Cope v. Cope

Citation137 U.S. 682,34 L.Ed. 832,11 S.Ct. 222
PartiesCOPE v. COPE
Decision Date19 January 1891
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

J. G. Sutherland, for appellant.

R. N. Baskin, for appellee.

Mr. Justice BROWN, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellant, George H. Cope, who is admitted to be the illegitimate child of Thomas Cope, by Margaret Cope, his polygamous wife, claims the right to inherit a share of his father's estate under a territorial statute of Utah, enacted in 18 2, which provided as follows: 'Sec. 25. Illegitimate children and their mothers inherit in like manner [as legitimate] from the father, whether acknowledged by him or not, provided it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that he was the father of such illegitimate child or childre.' While this statute is an innovation upon the common law, and in some particulars a novelty in legislation, we perceive no objection to its validity. By section 6 of the act of September 9, 1850, (9 St. at Large, 453,) establishing a territorial government for Utah, it is provided: 'That the legislative power of said territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, consistent with the constitution of the United States, and the provisions of this act; but no law shall be passed in terfering with the primary disposal of the soil; no tax shall be imposed upon the property of the United States; nor shall the lands or other property of non-residents be taxed higher than the lands or other property of residents. All the laws passed by the legislative assembly and governor shall be submitted to the congress of the United States, and, if disapproved, shall be null and of no effect.' With the exceptions noted in this section, the power of the territorial legislature was apparently as plenary as that of the legislature of a state. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 204, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 723. The distribution of and the right of succession to the estates of deceased persons are matters exclusively of state cognizance, and are such as were within the competence of the territorial legislature to deal with as it saw fit, in the absence of an inhibition by congress. Indeed, legislation of similar description is by no means unprecedented. By the laws of many states, natural children are permitted to inherit from the mother, and also from the father, in case of the after marriage of their parents, or where there are no lawful children, or where an adoption is made in due form, or where recognition is made by will; and, if the question of parentage be satisfactorily settled, there would seem to be power in the legislature to endow even the children of an adulterous intercourse with inheritable blood from the father. Legislation admitting illegitimate children to the right of succession is undoubtedly in derogation of the common law, and should be strictly construed, and hence it has generally been held that laws permitting such children, whose parents have since married, to inherit, do not apply to the fruits of an adulterous intercourse. Sams v. Sams' Adm'r, 85 Ky. 396, 3 S. W. Rep. 593. But, while it is the duty of the courts to put a construction upon statutes which shall, so far as possible, be consonant with good morals, we know of no legal principle which would authorize us to pronounce a statute of this kind, which is plain and unambiguous upon its face, void, by reason of its failure to conform to our own standard of social and moral obligations. Legislatures are as competent as courts to deal with these subjects, and, in fixing a standard of their own, are beyond our control. Thus in Brewer's Lessee v. Blougher, 14 Pet. 178, 198, it was said by Mr. Chief Justice TANEY, speaking for this court, that the expediency and moral tendency of a similar law was a question for the legislature, and not for this court; and it was held in that case that a statute of Maryland, endowing illegitimate children with inheritable blood, applied to such as were the offspring of an incestuous connection. It is true that the peculiar state of society existing at the time this act was passed, and still existing in the territory of Utah, renders a law of this kind much wider in its operation than in other states and territories, but it may be said in defense of this act that the children embracd by it are not responsible for this state of things, and that it is unjust to visit upon them the consequences of their parents' sins. To recognize the validity of the act is in the nature of a punishment upon the father, whose estate is thus diverted from its natural channel, rather than upon the child; while to hold it to be invalid is to treat the child as, in some sense, an outlaw and a particeps criminis.

It is contended by respondent, however, that even conceding the validiy o f this statute, it was abrogated and annulled by the anti-polygamy act of congress of July 1, 1862, (12 St. at Large, 501,) the second section of which annuls by title the ordinance for the incorporation of the Mormon Church, and then adds: 'And all other acts and parts of acts heretofore passed by the said legislative assembly of the territory of Utah, which establish, support, maintain, shield, or countenance polygamy, be, and the same hereby are, disapproved and annulled: provided, that this act shall be so limited and construed as not to affect or interfere with the right of property legally acquired under the ordinance heretofore mentioned, nor with the right 'to worship God according to the dictates of conscience,' but only to annul all acts and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
92 cases
  • Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Davidson
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • March 21, 1906
    ...passed it. Cannon's Adm'r v. Vaughan, 12 Tex. 401; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. (U. S.) 562, 11 L. Ed. 724; Cope v. Cope, 137 U. S. 682, 11 Sup. Ct. 222, 34 L. Ed. 832. (4) The character and nature of the tax is to be determined, not on the form of the agency through which it is to be c......
  • Parshall v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • March 22, 1911
    ... ... Law, par. 92, and note 5; Cope v. Cope, 137 U. S. 682, ... Page 766 ... 11 Sup. Ct. 222, 34 L. Ed. 832; U. S. v. Greathouse, 166 U. S. 601, 17 Sup. Ct. 701, 41 L. Ed. 1130 ... ...
  • Great Northern Ry Co v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • February 2, 1942
    ...the same subject.' Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S. 286, 309, 31 S.Ct. 578, 583, 584, 55 L.Ed. 738. See also Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682, 11 S.Ct. 222, 34 L.Ed. 832; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 11 L.Ed. 724. These statutes were approximately contemporaneous with petitioner......
  • Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • April 11, 1955
    ...by the territorial court of Utah, that the Territory was "restricted" to "rightful subjects of legislation". In Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682, 684, 11 S. Ct. 222, 34 L. Ed. 832, decided the following year, this Court held "With the exceptions noted in this section [such as 'no law shall be pas......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT