Brown v. Toombs
| Decision Date | 27 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-1333,97-1333 |
| Citation | 1998 WL 136185,139 F.3d 1102 |
| Parties | Carson Lynn BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Raymond G. TOOMBS, Warden; Peter W. Vidor, Named as Pete Vidor on complaint, Deputy Warden; Ray Palmer, ADW of Custody; T. Luna, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Carson Lynn Brown (briefed), Munising, MI, Plaintiff-Appellant pro se.
Linda M. Olivieri (briefed), Christine M. Campbell, Office of the Attorney General Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge, and MERRITT and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
Corrections Division, Lansing, MI, for Defendants-Appellees.
In this pro se prisoner case from Michigan brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the question is whether the prisoner has sufficiently alleged in his pleadings the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement contained in the recently enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The new statute provides in clear language that "no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 ... by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." The statute thus requires the exhaustion of all "available" state "administrative remedies" by the prisoner before a federal court may entertain and decide his § 1983 action. The prisoner here has sued on a number of grounds including placing him in "top-of-bed restraints," denial of medical treatment, food, water, and toilet facilities, denial of access to the courts, and interference with legal mail. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was in effect when the prisoner filed his complaint, although neither the prisoner, nor the state as defendant, nor the magistrate judge or the district judge took notice of its existence or acknowledged that the statute must now be enforced in prisoner litigation.
Forty-two U.S.C. § 1997e provides in part:
(a) Applicability of administrative remedies
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
(b) Failure of State to adopt or adhere to administrative grievance procedure
The failure of a State to adopt or adhere to an administrative grievance procedure shall not constitute the basis for an action under section 1997a or 1997c of this title.
(c) Dismissal
(1) The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
(2) In the event that a claim is, on its face, frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, the court may dismiss the underlying claim without first requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Prior to the enactment of the statute, no significant incentives existed to deter the filing of state prison petitions raising insubstantial issues, and so in federal courts each year prisoners file thousands of petitions and take thousands of appeals.
The new statute has extensive benefits. It recognizes that it is difficult to explain why we require full exhaustion of state remedies in habeas corpus cases involving life and liberty, but allow direct access in prison rights cases under § 1983. As Justice Stewart stated in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1837, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973):
Since these internal problems of...
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Steele v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 02-1492.
...the administrative proceeding and its outcome," Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir.2000) (citing Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir.1998)). These requirements are consistent with both the PLRA's provisions and generally applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ......
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White v. Fauver, Civil Action No. 97-5127 (D. N.J. 9/29/1998), Civil Action No. 97-5127.
...Additionally, "[d]istrict courts should enforce the exhaustion requirement sua sponte if not raised by the defendant." Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998). Sua sponte, this Court also notes that the PLRA arguably may apply to all of the claims made by all of the plaintiffs ......
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Grinter v. Knight
...Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 677 (6th Cir. 2005). 8. Jones v. Bock overruled Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the prisoner has the burden of demonstrating he has exhausted his administrative remedies in his complaint), B......
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White v. Fauver
...Additionally, "[d]istrict courts should enforce the exhaustion requirement sua sponte if not raised by the defendant." Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir.1998). Sua sponte, this Court also notes that the PLRA arguably may apply to all of the claims made by all of the plaintiffs i......