. 614

TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. SOUTHERN PAC. RY. CO.

November 3, 1890.

[Statement of Case from pages 48-53 intentionally omitted] W. W. Howe and John F. Dillon, for plaintiff in error.

H. J. Leovy and J. P. Paxton Blair, for defendant in error.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The decision of the supreme court of Louisiana was not against the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, nor in favor of the validity of a statute of, or an anthority exercised under, any state, drawn in question on the ground of repugnancy to the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States; and, in order to maintain jurisdiction because of the denial by the state court of any title, right, privilege, or immunity claimed under the constitution or any treaty or statute of the United States, it must appear on the record that such title, right, privilege, or immunity was 'specially set up or claimed' at the proper time and in the proper way. It is contended that the plaintiff company had the right, under the acts of congress by which it was incorporated, to make the contract in question, and hence that the decision that such contract was illegal and contrary to public policy constituted a denial of a right or privilege conferred by a statute of the United States; and also that, as the agreement related to earnings from interstate as well as from intrastate traffic, such decision was an interference with the freedom of interstate commerce, within the prohibition of the commerce clause of the constitution of the United States. But it does not appear that either of these propositions was presented to the trial court in any way, or advanced in the supreme court, until urged in the petition for a rehearing. The title, right, privilege, or immunity was not specially set up or claimed at the proper time and in the proper way. It is true that, under the law of Louisiana, a judgment of the supreme court does not become final until after six judicial days from the rendering of the judgment have elapsed, within which time a dissatisfied party may apply for a new hearing of the cause; but it does not follow that new grounds for decision will be allowed to be presented, or will be considered on such application, and the general rule is otherwise. Code Prac. La. arts. 538, 539, 547, 548, 911, 912; Rightor v. Phelps, 1 Rob. (La.) 330; Stark v. Burke, 9 La. Ann. 344; Caldwell v. Insurance Co., 19 La. 48; Hanson v. City Council, 18 La. 309. And, while the court is required to state the reasons of its judgments, it is not obliged to give reasons for refusing a new hearing. Code Prac. La. arts. 909, 914. We are of opinion that in Louisiana, as elsewhere, a title, right, privilege, or immunity is not properly clamed, under the act of congress, when suggested for the first time in a petition for a rehearing, after judgment. The case of Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall, 493, cited for plaintiff in error, is not to the contrary. The petition referred to there seems to have been simply one for review on appeal, and not a petition filed after the case had been decided by the supreme court, and the record showed the decision of the federal question by both tribunals. In the case at bar, it does not appear in direct terms or by necessary intendment that these points were brought to the attention of either of the courts prior to the entry of the judgment of affirmance. If, therefore, the...