Cavin v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. C2-00-400.,C2-00-400.
• Citation: 138 F.Supp.2d 987
• Parties: Samuel CAVIN, Plaintiff, v. HONDA OF AMERICA MANUFACTURING, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

138 F.Supp.2d 987

Samuel CAVIN, Plaintiff, v. HONDA OF AMERICA MANUFACTURING, INC., Defendant.

No. C2-00-400.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

March 28, 2001.

John Spenceley Marshall, Columbus, OH, for plaintiff.

Mary Ellen Fairfield, Vorys Sater Seymour & Pease, Columbus, OH, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HOLSCHUH, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. (Record 5). Plaintiff responded to this motion (Record 6.), and Defendant filed a reply (Record 7). This motion has been fully briefed and is ready for the Court's consideration.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiff Samuel J. Cavin was employed by Defendant Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc. ("HAM") from May, 1991 to November, 1999. Plaintiff most recently worked as a production associate in HAM's assembly department. In June, 1999 Plaintiff missed several days of work due to a shoulder injury he sustained in a motorcycle accident. Pursuant to HAM's policy, Plaintiff called HAM's security desk each day he was absent from work under his physician's care. When Plaintiff returned to work on July 5, 1999, HAM gave him a leave coordination packet and disciplined him for not submitting the packet prior to his return. After having his physician supply the information requested in the packet, Plaintiff returned the materials to HAM within the time requested by HAM.

Several months later in October, 1999, Plaintiff requested a leave packet for three days of leave, due to the same shoulder injury. Plaintiff completed all of the paperwork he was required to complete, and then gave the packet to his physician to complete the portions requiring medical information. Plaintiff then submitted the packet to HAM within the time allotted by HAM. However, on Friday, October 22, 1999, HAM called Plaintiff at home and informed him that his physician had not filled out all of the paperwork. HAM instructed Plaintiff to pick up the incomplete paperwork, have it completed by his physician, and return it to HAM. Plaintiff injured himself at work the following day, which was a Saturday. On the next business day, Plaintiff went to HAM's leave coordination department and picked up workers' compensation information and the incomplete leave packet. Plaintiff contends that HAM did not inform him of a deadline for resubmitting the leave packet materials.

Plaintiff took the incomplete leave packet materials to his physician, who was unsure of what information he needed to provide. In order to determine what information the physician should provide, Plaintiff telephoned HAM, and spoke with an employee regarding the forms. This employee informed Plaintiff that he was required to submit the forms to HAM by 11:30 p.m. that night. Plaintiff observed his physician complete the forms and begin to fax them to HAM. That evening, Plaintiff called HAM's leave coordination department to verify that HAM had received the documents faxed to it by his physician. A HAM employee told Plaintiff that the leave department was closed and that he could not check the fax machine. Plaintiff contacted his physician the next day, and his physician confirmed that he faxed the documents to HAM.

During Plaintiff's leave for his workers' compensation injury, HAM contacted him and informed him that it had not received the faxed documents from his physician. HAM discharged Plaintiff on November 9, 1999 for twice violating its leave of absence policy by failing to submit leave documents within the allotted time. Plaintiff contends that he was not made aware of HAM's policy that he only had two days to return the incomplete medical certification until the day the paperwork was due.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on April 3, 2000, asserting three causes of action against HAM. Plaintiff asserts that HAM violated the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., when it discharged him, and when its agents interfered with his rights under the FMLA. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that HAM wrongfully discharged him in violation of Ohio public policy. (Complaint, Record 1). HAM filed an answer to this Complaint on June 2, 2000. (Record 2).

On June 23, 2000, HAM filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff's Ohio public policy claim for failure to state a claim upon relief can be granted. (Record 5). In its motion, HAM asserts that the weight of authority holds that Plaintiff may not base his state public policy claim on an alleged violation of the FMLA, and that permitting Plaintiff to do so would allow Plaintiff to "thwart Congress' exclusive remedial scheme by asserting an FMLA claim under the guise of an Ohio `public policy' claim." (Record 5 at 2). Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to HAM's motion on July 6,2000. (Record 6). HAM filed a reply to Plaintiff's memorandum on July 19, 2000. (Record 7).

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant HAM moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Ohio public policy claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of a motion under this rule is to test the sufficiency of the complaint. When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded material allegations in the complaint as true. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone, 492 U.S. 229, 249, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989); Dunn v. Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 125 (6th Cir.1982). Although the Court must liberally construe the complaint in favor of the party opposing the motion to dismiss, see Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125-126, n. 5, 95 S.Ct. 1524, 44 L.Ed.2d 15 (1975); Davis H. Elliot Co. v. Caribbean Utils. Co., 513 F.2d 1176, 1182 (6th Cir.1975), it will not accept conclusions of law or unwarranted inferences cast in the form of factual allegations. See Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121, 124 (6th Cir.1971). The Court will, however, indulge all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from the pleading. See Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076-77 n. 6 (6th Cir.1972).

When determining the sufficiency of a complaint in the face of a motion to dismiss, a court will apply the principle that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 249, 109 S.Ct. 2893; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). See also McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 246, 100 S.Ct. 502, 62 L.Ed.2d 441 (1980); Decker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 205 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2000); Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir.1983). A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is directed solely to the complaint itself. See Roth Steel Prods., 705 F.2d at 155; Sims v. Mercy Hospital, 451 F.2d 171, 173 (6th Cir.1971). Thus, the focus is on whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims, rather than on whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See McDaniel v. Rhodes, 512 F.Supp. 117, 120 (S.D.Ohio 1981). The Court will grant a motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) only if there is an absence of law to support a claim of the type made, or of facts sufficient to make a valid claim, or if on the face of the complaint there is an insurmountable bar to relief indicating that the plaintiff does not have a claim. See generally Rauch v. Day & Night Mfg., 576 F.2d 697, 702 (6th Cir.1978); Brennan v. Rhodes, 423 F.2d 706 (6th Cir.1970).

Thus, for purposes of this motion, Plaintiff's compliance with the requirements of the FMLA is irrelevant; instead, the issue is whether, assuming Plaintiff complied with the FMLA, Plaintiff is entitled as a matter of law to assert a wrongful discharge claim under Ohio law based solely on the policy embodied in the FMLA.

II. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

Plaintiff claims he was wrongfully discharged in violation of Ohio public policy, and asserts that he should be able to maintain a wrongful discharge claim based on the FMLA because the FMLA does not provide for punitive damages or compensatory damages based on emotional distress. (Memorandum in Opposition at 7). Defendant asserts that the clear weight of authority indicates that Plaintiff may not base public policy claims upon purported violations of the FMLA and that Congress intended the remedies provided in the FMLA to be exclusive. (Motion to Dismiss at 2). For these reasons, Defendant moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claim that he was wrongfully discharged in violation of Ohio public policy.

Ohio law recognizes the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. See Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981, Syl. ¶ 2 (1990). Although Ohio law presumes that every employment relationship is at-will, an employment relationship cannot be terminated for a reason which is contrary to law. See Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150, Syl. ¶ 1 (1985).

To maintain a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, the plaintiff must establish: (1) a clear public policy manifested in the Ohio or United States Constitutions, a statute or administrative regulation, or the common law (the "clarity element"); (2) that the dismissal of employees under similar circumstances would jeopardize the public policy (the "jeopardy element"); (3) that the discharge was motivated by conduct related to the public policy (the "causation element"), and (4) that the employer lacked a legitimate overriding business justification for the plaintiff's discharge (the ...